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ABSTRACT
The aim of the present research was to provide a theoretical, research, and 
measurement context to the notion that a commitment to belief leads to a positive 
outcome, particularly in terms of mental health. The present work seeks to test a 
number of hypotheses derived from a Jungian theoretical framework, but seeks to 
draw on modem personality, individual difference, cognitive and social 
psychological theory to critically examine findings.
A total of 14 studies (10 which use original data) are carried out that (1) 
develop a measure of commitment to belief (Chapter 2), (2) examine the reliability 
and validity of the commitment to belief measure (Chapters 2 and 3), (3) examine 
psychological correlates of the commitment to belief measure against measures 
thought to reflect Jungian descriptions (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), and (4) examine the 
relationship between commitment to belief and mental health within the context of 
modem theories of stress appraisal and coping style (Chapter 7 and 8).
The present findings suggest it may be possible to measure commitment to 
belief, and that a person scoring high on the commitment to belief scale tends to 
report: fewer depressive symptoms, less anxiety, less social dysfunction, fewer 
somatic symptoms, liking words that suggest completeness or wholeness, sometimes 
higher levels of extraversion, higher levels of optimism, using challenging primary 
appraisals, using a positive reinterpretation and growth coping style, and using their 
beliefs to deal with major life events.
Such findings suggest the development and measurement of a construct that 
has a relationship to a number of variables that can be interpreted within a Jungian 
framework of ideas. Future research is needed to examine the applied nature of the 
measurement of commitment to belief.
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Chapter 1: A theoretical context.
PREFACE: A Context for the Thesis
It may be necessaiy to provide some context for the following thesis. There seems to 
be two forms of PhD submission in present UK institutions; the first is through a 
studentship, whereby (under present guidelines), the student presents unpublished 
work, and the PhD is partly viewed as comprising research training leading to a 
researcher capable of publication. The second is submission of a PhD through 
publication, for established researchers, where a collection of articles is presented 
within an introduction/discussion context for consideration.
The present submission presents a mixture of both, as the submission 
comprises research that is entirely new, but is based firmly within the context of 
work that has already been published by the author. It is, therefore, important to note 
that the ideas for presenting an original contribution to the literature grew out of 
existing and published research work.
This impacts on the presentation of the PhD in two ways;
1. The work does not necessarily start from an outline of theory, review of 
relevant research, leading to an examination of several research ideas.
Rather, the work re-interprets/examines some present research (some of 
which is led by the author), then tries to provide a theoretical context for the 
present work, and then seeks to test and develop this context through the 
examination of research questions.1
2. The work does not represent a growth in research training around developing 
a range of methods; rather, there is a use of traditional quantitative and 
experimental methods to develop a research idea. As such, a quantitative 
methodology and outlook are already defined and expected within much of
1 In as much, this PhD is similar to the type o f  PhD which may come from commissioned 
work/project or a funded project which is extended into a PhD which is often found in 
educational and occupational psychology.
1
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the current research literature work, as to be consistent with existing 
research.2
Aside from these aspects, all the usual features of a PhD are present, with the work 
pulling from a range of literature across disciplines within the subject to provide an 
interpretation of recent research, a modem context to some very old ideas, an 
impetus for future research, and an original contribution to the psychological 
literature.
2 That is not to say that the quantitative analysis used in the present work is not advanced or inventive, 
with some work comprising qualitative aspects and representing the statistical examination of the 
goodness of fit of some psychological models.
Chapter 1: A theoretical context.
CHAPTER ONE
A theoretical context for findings supporting commitment to belief and
positive outcomes from belief
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The study of belief is not a new phenomena; however, interest has been re-generated 
and greatly increased over recent years. The shift in emphasis from philosophical 
theory (such as Foucault’s writings on belief systems [1970; 1980], and William 
James’s first links of belief to psychology [1902/1985]) towards the scientific study 
of belief has led to substantial and exciting progress in the understanding of belief 
and its effects on psychological well-being, and as a consequence, in some cases, the 
development of therapy techniques for relieving symptoms (cognitive therapy). In 
spite of the progress made, however, there are still very many inconsistencies in the 
research to date, and there is a lot more scope for improving our understanding. This 
is particularly the case with the research examining the relationship between belief as 
a function and positive effects on health. There appears to be very little research 
directly investigating the actual construct of belief (the energy, or dynamic of belief, 
behind the observable belief), and its relationship to psychological well-being, as 
opposed to specific belief and well-being (i.e. the direction of belief -  how the belief 
manifests itself), as well as little theoretical guidance as to the why and how belief 
affects health. As a step towards filling this apparent research void, this thesis seeks 
to systematically examine the relationship between commitment to a belief and its 
positive effects on well-being, whilst providing a theoretical context.
As a result of the research activity in the field of belief, several theories of 
how specific beliefs effect health have been proposed, and extensively tested. Belief, 
as with attitudes, has been considered as possessing a function, that is, that a person’s 
beliefs, and consequently their behaviours derived from these beliefs, serve the needs 
of the individual (e.g. Allport, 1960; Frankl, 1978; Jung, 1958; Maltby, Lewis, & 
Day, 1999; Maslow, 1971; Seligman, 1990; Thoreson, 1999; Scheier & Carver,
1985). Beliefs have been considered via a number of constructs, such as spirituality 
(Gartner, Larson & Allen, 1991; Jung, 1933; Maltby & Day, 2000; Westgate, 1996), 
religion (Crawford, Handal & Weiner, 1989; Gorsuch, 1988; Maltby & Day, 2000; in 
press; Maltby, Lewis & Day, 1999; Pargament, 1997; Sharkey & Maloney, 1986), 
more cognitive attitudes on belief, including Locus of Control (Findley & Cooper, 
1983; Lefcourt, 1982; Presson & Banassi, 1996), Just World Belief (Lemer, 1980; 
Miller & Mangan, 1983; Seligman, 1975), optimism (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; 
Carver & Scheier, 1981; 1982; Chang, Maydeu-Oliveras & D’Zurilla, 1997; Scheier 
& Carver, 1985), and Irrational Beliefs (Chang & Bridewell, 1998; Ellis, 1962;
4
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1995). Belief has been reported to have both beneficial and detrimental effects on a 
person’s well-being. These research areas are fully established, and are interesting 
because they demonstrate how particular beliefs have both positive and negative 
effects on the mental health of the individual, and suggest that certain individuals 
have a vulnerability to become anxious, depressed, or lower in self-esteem due to 
believing in certain ‘detrimental’, or ‘irrational’ beliefs (e.g. Ellis, 1962; 1995). 
However, alongside these supposed ‘negative’ effects on mental health, researchers 
have also shown that specific beliefs, such as religion and belief in good luck, also 
have ‘positive’ effects on the individual. If this is the case, as authors such as Darke 
and Freedman (1997), Maltby and Day (2000), Pargament (1997) have demonstrated, 
further research into the dynamic of the actual construct of belief is called for.
Belief, then, is a phenomenon that has many and varied consequences. 
Because of this, it is of great interest to psychologists, with emphasis around 
consequent behaviour, effects on general health, and psychological well-being. 
However, major considerations and overviews of belief tend towards considering 
them as specific, independent beliefs; not as how and why belief, as a construct, 
functions as it does, but how specific beliefs (such as religion, irrational beliefs, e.g. 
luck, etc.) are structured, formed or changed, and what psychological purpose these 
specific beliefs serve. The research reported in this thesis attempts to address recent 
findings that belief has a positive effect on mental health, and seeks to establish a 
theoretical context to why belief performs/functions in this way. Firstly, however, a 
discussion of the relevant literature will be presented, in order to further explain the 
need for this research.
The present chapter, then, is designed to look at two areas of belief (religion 
and luck) more closely, in order to present arguments for a programme of research. 
Though both areas of research, in religion and luck, are somewhat disparate and 
fragmented, certain elements emerge from these areas that (i) highlight the 
importance of belief to the well-being of the individual; (ii) demonstrate similarities 
in how they are presently conceptualised; and (iii) suggest how an overall 
interpretation of belief (how the underlying construct of belief is functioning in itself, 
and not how the manifested, specific, belief functions) may be required, and be 
applied to understand some recent theoretical speculations. There will then follow a
5
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presentation of how a theoretical context can be supplied by returning to the 
traditional theories of Jung. Finally, problems and concerns of the type of 
methodology needed to explore the programme of research will be addressed.
Firstly, however, various definitions of belief will be presented in order to outline 
how the word/construct of ‘belief will be used within this thesis, as well as a general 
theoretical context for how belief will be perceived and conceptualised.
Belief Definition
As with any research process, it is very useful to have a relatively clear 
conceptualisation of the phenomenon of interest. It would, therefore, be very useful 
to outline what belief might be, and how it will be conceived within this thesis.
The word ‘Belief is generally used in the standard dictionary sense for an 
emotional acceptance, or confidence, of some proposition, statement or doctrine 
(Reber, 1985). However, the term ‘Belief has many and varied conceptualisations 
within psychology, and the research literature concerning belief often uses the term 
‘belief in conjunction, or as well as, terms such as ‘opinion’ or ‘attitude’.
Opinion is generally a tentatively held and expressible point of view, and the 
term is usually used with the connotations of being intellectually held and based on 
at least some facts or data. These aspects can help, somewhat, to differentiate 
opinion from belief (where an emotional component is entailed), and from attitude 
(which has a much broader range of semantic implication).
According to Reber (1985), psychology regularly gets itself into stormy 
definitional waters, when referring to attitudes, no more so than when a term like 
‘attitude’ is used to denote a concept of fundamental importance in human behaviour 
and when the domain of reference turns out to be much more complex than the 
original researcher imagined. However, in traditional personality and social 
psychology, attitudes have taken on an explanatory role (rather than a descriptive 
one), whereas an attitude is viewed as some internal affective orientation that would 
explain the actions of a person. This meaning is basically one of intention, but
6
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entails several components, namely; cognitive (consciously held belief or opinion); 
affective (emotional tone or feeling); evaluative (positive or negative); and conative 
(disposition for action). Reber (1985) suggests that there is considerable dispute as 
to which of these components should be regarded as more, or less, important. 
Cognitive theorists usually maintain that the underlying belief is fundamental, 
behaviourally oriented theorists focus in the conative, and most other researchers feel 
that a combination of the affective and evaluative components are the critical ones. 
Exactly how the term is used in modem psychological literature will, thus, depend 
largely on the theoretical tilt on the writer. Finally, other authors, by attempting to 
rescue the term from its frizziness of usage, consider attitude as a response tendency, 
i.e. regard attitudes as things, which can only be inferred from observed behaviours 
(Reber, 1985).
Within the literature on belief, then, these three terms, particularly belief and 
attitude, consistently overlap, and it is impossible to review the literature without 
encountering both terms. Therefore, this thesis will also use both terms 
interchangeably, considering attitude within a more cognitive and affective domain,
i.e. as having emotional tone or feeling, and maintaining the underlying belief as 
fundamental. However, this thesis will attempt to use the term attitude, instead of 
belief, when discussing a suggested observable behaviour, in other words, when 
measuring belief.
A general theoretical context for belief
If there were a general theoretical context in which to understand this thesis, under 
which it will be argued that Jungian ideas can be used as a basis to test research 
questions relating to positive outcomes of belief, it would be placed generally within 
a functional theory of attitude.
Within a functional theory of attitude there is an emphasis on social attitudes 
and belief being seen as serving a purpose (Katz, 1960). Originally Katz (1960) 
suggested that attitudes and beliefs held by any individual serves any one of four 
personality components. These include the:
7
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1. Utilitarian function (Katz, 196), also known as Instrumental and 
Adaptive (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), in which people are motivated by 
securing positive outcomes and resisting negative outcomes,
2. Knowledge function with which attitudes are used to supply a 
standard frame of reference for organising and simplifying 
information from the world.
3. Ego defensive function, which emphasises the psychoanalytic 
principle of the use of defence mechanisms to preserve self-concept 
against internal and external threats.
4. Value expressive function, which emphasises the importance of 
attitudes as a need for self-expression and self-actualisation.
There is relatively little theorising that seeks to add to these functions (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993), and very little available empirical evidence (Shavitt, 1989). 
Originally, Katz (1960) saw these aspects as distinct functions, however, there has 
been some attempt to integrate or combine the four functions (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993). For example, there is thought to be the Object-appraisal function, sometimes 
thought to be an integrated version of the Utilitarian and Knowledge functions 
(Herek, 1986; Kiesler, Collins & Miller, 1969; Tesser & Shaffer, 1990) which is 
thought to provide individuals with schemas for assessing objects and events in terms 
of the interests of the individual. Other authors, Abelson and Prentice (1989), Herek 
(1986), and Shavitt (1989; 1990), have also sought to integrate and elaborate on 
Katz’s model, yet have always placed the integration within Katz’s original 
distinctions (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
What is pertinent to the present consideration is that some authors have 
combined the functions. This overlap between many of the concepts is important in 
providing a general theoretical context to the present research programme, because 
each of the four aspects of Katz’s (1960) model emerge in the following thesis, 
providing a general context. Thus, in the following theory and research, the
8
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emphasis is on attitudes3 serving as a function. That is, in this and the following 
chapters, ideas in relation to the ways that attitudes secure positive outcomes and 
resist negative outcomes, supply a standard frame of reference for organising and 
understanding the world, emphasise psychoanalytic principles (albeit in this work 
Jungian principles rather than traditional Freudian ego-defensive theory are 
important), and stressing the importance of attitudes as a need for self-expression and 
self-actualisation are explored.
Thus, using this context, two areas of belief (religion and luck) will be 
presented, in order to forward arguments for this thesis. As mentioned earlier, 
certain elements emerge from the research of both religion and luck that:
1. Stress the importance of belief to psychological well-being and how the 
importance of belief may have positive outcome in terms of mental health
2. Examine how researchers within certain areas have tried to explain 
positive outcomes of a specific belief and, finding problems in explaining 
this, have suggested how an overall interpretation (how the underlying 
construct of belief is functioning in itself) may be required, and be applied 
to understand these explanations, and
3. Because of this, suggest the need for a provision of an overall theory that 
centres on a commitment to belief
Each of these points will now be considered individually, where research on religion 
and luck can be used as an argument/proposal for the direction of this thesis.
(1) The importance of belief to psychological well-being: positive outcomes in terms 
of mental health.
As previously mentioned, the literature suggests that beliefs can be related to an 
individual’s mental health, though often, within sets of the literature, a distinction 
can be made as to whether the belief has a positive effect or a negative effect on
3 Though belief is used commonly throughout the work, but here as in the functional theory 
o f attitude (see for example Abelson & Prentice, 1989) the two terms are used 
interchangeably.
9
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mental health. Two examples from the literature show this; religiosity and belief in 
luck.
The first example is religiosity. Many authors debate the issue of whether 
religion has beneficial or detrimental effect on the mental well-being of individuals 
(Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997; Gorsuch, 1988; Wulff, 1997). However, one area of 
research has suggested that distinctions can be made between individuals’ orientation 
toward religion, and it is these religious orientations that are useful in predicting 
whether religiosity has a positive or negative effect on mental health (Gorsuch,
1988). Three main religious orientations have been identified that are thought to 
have varying effects on psychological well-being (Allport & Ross, 1967; Beit- 
Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997; Gorsuch, 1988; Leong & Zachar, 1990; Maltby, 1999a; 
Wulff, 1997). The first is an intrinsic orientation, where a person lives their religious 
beliefs, the influence of which religion is evident in every aspect of their life (Allport, 
1966; Allport & Ross, 1967). The second is an extrinsic orientation, which is split 
into (ii) extrinsic-personal, where individuals look to religion for comfort, relief, and 
protection, and use religious practices for peace and happiness (Kahoe & Meadow, 
1981) and (iii) extrinsic-social, where individuals look to church for making friends, 
creating social status, and being part of an in-group (Allport & Ross, 1967; Fleck, 
1981; Genia& Shaw, 1991).
Overall, an intrinsic orientation has been found to be related to mental health 
in finding that it is related to lower anxiety and depression, and higher self-esteem; 
while both extrinsic orientations are related to poorer psychological well-being 
through reports of higher extrinsic religiosity being related to higher neuroticism, 
anxiety, depression and lower self-esteem (Allport, 1996; Allport & Ross, 1967; 
Baker & Gorsuch, 1982; Batson, 1976; Batson & Gray, 1981; Batson & Ventis,
1982; Bergin, 1983; Fleck, 1981; Genia, 1991; 1996; Genia & Shaw, 1991; Kahoe & 
Meadow, 1981; Kirkpatrick, 1989; Koenig, 1995; Maltby, 1999a; Maltby, Lewis & 
Day, 1999; Nelson, 1989; 1990; Park, Cohen & Herb, 1990; Sturgeon, 1979;
Watson, Morris & Hood, 1989).
Likewise, recent findings in the area of luck present some similar distinctions. 
Traditionally, belief in luck has been seen as an irrational belief (Darke & Freedman,
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1997). Irrational themes of belief traditionally centre on a cognitive theory to 
explain the development of maladaptive emotion (Ellis, 1962). Ellis’ Rational 
Emotive Therapy (RET; Bernard & DiGuiseppe, 1989; Ellis, 1985), or more recently 
renamed Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT; see Ellis, 1995) is based on 
an ABC model of psychological disturbance and therapy, where 4 A’ is some 
activating stressful life event (e.g. frustration, failure, rejection), 4B’ refers to 
irrational beliefs, and 4C’ refers to the psychological and behavioural consequences 
of these irrational beliefs, i.e. psychological disturbance and maladaptive behaviours. 
One of the major assumptions of this model is that a positive relationship exists 
between the separate constructs of irrational beliefs (B) and psychological 
disturbance (C), particularly with regards to depression. Empirical support for this 
assumption has been reported in numerous correlational studies relating irrational 
belief to mental health (Malouff, Schutte, & McCellend, 1992; Muran, Kassinove, 
Ross, & Muran, 1989; Muran & Motta, 1993; Nottingham, Rosen, & Parks, 1992). 
However, due to recent findings (Darke & Freedman, 1997a; Day, Maltby & 
Macaskill, 1999; Day & Maltby, in press), it is unclear whether an irrational belief 
such as luck is detrimental to mental health. Researchers have begun to re-evaluate 
the notion that luck is maladaptive, and instead, their findings show that it is adaptive 
(has a positive effect) when considering the positive illusions around good luck; 
leading to feelings of confidence, control and optimism, increasing self-esteem, and 
reducing levels of depression and anxiety (Darke & Freedman, 1997a; Day, Maltby 
& Macaskill, 1999; Day & Maltby, in press; Taylor & Brown, 1988). These 
findings, then, are contrary to what would be predicted by the usual theory relating to 
luck and suggest further conceptualisations are needed to understand the positive 
relationship between belief in an irrational belief (good luck) and mental health (Day, 
et al., 1999; Day & Maltby, in press).
Such distinctions, then, of both beliefs in religion and luck having contrary 
positive and negative effects on well-being, suggest that there is some kind of 
dynamic relationship between the set of beliefs and mental-health. These different 
outcomes for mental health is very intriguing for authors reporting over-views in the 
literature; particularly when positive relationships with mental health are found 
within belief domains that are also related to poorer mental heath. What will be 
discussed next is the lack of empirical theorising for such findings.
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(2) An explanation of positive outcomes: Something more than ‘somehow just 
coping’
As mentioned above, present findings suggest that religiosity and belief in luck can 
sometimes be associated with better psychological well-being, particularly when 
concentrating on certain aspects of these beliefs (i.e. intrinsic orientation towards 
religion, e.g. Genia, 1991; 1996; Genia & Shaw, 1991; Maltby, 1999a; 2000; Maltby, 
Lewis & Day, 1999; belief in good luck, Darke & Freedman, 1997a; Day, Maltby & 
MacAskill, 1999; Day & Maltby, in press; Taylor & Brown, 1988). However, within 
this research there is little overarching theoretical guidance that suggests the reasons 
for these positive outcomes. Usually researchers, reflecting on such findings, often 
conclude that individuals demonstrating these set beliefs are able to ‘cope better’ 
than those other individuals that do not show these aspects of belief (Day & Maltby, 
1999; Pargament, 1990,1997).
At best, some researchers have tried to expand this idea of coping in more 
detail, though often this is descriptive, or philosophical, more than theoretically, or 
empirically, led. For example, Pargament (1990,1996,1997) makes the distinction 
between positive religious coping and negative religious coping. This theoretical 
perspective views religion as a coping process (Pargament, 1990; 1996; 1997; 
Pargament, Olsen, Reilly, Falgout, Ensing, & Vanhaitsma, 1992; Pargament & Park, 
1995). Pargament (1990; 1997) suggests that a religious coping model might better 
explain the relationship between religiosity and psychological well-being. He argues 
that such a theoretical model would address the complex and continuous process by 
which religion interlocks with an individual’s life and allows them to deal with 
stresses in life. Pargament (1997) uses and extends coping theory, by arguing that 
religion may enter the coping process in a number of ways, with critical events, 
appraisals of situations, coping activities and outcomes, to which religion may be 
integral or external to these occurrences. 'Hiis model of coping encompasses a 
number of positive and negative religious coping styles including religious 
forgiveness, collaborative religious coping, spiritual connection, and religious 
purification. Pargament, Smith, Koenig and Perez (1998a) report that positive 
coping is associated with fewer symptoms of psychological distress, while negative
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religious coping is associated with higher levels of depression and reporting of 
psychological symptoms. Such theorising, regarding the influence of religious 
coping in the relationship between religious orientation and psychological well­
being, is useful. However, this consideration cannot, at present, be expanded into a 
wider theoretical context, i.e. religious coping cannot be used to explain the positive 
and negative distinction in, for example, the belief of luck etc, and rather, like 
religious orientation, theory is led by findings from analysis of scales rather than any 
driving rationale.
Similarly, there is a relationship between belief in ‘good’ luck and 
psychological well-being, though theorising does extend beyond a simple coping 
hypothesis. At best, authors conclude good luck may provide an important means of 
coping with the very real influences that chance sometimes has on everyday life 
(Darke & Freedman, 1997; Day etal., 1999). However, despite some findings 
suggesting that optimism may sometimes play an important role in the relationship 
between belief in good luck and mental well-being (Day & Maltby, in press), again 
there is little overarching theoretical guidance for this relationship.
However, the literature on the positive effects of religion and belief in good 
luck do share some similarities, not only in terms of the relationship between some 
aspects of these beliefs and better mental-health outcomes, but also in the reliance on 
a simple coping hypothesis to understand these relationships. Not only can this 
reliance be discussed in its failure to provide a comprehensive theory, but, even when 
presented with detailed coping theory (as with positive and negative religious 
coping), some authors have found that religious orientation accounts for unique 
variance in mental-health measures outside a number of measures of religious and 
non-religious coping, suggesting both religious orientation and religious coping 
might each contribute uniquely to psychological well-being (Maltby and Day, 2000; 
in press; Maltby, Lewis & Day, 1999). Further to this, some authors have also 
speculated on certain findings with belief in good luck and the relationship with 
coping (i.e. optimism), and have yet to be able to conceptualise comprehensively the 
relationship between belief in good luck, optimism, and mental-health, and dismiss 
the idea that the variable may also account for unique variance in the relationship 
between luck and psychological well-being (Day & Maltby, in press).
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Therefore, there seems a need to begin to conceptualise these findings. With 
authors coming to such conclusions in these areas, further theorising is limited. At 
best, authors have only been able to suggest that there may be some integral aspect in 
the belief itself, that is important to the belief, and that this is a neglected sole 
emphasis within the psychology of religion, whereby positive outlook and outcomes 
are central to the research questions (Day & Maltby, 1999; in press; Maltby & Day, 
2000; in press). Part of the reason for such an explanation may be due to these 
aspects being traditionally seen, then, as single personality variables or traits, which 
are the means to better psychological well-being. However, if this is so, then this 
personality characteristic or belief trait needs to be examined more closely. This 
closer examination, and the clues to which psychological processes may be integral 
to the beliefs that result in better psychological well-being, may already be present in 
authors’ descriptions and speculations regarding the present findings relating to 
intrinsic religiosity and belief in good luck.
(3) Providing an overall theoretical perspective: The central role of commitment to/ 
strength of belief.
One aspect to the present literature findings, on occasions when distinctions can be 
made between different types of belief, is that, certain dimensions may reflect a 
commitment. That is, where the individual has somehow internalised their belief, i.e. 
that a person has become committed to that belief, and thus it has become an 
underlying principle in their life.
An example of this, within the current literature, is the references to an 
intrinsic orientation toward religion, rather than an extrinsic orientation. Individuals 
defined as having an intrinsic orientation to religion have been described as living 
their religious beliefs, the influence of which is evident in every aspect of their life 
(Allport, 1966). Within this perspective, an individual lives, and is committed to, 
their belief (e.g. intrinsic religion), thus internalising or making it personal, and using 
it to give meaning and control over their lives, as opposed to an individual who is 
using it to serve more external purposes (e.g. extrinsic religion). Therefore, it could 
be argued that it is the commitment/strength of belief that may be integral to the
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positive effect on a person’s psychological well-being. Other evidence in the 
psychology of religion supports this. Maltby, et al (1999) show that, with frequency 
of prayer, it is those persons, who show a commitment to prayer (i.e. once a day or 
more) that show better mental-health, through lower depression, anxiety and higher 
self-esteem. Here, then, commitment is reflected in the attention and importance 
placed on religious worship, in that it is a daily activity.
Similar ideas around the importance and commitment/strength of beliefs are 
echoed in the belief in good luck literature, where this concept of a committed set of 
ideas being lived, can also be found. Within this literature, belief in good luck is 
seen as an attempt to understand the world, particularly in response to events in our 
lives that are largely beyond any direct attempts to control (Darke & Freedman, 
1999). The uncertainty associated with the possibility that such events may occur 
can be quite disconcerting, especially when the consequences are substantial. 
Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982) suggest that irrational beliefs about luck may 
allow individuals to remain optimistic even when it is objectively impossible to 
exercise direct control over one’s circumstances. As such, it is this belief that gives 
meaning to life and events, and adherence to this belief set helps the person interpret, 
understand and deal with the world.
Alongside these, there are many other theories of belief that propose that 
specific beliefs give purpose in life (e.g. Carson, Soeken & Grimm, 1988; Klein, 
Kupfer & Shea, 1993; Richards, Owen & Stein, 1993; Seligman, 1990). For 
example, Wright (1993) found that lower depression scores among adolescents are 
significantly positively correlated to those individuals who found meaning in life. 
Also, Carson, Soeken and Grimm (1988) found that a sense of life purpose and 
satisfaction related both to trait hope (hope as a personality characteristic; how one 
generally feels) and state hope (hope based on specific situations and times; how one 
feels at the moment).
Such findings, then, need to be conceptualised within a wider theoretical 
framework, that may not only be used to explain a set of behaviours related to a 
commitment to belief, but may be useful in understanding why different types of
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belief, such as religion and luck, demonstrate a positive effect on psychological well­
being, as well as, or in place of, a negative effect.
To summarise, then, it has been argued, so far, that there are 3 main areas in 
how the research literature can support the need for an overall theory of positive 
belief, instead of considering individual theories. First, there is some evidence in the 
literature, which stresses the importance of belief to psychological well-being, and 
emphasises positive effects on mental health. Second, there is the need to consider 
these positive effects in more than ‘coping better’ theoretical terms. Third, that it is a 
commitment/strength of belief that may be important. However, although a strong 
argument for an overall theory of commitment to belief has been presented, and 
common variables/constructs put forward to warrant examination of an overall 
theory, as yet, little theoretical guidance has been identified. Nevertheless, whilst 
reviewing the aforementioned literature, one traditionalist theorist has proposed 
similar principles on the nature of belief. This theorist is Jung, who, across his 
lifetime, outlined theoretical underpinnings that can lend themselves to the strength 
and commitment shown by individuals to a set of beliefs, rather than to the type of 
belief. Again, this literature is somewhat fragmented, nevertheless there are definite 
theoretical constructs that can be drawn upon to support and enhance a theory 
considering these dimensions to overall belief. These focus on two areas; (i) 
conceptualising a commitment to belief, and (ii) using commitment to belief to 
explain positive mental health effects.
A commitment to belief: Jung’s theoretical support
Jung demonstrates throughout his work that commitment is a fundamental part of 
belief. He indeed sees this commitment as intrinsic to human nature, and thus a 
person both lives, and is part of their “religious” beliefs, the influence of which, 
belief is evident in every aspect of their life. Jung provides theoretical guidance for 
the importance of a commitment to belief in three main ways.
First, Jung shows commitment to a belief through religious experience. For 
Jung (1958), belief was an attitude of mind, he felt man to be naturally religious, and
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argued that this religious function was as powerful as the Freudian instinct for sex 
and aggression, and that every spiritual feeling, every mystical insight, every creative 
experience, comes from the collective unconscious. This religious experience Jung 
called a Numinosum (a word coined by the theologian Rudolph Otto, 1917). Indeed, 
Corbett (1999) has suggested that certain situations can also be summed up as 
numinous, filling the person with awe and wonder, being irresistibly attractive, 
allowing the person to effortlessly lose all track of time, providing joy, or removing 
all sense of self in a felt oneness with the world. These experiences, he argues, may 
occur in innumerable ways; listening to music, dancing, painting, weaving, watching 
children play, being in the wilderness, writing or cooking are only a few of them. 
When these experiences are numinous, Corbett argues that they are legitimate 
channels for spiritual experience, and regular participation in such an activity can be 
considered devotional or meditative. Yet he argues that such experiences are often 
ignored by Western religious culture, so that often they are not carried out with 
conscious reverence, in other words, people are unaware of the importance of these 
experiences/activities, considering only orthodox religious activities as religious in 
nature. Indeed, this criticism is also true of Jung, throughout his later works, as Jung 
began to believe that religious belief, however unorthodox, represented a supreme 
value, and became less able to conceive of this process in any other than religious 
terms (Storr, 1973). Nevertheless, Jung believed that every individual possesses an a 
priori 'religious instinct', an impulse for religion that is a psychic function, and that it 
is this instinct, which provides the occasion and the pattern for all his subsequent 
religious imagery and activities.
Secondly, Jung shows commitment to belief through an internal process via 
the self, and that of individuation, the final arbiter being the discovery of meaning. 
Another way of expressing this would be to say that the religious attitude, however it 
may be personally or socially realized, and irrespective of time or place, proceeds 
from the fact that deep within our unconscious lies an archetypal form of God which 
is deeply, and indelibly, engraved upon our psyche. Jung argues that this religious 
disposition functions as an internal activity of the psyche, which generates an energy 
unique to itself, which then comes forth from the collective unconscious, and 
manifests itself in the visible and multifarious phenomena of religion. Thus, this 
religious attitude is revealed as a collective attitude, in other words, it is recognised
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as expressing an archetypal dimension that is intrinsic to human nature. Jung calls 
the process by which the individual integrates the conscious and unconscious parts of 
the personality the process of individuation. The concept of individuation (Jung, 
1957; 1971; 1956) denotes not a state but a living and dynamic process by which a 
person becomes an "individual", i.e. a separate, indivisible unity or "whole."
For Jung, individuation is a ‘coming to selfhood,' and thus the goal of 
individuation is the realization of the Self. The Self, in other words, must be 
conceived not just as the goal of individuation but also as its originating impulse, it is 
both result and agent. Individuation is thus innate to individuals, a natural law of the 
psyche, and is considered the component, and process, to which all human beings 
must devote themselves, albeit with differing degrees of success. Individuation seeks 
the union of opposites, which means assimilating or integrating into consciousness 
the various unconscious parts of the psyche. It is not just that the desire for 
individuation is archetypal, then, but that the archetypes themselves provide specific 
psychological information about how individuation is to be contained. This, Jung 
argues, is why philosophical and spiritual questions are asked about the meaning of 
life, and the purpose of existence. Individuation may be defined as religious because 
it is an archetypal process, and because any such orientation towards archetypes is 
religious. This conclusion follows directly from Jung’s account of religious 
experience, where religious experience is named the ’numinous’ experience by the 
individual of that aspect of his own psyche that is primordial, archetypal and 
collective. In this case, the archetypal desire for wholeness. It may also be 
construed that a religious and numinous process derives its religious quality solely 
from being a collective experience; it requires, in other words, a ‘religious outlook on 
life’ by demanding of the individuating self insight into their own psychic nature. 
Thus, a person perceives that his conscious ego is grounded on something that is 
deeper than, prior to, and more fundamental than his own distinct personality, and 
that his desire to become an integrated human being is at the same time an 
experience of the eternal and archetypal foundation of his own psychic being (Jung, 
1921).
Thirdly, Jung considers commitment to belief as a libidinal process. Jung is 
here referring to the importance of the living reality of the psyche, which reveals its
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own philosophical commitment. Jung argues that in order for a person to live 
happily, they need faith, hope, love and insight, and that these four highest 
achievements of human effort only come through experiences that require us to 
commit ourselves with our whole being, to resolve our doubts into a 'conformed 
belief,' and the energic movement of the libido towards the deepest layer of the 
psyche, in which reside the universal and primordial images of the collective 
unconscious.
When Jung speaks of the act of ascribing meaning to something as a dynamic 
and psychically intense act, he is recalling his earlier theory of psychic energy. The 
relatively closed system of the psyche is characterized by the constant and dynamic 
movement of the libido. Although the libido itself is not observable, its course can 
be charted in terms of the 'value' being attributed in any given case. Values are 
'quantitative estimates of energy,' so that for a person to place a high value on, say, a 
work of art is the same as saying that this art-object has been invested by him or her 
with a large amount of psychic energy. What has happened here is that psychical 
energy has been 'transformed' or 'canalized’ into a particular cultural phenomenon, 
the value being attributed to it being directly calculable in terms of the intensity of its 
libidinal effect.
These symbolic images, whatever form they take, are thus the manifestation 
and expression of the libido, and the intensity of their effect derives directly from the 
energic movement of the psyche, of the infusion of these images with libidinal 
power.
In summary, then, a religious experience is a numinous experience, and a 
numinous experience carries with it certain necessary psychic processes, and thus, 
supports the need for commitment within belief.
Commitment to Belief and positive mental-health outcomes: Jung’s theoretical 
support
Jung’s ideas can be further applied to understand why beliefs may be specifically
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related to better mental health. Jung (1958) suggested that all individuals strive for 
meaning, which gives our life purpose and a reason for existence, thus allowing our 
selves, and the Self, to grow and develop toward individuation, which in turn, allows 
for a mentally healthy outlook on life. Jung's recognition and delineation of the inner 
world of the psyche did not include a statement as to why a person was so constituted 
that what went on inside him was so often at variance with the external world that he 
could not find all his satisfactions therein. And it is this fact, which makes a person 
restlessly creative, searching for ‘ideal' solutions, whether these are in the shape of 
scientific world-views, philosophies, religions or the integrative patterns of art, rather 
than a loss of the sense that there is any meaning in existence. Jung conceived that 
this mythological material had a positive function in giving meaning and significance 
to a person’s existence.
However, if, according to Jung, we cannot find a strong enough belief, in 
which meaning is established, then this may be extremely damaging to our mental 
health. Indeed, meaning was fundamental to Jung's concept of the aetiology of 
neurosis since the recognition of meaning appears to have a curative power. 'A 
psychoneurosis must be understood, ultimately, as the suffering of a soul, which has 
not discovered its meaning,' he wrote (Jung, 1958, para. 497). The clinical picture of 
neurosis often contains the feeling of meaninglessness. This led Jung to refer 
metaphorically to a typical neurosis as a religious problem (1958), and states that, in 
the majority of cases the root cause of neurosis is connected with a loss of meaning 
and worth. Indeed, Sandner and Beebe (1982) see neurosis as springing from ‘the 
tendency of the psyche to dissociate, or split, when faced with intolerable suffering. 
Wheelwright (1982) speaks of both neurosis and psychosis as 'nature's attempt to 
initiate growth and development', a view pursued in psychiatric research and 
experiment by Perry (1974,1985). For Jung, then, it is not the presence of religion 
that is a symptom of neurosis but its absence. A psychoneurosis must be understood 
as the suffering of a human being who has not discovered what life means for him. 
For Jung this manifests itself by the individual having no love, but only sexuality; no 
faith, and having no belief structure by which to understand the world; no hope, 
leading to disillusionment in the world and life; and no understanding, leading to a 
lack of clarity in the meaning in life and existence (Jung, 1958).
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Thus, because religion is a psychic function, as inseparable from the 
individual as any other instinct, any attempt to deny its significance will result in a 
loss of psychic equilibrium and thus a descent into neurosis. The religious experience 
is a numinous experience of the archetypal and eternal foundations of humanity 
itself, and to that extent it enables the individual to lift himself above his personal 
problems and to relate instead to the indestructible and primordial dimension of his 
own psychic being. It is not, therefore, the acceptance of belief that is 
psychologically damaging but its rejection. Therefore, Jung saw the embracing of 
beliefs as a positive outcome that could have positive effects on mental-health.
Therefore, it is suggested, in this thesis, that Jungian theory on belief can be 
used to inform modem psychology on the processes of underlying belief.
Particularly whilst focussing on two areas of; (i) conceptualising a commitment to 
belief, and (ii) using commitment to belief to explain positive mental health effects. 
Therefore, whilst investigating positive effects and commitment of belief, Jungian 
theory will also be investigated in order to achieve theoretical guidance for the 
findings.
Main Statement relating to the Programme of Research
It has been proposed, so far, that major considerations and overviews of belief tend 
towards viewing them as specific, independent beliefs; not as how and why belief, as 
a whole, functions as it does, but how specific beliefs are structured, formed or 
changed, and what psychological purpose these specific beliefs serve. Given this, it 
has been argued that there are 3 main reasons to think that the construct of belief 
would benefit from considering it as an overall theory of belief, instead of individual 
theories. Firstly, there is a lack of theoretical guidance within each specific theory 
on belief; secondly, all theories show common threads; and thirdly, a number of 
variables can be extracted, and examined more closely, in order to enable the 
investigation of an overall theory of belief. It has also been highlighted that 
theoretical guidance may be achieved by exploring Jungian concepts on the nature of 
beliefs. Therefore, there seems to be the opportunity to examine the concept of 
overall belief. This would facilitate the full examination of present limited findings,
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themes, and speculations from the literature regarding an overall theory of belief to 
establish whether such a psychological construct can be measured, and that 
commitment to belief can be of psychological benefit. Chapters 2 and 3 will 
concentrate on the construction of a reliable and valid instrument of measurement 
and establishes the relationship between commitment to belief and better mental 
health. Chapters 4 and 5 will consider the measurement of commitment to belief 
within the context of Jungian theory. Chapter 6 will consider commitment to belief 
with measures of religiosity and spirituality by way of homage to Jungian writing on 
commitment to belief in religiosity and spirituality. Chapters 7 and 8 try to 
conceptualise and test many of the findings from Chapters 2-8 within a modem 
context using the more recent theoretical explanation of ‘coping’. Finally, chapter 9 
will present an overall discussion.
Implications in considering a commitment to belief: issues of measurement
A further issue that needs to be considered within this research programme is that of 
measurement, in other words, how do we measure an underlying concept of belief? 
Within psychology there are generally two main streams of measuring constructs; 
qualitative methods and quantitative methods, which can lead to a multitude of 
research strategies seeking to separate out, or to integrate both, these aspects.
Qualitative research recognises a complex and dynamic social world. It 
involves researcher’s active engagement with participants and acknowledges that 
understanding is constructed, and multiple realities exist (Bannister, Burman, Parker, 
Taylor, & Tindall, 1996). It is argued that qualitative methods are theory generating, 
inductive, aiming to gain valid knowledge and understanding by representing and 
illuminating the nature and quality of people’s experiences. Here, participants are 
encouraged to speak for themselves, personal accounts are valued, and emergent 
issues within the accounts are attended to. The developing theory is, thus, firmly and 
richly grounded in personal experiences rather than a reflection of the researcher’s a 
priori frameworks. In this way insight is gained to the meanings people attach to 
their experiencing. It would seem appropriate, then, when measuring a commitment 
to belief to consider this method as the best option for a research programme.
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However, it was felt, by the researcher, to be an inappropriate methodology for two 
main reasons;
(i) Because of the nature of research, i.e. considering an underlying construct 
of belief, in which to explain the positive effects on well-being within 
areas such as religion and luck, it was deemed necessary to fall in line 
with the generally accepted methodology within these areas, in other 
words quantitative.
(ii) Because of point 1, and from what has been established so far in this 
thesis, that the research on beliefs is extensive, and in order to present an 
immediate valuable contribution to the literature, the research here needs 
to be able to be extrapolated easily to a number of populations using a 
number of theoretical perspectives. It was felt that qualitative research, 
tends to afford smaller samples, and seeking larger samples would be 
time-consuming (particularly within the time constraints of the present 
considerations) and would not enable such a contribution
Therefore, a quantitative programme of research was followed.
Within quantitative methodologies, psychometric measures of belief are 
substantial; however, these measures are designed to assess specific beliefs such as 
religion and luck, and cannot be used to measure an underlying commitment to 
belief. Therefore, it is necessary, within this thesis, to create a new psychometric 
measure in which to assess, and quantify the construct of belief. Thus, chapters 2 
and 3 mainly focus on the creation and validation of this new scale.
Alongside the issues of research methodologies, however, other problems 
arise when attempting to measure the abstract construct of belief. First, a person’s 
beliefs are sometimes considered to be extremely personal, and are not revealed 
easily. Therefore, this thesis needs to take account of this sensitive material when 
devising a suitable instrument of measurement. Second, the word ‘belief can have 
numerous constructed definitions for different people; for example, some individuals 
may consider belief to be only religious or spiritual, whereas other individuals may 
be aware of beliefs having a wider context, which includes many other
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experiences/activities classified as ‘numinous’. Thus, the construction of a new scale 
must also consider this ambiguous connotation within its construction, allowing 
participants to reveal all their concepts of belief. Thirdly, it must be considered that, 
when measuring the commitment of a belief, in other words, if  these beliefs are 
underlying or central to a person, i.e. internal, used in all situations, and have become 
part of the self, as well as their everyday life, then it may be difficult for individual’s 
to even consider them as actual beliefs. They may in fact be considered, for 
example, as part of their personality. Again, this issue needs to be addressed within 
the scale’s construction. These issues, then, will be considered and addressed more 
fully within chapters 2 and 3.
Aims of the following studies
Notwithstanding the outline of the methodological stance; the main aim of the 
following studies was to examine a functional role of overall commitment to belief 
which argues (i) that a commitment to belief is important; (ii) that overall belief will 
be related to mental health and well-being4; and (iii) that it is the strength of belief in 
itself that is important and not the type of belief. Such consideration would include 
the development of an overall commitment to belief measure, and hypotheses 
derived from both Jungian theory and the research literature concerning belief. It 
was also a major aim of the studies to account for any alternative explanations of 
results found in support of an overall commitment to belief
4 It is of importance to highlight the point that this thesis will concentrate on an attempt to 
explain positive contributions to mental health, and will not address the issue of negative 
contributions. It could be argued that negative contributions are due to a weak commitment 
to belief, or alternatively, a wholly different theoretical context may be needed to address 
these effects. However, it is proposed that these issues would need a full programme of 
research in it its own right, and thus, is not examined within this thesis.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Commitment to Belief Scale: Exploratory Factor Analysis and some 
initial consideration of Construct Validity
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Chapter 2: The Commitment to Belief Scale
Building on the theory of Jung, it was proposed, in chapter one, that three basic 
dimensions underlie the importance of belief; (i) that a commitment to belief is important 
(i.e. that it is internalised, and used within all situations within one’s life, and is present 
across time); (ii) that the belief will be related to mental health, or well being; and (iii) 
that the strength of the belief in itself is important and not necessarily the type of belief.
To begin to explore these ideas, a measure of commitment to belief is developed 
and compared to measures of psychological well-being, personality and attribution style 
among 154 undergraduate students (52 men, 100 women). The measure was developed 
by adapting aspects of attribution style theory (Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, 
Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982), to measure internal, stable, and global aspects 
of belief; and Kelly’s Construct theory (Kelly, 1955), to enable the issues of belief, 
mentioned in chapter one, to be addressed (i.e. to reduce ambiguous meanings of belief 
to individuals).
Reliability and validity is found for a measure that adapts personal construct 
theory and attribution style as a basis for measuring individuals’ commitment to a set of 
beliefs. Exploratory factor analysis suggests both a one factor (overall commitment to 
belief) and a three factor model of commitment to belief (internal, global, and stable 
aspects of belief), in which both models are related to better psychological well-being, 
and largely fall outside personality space, and attribution style.
In summary the present findings suggest confidence in continuing to explore the 
commitment to belief construct, the relationship between commitment to belief and 
psychological well-being, and the relationship of commitment to belief to psychological 
theory.
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The previous chapter has presented the view that belief is important to the well-being of 
the individual. In summary, the reviewed literature suggests the possibility of an overall 
theory of belief, where three basic dimensions underlie beliefs functional role; (i) that a 
commitment to belief is important (i.e. that it is internalised, stable across time, and used 
within all situations within one’s life); (ii) that the belief will be related to mental health, 
or well-being; and (iii) that the strength of the belief in itself is important and not 
necessarily the type of belief.
Thus, the concept of commitment to belief will concentrate on a theory 
applicable to understanding different types of belief and will be used to encompass a 
variety of belief, or possible outcomes. However, the research literature has, so far, 
tended to focus on the function of specific beliefs, such as religion, spirituality, 
conservatism, irrationality, rather than aspects of overall belief, and thus, at present, no 
psychometric test is available in which to measure this commitment to overall belief. 
Therefore, the psychometric development of a measure is needed in order to measure 
and take forward this presented theory of an overall commitment to belief.
Underlying principles measuring commitment to belief
There are two main aspects to measuring commitment to belief. First, this measure must 
reflect core belief (beliefs that are highly important/central to the person), and must not 
be reliant upon one type of belief. Second, the measure must be able to measure the size 
of commitment within that belief (i.e. its strength of belief, whether it is evident within 
all aspects of one’s life).
In addition to the above criteria, three further aspects should be considered.
• The scale must take account of the sensitive nature of the research. In order 
to facilitate a measure of beliefs that are central to the person (core), the scale
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must allow for consideration that individual’s beliefs can be extremely 
personal, and not easily revealed.
• The word ‘belief can have numerous constructed definitions for different 
people; for example, some individuals may consider belief to be only 
religious or spiritual. Thus, the scale must consider this ambiguous 
connotation within its construction.
• It must be considered that, if these beliefs are indeed central to the person,
i.e. internal, used in all situations, and have become part of the self, as well as 
their everyday life, that it may be difficult for individual’s to even consider 
them as actual beliefs. They may in fact be considered, for example, as part 
of their personality. Again, this issue needs to be addressed within the 
scale’s construction.
Eliciting core beliefs using Personal Construct Theory
A commitment to belief measure needs to be able to generate people’s beliefs, and, 
indeed, to elicit that said individual’s core beliefs (those central to the person), as well as 
taking into account their sensitive nature. However, beliefs can have numerous 
constructed definitions, and because of this, it is sometimes difficult to reveal the actual 
nature, or core, of belief. Beliefs are usually structured, and are not always easy to 
identify, and thus, not easy to measure. Even such beliefs as, for example, religion, are 
not as straight forward as the term suggests, indeed, religion has a plenitude of lesser 
beliefs, complexes, and behaviours. Therefore, in order to measure the actual core 
belief, it is necessary to consider methods that can bypass these complexities, and reach 
the actual belief. For this purpose, Kelly’s Repertory Grid technique (Kelly, 1955) for 
eliciting individuals’ construct systems, can be utilised. According to Kelly (1955), 
Constructs are the key concepts and values used by the individual to construe and 
organise their world, and regulate their lives and social relationships. Our personal 
frameworks, or construct systems, in Kelly’s terms, are made up of a vast collection of
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similarity-difference dimensions or bipolar constructs. Individuals uniquely, yet 
systematically, hierarchically network their constructs. Core or super-ordinate 
constructs are those that are central to our being, those that we use to impose personal 
order on our lives (Kelly, 1955). Each core construct subsumes a number of subordinate 
constructs, which in turn subsume more subordinate constructs, and so on. This theory, 
then, immediately suggests a way in which we can consider belief structures, and 
measure the core belief. Thus, this technique should allow direct access to the belief 
itself, by eliciting the individual’s own belief system and not relying on numerous or 
insubstantial definitions for the word ‘belief.
Considering dimensions to belief, borrowing Attribution Theory
To measure the individual’s actual commitment to their beliefs, the different dimensions 
to belief needs to be considered (i.e. whether the belief is internalised, used within all 
situations within one’s life, and is present across time), and can be facilitated by using 
aspects of Attribution Style Theory (outlined below) (Rotter, 1966; Peterson, Semmel, 
von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982; Kinderman, & Bentall, 1996). 
Indeed, authors, such as Jung (1933), and Allport (1966) have presented commitment as 
intrinsic to human nature, in other words, a person lives, and is part of, their beliefs, the 
influence of which, is evident in every aspect of their life, and throughout their life. This 
view is relevant to the present considerations as it emphasizes the importance that any 
measure must take account of, when measuring underlying belief. However, although 
authors within the literature agree upon this idea of commitment within certain contexts; 
e.g. intrinsic or internal religiosity (e.g. Allport, 1966; Jung, 1933), there is as yet no 
such scale with which to measure degrees of commitment to belief regardless of the type 
of beliefs respondents may have.
To begin the measurement of commitment to belief; it is worth noting the 
similarities between the dimensions of commitment to belief, as previously 
hypothesized, and aspects of the theory and measurement that underpins Attribution 
Style (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996; Peterson, et al., 1982; Rotter, 1966). Attribution
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style is a cognitive personality variable that can be defined as the way individuals 
interpret good and bad events (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Peterson, et al., 
1982). In essence, interpretations of good and bad events reflect the use of internal 
(‘cause of events due to the individual’) versus external (‘cause of events due to other 
people or circumstances’) attributions, stable (‘cause of events persistent over time’) 
versus unstable (‘cause of events not persistent over time) attributions, and global 
(‘cause of events persistent over time evidence in a variety of situations’) versus specific 
(‘cause of events specific to one situation) attributions (Peterson et al., 1982).
Attribution style has been used in a number of research contexts, however, its largest 
application has been in using a reformulated learned helplessness model to explain 
attribution style depression (Abramson et al., 1978).
Although Attribution Style is not the target of measurement, the essence of the 
theory easily lends itself, for the purpose of measurement, to commitment of belief. To 
illustrate, an individual with a strong commitment to religious beliefs may believe that 
their religiosity is very personal to them (internal versus external), see religion playing a 
part in many, or all, areas of their life (global versus specific), and see their religiosity 
occurring over a long period of time (stable versus unstable).
Therefore, both Personal Construct theory and Attribution Style Theory can be 
utilised to operationalise the hypotheses regarding measuring core beliefs and a 
commitment to them. Using Personal Construct theory will also allow beliefs to be 
considered with sensitivity, to allow individuals to use their own frame of reference, and 
be used as a tool to reveal individual beliefs.
Initial consideration of construct validity
When considering Jung’s arguments on the importance of belief, the new Commitment 
to Belief scale assumes that strong beliefs are beneficial to mental health. Indeed, 
support for this assumption is also provided by a series of specific beliefs being related 
to psychological well-being, particularly anxiety, depression and self-esteem, in religion
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(Baker & Gorsuch, 1982; Bergin, 1983; Genia, 1996; Genia & Shaw, 1991; Koenig, 
1995; Maltby & Day, 2000; Maltby, Lewis, & Day, 1999; Park, Cohen, & Herb, 1990), 
spirituality (Carson, Soekin, & Grimm, 1988; Klein, Kupfer, & Shea, 1993; Seligman, 
1990; Thoreson, 1999), and belief in good luck (Darke & Freedman, 1997; Day, Maltby, 
& MacAskill, 1999; Taylor & Brown, 1988). However, these research findings are 
related only to a specific belief, and cannot be generalised to all beliefs. This, again, 
highlights the important need to develop a reliable and valid measure of core beliefs 
(regardless of the specifics of the belief) that will; (i) measure all underlying core belief 
(beliefs that are central to the person), and must not be reliant upon one type of belief;
(ii) be able to measure the size of commitment within that belief (i.e. its strength of 
belief, whether it is evident within all aspects of one’s life); and (iii) be considered 
alongside measures of health and well-being. Therefore, to be certain that the 
Commitment to Belief scale is in fact measuring all these things (e.g. for the purposes of 
construct validity), it would be expected, that there would be significant negative 
correlations between the Commitment to Belief scale and anxiety and depression and a 
positive significant correlation between the Commitment to Belief scale and self-esteem.
When considering construct validity, another issue to be considered here is that, 
if beliefs are indeed central to the person, i.e. internal, used in all situations, and have 
become part of the self, as well as their everyday life, it may indeed be difficult for 
individual’s to even consider them as actual beliefs. Researchers may argue, in fact, that 
it could be merely considered as part of their personality. It is important, then, to 
demonstrate that a measure of core beliefs is not simply assessing personality, but that it 
is indeed measuring an underlying principle of commitment. Therefore, for the purposes 
of construct validity only, personality factors will be explored using the simple measure 
of Eysenck’s 3-factor model (extraversion, neuroticism, psychoticism). It is expected 
that the Commitment to Belief scale will have no significant correlation with these 
personality variables.
In addition, because the Commitment to Belief scale has adopted certain aspects 
of attribution style theory, it would be prudent to explore commitment to belief in
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relationship to the Attribution Style Questionnaire (Peterson, et al., 1982), in order to 
provide further evidence of discriminant, and therefore, construct validity for the new 
commitment to belief measure. It is, therefore, expected that the Commitment to Belief 
scale will not be congruent to aspects of attribution.
Aim of the Study
The aim of the present study was to develop a Commitment to Belief scale. It is 
expected that; higher scores on the scale should be positively related to better 
psychological well-being, should not be related to personality factor, and, given the use 
of attribution style concepts to develop the scale, should not be related to attribution 
style.
Method
Participants
154 undergraduate students (52 men, 100 women) of ages 18 to 51 years (Mean=23.12; 
SD=7.04) were administered the Commitment to Belief scale and a number of other 
questionnaires.
Questionnaires
The Commitment to Belief Scale
There are two stages to the development of the questionnaire. First is the elicitation of 
the super-ordinate constructs (beliefs central to the person), using Kelly’s Repertory 
Grid technique (Kelly, 1955). The second is the measurement of the commitment to 
those beliefs, adapting aspects of Attribution Style theory (Abramson, Seligman, & 
Teasdale, 1978; Day & Maltby, 2000; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996; Peterson, Semmel, 
von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982).
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1. Elicitation o f the beliefs -  construct theory
(i) In order to perform Kelly’s Repertory Grid technique (Kelly, 1955), a number of 
initial elements are required (elements are anything that give rise to construing, so as to 
enable the generation of constructs, e.g. the elements o f ‘car’ will generate such 
constructs as ‘ability to get from a to b’, ‘financial stability’, ‘status symbol’, 
trustworthy’ etc). In creating the Commitment to Belief scale, these elements were 
achieved by extracting attitudinal words or statements, that pertained to attitude theory 
formation and research, (attitudes: as a tendency; as evaluative; as cognitive, affective 
and behavioural; as objects; as representations; as functional; as self-perceiving; as self- 
identifying; as attitude strength) derived from a number of theoretical books (Eagle & 
Chaiken, 1993; Ajzen, 1996). These elements were designed to trigger belief like 
constructs. 34 attitudinal words or statements were believed to be appropriate for use. 
Raters (N=5) then sought to condense the list to a workable level by checking for 
duplications and inappropriate questions. Finally, a list of 18 attitudinal statements was 
agreed upon, and written into full instructional sentences.
A full list of the 18 attitudinal sentences are shown below (attitudinal statements are 
shown in bold):
1. Write down a belief, or attitude that you have that you feel strongly about.
2. Write down a belief, or attitude that you have that you are very closed about, i.e. 
something that is very private to you, that you are secretive about.
3. Write down a strong belief, or attitude that you have about, or within, your 
profession.
4. Write down a belief, or attitude that you have that you are proud of.
5. Write down a belief, or attitude that you have that you feel is personally useful 
or beneficial to you.
6. Write down a belief, or attitude that you have that motivates you in your life.
7. Write down a belief, or attitude that you care about deeply.
8. Write down something that you feel is important.
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9. Write down an attitude or belief that you have that you feel hinders you in some 
way.
10. Write down something that you feel that you need in your life.
11. Write down something that you desire in your life.
12. Write down something that you feel is important in relationships.
13. Write down a belief, or attitude that you have that you are guided by in your life.
14. Write down a belief, or attitude that you aspire to.
15. Write down a belief, or attitude that you have that you would like to enhance.
16. Write down a belief, or attitude that you have that you would like to improve.
17. Write down a belief, or attitude that you have that could be considered as 
harmful to your personal growth.
18. Write down a belief, or attitude that you feel is particularly healthy or good for 
you.
(ii) The aim of the questionnaire was to elicit as many beliefs as possible from the 
respondents. The generating of seven beliefs was decided upon, this number was 
arbitrary; however, from pilot studies (N=5) using the questionnaire, it was suggested 
that these were as many beliefs as respondents could generate within an appropriate 
timeframe (approximately 45-60 minutes).
(iii) The repertory grid method of eliciting constructs suggests that 3 constructs should 
be compared in order to provide a super-ordinate construct, i.e. those constructs that 
should be central to the person (Kelly, 1955). As such, the 18-attitudinal statements 
(feel, private, profession, proud, beneficial, motivates, care about deeply, important, 
hinders, need, desire, relationships, guided by, aspire to, enhance, improve, harmful, 
healthy or good for you), developed in step (i) above, were considered too many for the 
participants to contend with, however, all raters felt that these above statements were 
appropriate. Thus, it was decided that 7 out of the 18 statements should be given to 
participants (thus producing 7 beliefs -  see point (ii) above). Furthermore, because 
raters had felt that all statements were appropriate, each 7 statements should be taken 
randomly from the existing 18. Therefore, each of the 7 statements was chosen, and the
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order with which they should be administered to each participant was decided, by using 
a random number programme.
(iv) Within repertory grid techniques, the task is for participants to identify certain 
constructs, in this case, to identify their belief constructs. This is done by giving them 
three elements (attitude statements) and asking them in what way two of the three are 
similar to each other and different from the third. Here, the three elements were chosen 
randomly via random numbers. This procedure was then repeated seven times, in order 
to achieve 7 beliefs. As previously mentioned, carrying out this task seven times was 
arbitrary, but it was decided that this would be ample in which to create enough belief 
constructs for the purpose.
(v) The purpose of the Commitment to Belief scale is to gain access to people’s 
individual beliefs, thus it is important to make sure that the constructs that were 
generated in step (iv) above are indeed endorsed by the respondents, and that they are 
committed to these beliefs. To ensure this, then, as with Kelly’s repertory technique, 
respondents were asked to take each construct that had been generated and to write 
down its opposite. They were then asked to identify which of the two alternatives they 
believe was desirable to them. Kelly (1955) believes that the desirable construct 
signifies the direction of the construct, i.e. it is the desired element that is measured, for 
the example with ‘car’, a desired construct would be that the car presents the correct 
status symbol, as opposed to not. Hence, with the Commitment to Belief scale, the 
desirable construct is considered to be a core belief generated by the participant, and it is 
these 7 desirable constructs that are used in the remainder of the scale, which is 
concerned with the level of commitment to these said beliefs.
2. Assessing the level o f commitment -  adapting Attribution Style.
In order to measure a commitment around the internal, stable and global properties to 
belief, a format similar to all Attribution Style Questionnaires was employed, but with 
some differences.
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The Attribution Style Questionnaire (Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, 
Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982) asks respondents to think of the most likely causal 
explanation for 6 positive and 6 negative situations. The respondent is then required to 
categorise these causes as being either internal versus external (something to do with the 
respondent, or due to others), global versus specific (something which happens in all 
situations, or in just this situation), or stable versus unstable (something which always 
happens, or never happens). The original attribution style questionnaire considers these 
assessments as naturally bi-polar, however, for the purposes of the theoretical rationale 
of this study, it was more appropriate to separate these scales out. In other words, the 
present research aims to measure the strength of commitment -  how internal, stable, or 
global a belief construct is, and not whether a person sees it as internal or external etc. 
Thus, among the present hypotheses of commitment to beliefs, these are not bi-polar 
constructs.1 Therefore, 3 scales were used, Internal, Global and Stable. Thus, the 
Internal, Global, and Stable scales were included to measure commitment to belief. 
However, one further amendment was made to this scale to make it applicable for 
measuring commitment to beliefs, that is, to change the wording of the ratings scale. The 
rating scales were amended to;
1. ‘The construct is very personal to me’ to measure an Internal dimension
2. ‘In the future, the construct is something I will continue to believe in’ to 
measure a Stable dimension
3. ‘This construct is applicable to many aspects of my life’ to measure a Global 
dimension
Once respondents had obtained their desirable super-ordinate constructs, they 
were then asked to categorise these constructs on each of the three dimensions using a 7- 
point scale (l=Strongly disagree, through 7=Strongly agree). Those respondents
1 There is also recent evidence to suggest that attribution style itself is not necessarily bi-polar 
and should also be separated out (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996; Day & Maltby, 1999)
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answering “Strongly Agree” to the scales of “Internal”, “Stable”, and “Global” would 
then be construed as possessing strong central, or core, beliefs.
Thus, an example of a respondent completing the two parts of the Commitment 
to Belief scale is laid out below:
Step one:
For this step respondents would be working with the statements attached on a separate 
blue sheet. An example of these statements would be; (1) Write down a belief, or 
attitude, that you have that you would like to improve; (2) Write down a belief, or 
attitude, that you have that you feel is particularly healthy or good for you; (3) Write 
down something that you feel that you need in your life; (4) Write down a belief, or 
attitude, that you have that you are guided by, in your life; (5) Write down a belief, or 
attitude, that you care about deeply; (6) Write down an attitude, or belief, that you have 
that you feel hinders you in some way; and (7) Write down a belief, or attitude, that you 
have that you feel strongly about.
Respondents were then asked to answer each question in numerical order, 
writing them on a separate pink sheet provided. Given the personal nature of these 
constructs, respondents were allowed to retain this sheet at the end (only the super­
ordinate constructs are recorded on the questionnaire).
Thus, the pink sheet may provide answers as outlined below (using the 7 
questions mentioned above);
1. Caring for others
2. Honesty
3. Happiness
4. Being successful
5. Communication
6. Competition7. Honesty
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It is worth noting here (as seen in the diagram above) that it is possible for a 
respondent to give the same answer more than once. One assumption brought forward 
with this measure is that it is important to measure commitment to belief, not specific 
beliefs. Subsequently, it could be argued that the duplication of a construct in this step 
is the result of the construct being very important to the individual’s belief. Therefore, it 
is this author’s recommendation that if a construct is repeated it should be retained, as its 
inclusion more than once is simply reflecting an emphasis of this construct to the 
individual’s belief. To alter it, or ask respondents to search for another construct may 
weaken the accurate measurement of what constructs are important to the individual.
Step 2:
For this step respondents would need their answers from step 1 (pink sheet) and a 
yellow sheet provided with 7 sequences of 3 numbers.
An example of the yellow sheet is shown below:
1. 2 6 1
2. 4 5 7
3. 3 4 6
4. 1 4 7
5. 3 4 2
6. 7 3 1
7. 3 5 6
i..— .......... .............. .........................  ......... .................................
These numbers correspond to different sequences of the answers written down on the 
pink sheet. The respondents were then asked the following;
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• Using only the first sequence of numbers, respondents were asked to look at each of 
the 3 answers that correspond to the first number sequence (so for the example sheet 
above, the first sequence was 2, 6, 1, respondents would be looking at their answers 
to questions 2, 6, and 1 only).
• Now respondents were asked to think about these 3 answers. For the respondent, 
one answer would be different from the other two in some way. Respondents wrote 
this difference down in the ‘Construct’ part of the Number sequence 1 
(respondents were informed not to get too worried about this -  to just put down the 
first thing that springs to mind -  if they could not think of one word to describe the 
difference, then they could use a sentence that describes it).
• Then, using the construct they had written down, respondents were asked to write 
down next to it what, to them, is its opposite meaning (again, respondents were 
informed that if they could not think of one word to describe the difference, then to 
use a sentence that describes it).
• The respondents were then asked to mark the construct that is most desirable to 
them.
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To alleviate any problems, respondents were given the example below.
Example
If the sequence of numbers were 1,2, 3. My answers may have been
1. Open mindedness
2. Being in control
3. Perfection.
For me 2 and 3 are ‘Rigid’, and number 1 is ‘Flexible’. So, I would decide that the 
different construct is ‘Flexible’ and decide its opposite is ‘Rigid’.
I would then write in the workbook
Example Sequence
Construct F l e x i b l e  It’s Opposite R i g i d
Step 3:
Next, using only the ‘desirable construct’ from step 2, respondents were asked to 
complete the attribution style type scales for ‘number sequence 1’ only. Here, 
respondents had to decide whether the ‘desirable construct’ was something personal to 
them, whether it is something that will persist across time and whether the construct is 
something that affects all situations in their life. For this, respondents were asked to 
circle either; l=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Slightly disagree, 4=Not certain, 
5=Slightly agree, 6=Agree, and 7=Strongly agree.
Step 4:
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Now respondents were asked to complete steps 2 and 3 for each of the remaining 6 
number sequences given. Completing each scale, which corresponded to each sequence. 
See Appendix 1 for a full copy of the questionnaire.
Other measures administered
(i) The General Health Questionnaire (Goldberg & Williams, 1991). This scale 
contains four sub-scales that measure aspects of general health. Each of 
these sub-scales comprise 7-item measures of; depressive symptoms (e.g. 
‘Felt that life is entirely hopeless’ [item 23]); anxiety symptoms (e.g. ‘Been 
getting scared or panicky for no good reason’ [item 12]); social dysfunction 
(e.g. ‘Been taking longer over the things you do’ [item 16]; and somatic 
symptoms (e.g. ‘Been feeling run down and out of sorts’ [item 3]). Scores 
are recorded on a four point response format, from 0= ‘Better than usual’, 2 = 
‘Same as usual’, 3 = ‘Worse than usual’, through 4 = ‘Much worse than 
usual’. The scale demonstrates satisfactory reliability and validity across a 
number of samples (Goldberg & Williams, 1991).
(ii) The 12-item general self-esteem sub-scale of the Self-Description 
Questionnaire III (Marsh, 1990). This scale is modified from the original, 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and is designed for use 
among adolescents. However, a number of reports on the reliability and 
validity of the scale (Hunter & Stringer, 1993; Maltby, 1995; Maltby, Lewis, 
& Day, 1999) suggest confidence in using the scale among the present 
sample. Higher scores on this variable indicate a higher level of self-esteem.
(iii) The Abbreviated form of the Short-form of the Revised Evsenck Personality 
Questionnaire (Francis. Brown, & Philipchalk, 1992). This shorter measure 
of the Eysenck Personality dimensions is a psychometric equivalent to its 
revised parent form. The questionnaire contains 6-item measures of 
extraversion, neuroticism, psychoticism, and lie scores. The scale has been
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subject to exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses that suggests the 
unidimensionality of the four EPQR-A subscales of extraversion, 
neuroticism, psychoticism, and the lie scale (Forrest, Lewis & Shevlin,
2000). Further construct validity can be found for this version of the 
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire in terms of predicted relationships with 
psychological well-being, affect, religiosity, cognitive tasks, and sex roles 
(Chang, 1997; Cooper & Taylor, 1999; Francis & Bolger, 1997; Lewis & 
Maltby, 1995; Shevlin, Bailey & Adamson, 2002).
(iv) The Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer,
Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982). Measurement of attribution style 
centres around individuals generating causes for a number of good (e.g. ‘You 
get a raise’ [item 12]) and bad (e.g. ‘A friend comes to you with a problem 
and you don’t try to help’ [item 4]) events, and then rating the cause along a 
7-point response format corresponding to internal, stable and global 
attributions. However, Peterson et al., (1982) reports low reliability statistics 
for the sub-scales of the questionnaire. Nevertheless, the scale has since been 
expanded (Peterson & Villanova, 1988) and there has been further discussion 
around further shortened versions (Peterson, 1991; Whitley, 1991;). Further, 
two recent papers make suggestions regarding how the measurement of 
attribution style might be improved (Day & Maltby, 2000; Kinderman & 
Bentall, 1996). Thus, the Attribution Style Questionnaire, incorporating 
suggestions made by Kinderman and Bentall (1996) and Day and Maltby 
(2000) was used. In this version, the completed instructions preceding the 
questionnaire were retained, but the opposing dimensions were separated out; 
(1) Totally due to me, (2) Totally due to others, (3) Totally due to other 
circumstances, (4) Always present, (5) Never present, (6) Just this situation 
and (7) All situations. Further a 7-point response format was retained with 
available responses ranging from (1) Strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) Slightly 
agree, (4) Not Certain, (5) Slightly disagree, (6) Disagree and (7) Strongly
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disagree. Day and Maltby (2000) report satisfactory reliability and validity 
of this amended scale.
Results
Psychometric theory suggests that items of a scale should be examined for possible 
response bias (Kline, 1986). Subsequently responses to all the items of the Commitment 
to Belief scale were examined to ensure all available response categories were used by 
respondents and skewness statistics were computed to ensure none of the items showed a 
skew of above + or -  1 (Cohen, 1988). Table 2.1 (over leaf) demonstrates that when 
answering the Commitment to Belief Scale, respondents used all available response 
categories and the general responses to each item were not skewed.
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Table 2.1: Frequency of responses to each category of the response format for each item
in the Commitment to Belief Scale and skewness statistics for each item.
Frequency of responses to each category of the response 
format in the Commitment to Belief Scale (see key below)
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Skew
Internal 1 40 31 23 10 11 17 22 .483
Internal 2 16 32 24 21 14 21 26 .156
Internal 3 15 40 18 24 13 20 24 .240
Internal 4 36 39 22 12 7 14 24 .597
Internal 5 17 27 30 16 26 16 22 .150
Internal 6 17 24 32 24 19 15 23 .205
Internal 7 40 34 13 15 11 15 26 .423
Stable 1 12 39 14 26 18 24 21 .104
Stable 2 17 33 24 27 9 25 19 .231
Stable 3 52 23 17 13 14 17 18 .485
Stable 4 27 25 18 18 31 25 10 .018
Stable 5 22 21 28 32 19 13 19 .205
Stable 6 36 27 21 17 11 22 20 .311
Stable 7 9 27 32 16 29 26 15 .032
Global 1 18 16 34 27 19 17 23 .102
Global 2 36 29 27 12 10 17 23 .440
Global 3 15 31 21 24 23 19 21 .104
Global 4 17 29 19 32 18 18 21 .131
Global 5 37 34 18 15 9 17 24 .441
Global 6 26 30 16 24 18 19 21 .169
Global 7 14 37 14 26 19 19 25 .112
Key: l=Strongly Disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Slightly Disagree; 4=Not Certain; 5=Slightly Agree; 6=Agree;
7=Strongly Agree.
Table 2.2 shows alpha coefficients for all the items on the Commitment to Belief 
scale (Cronbach, 1951). The alpha coefficients for the scale are above 0.7, suggesting
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internal reliability for each factor (internal, stable, global) of the Commitment to Belief 
scale; and shows overall internal reliability (a= 9187). This suggests that all 3 factors 
(internal, stable, global) perform well together, leading to the suggestion of a one-factor 
model -  that of commitment to belief. However, the Item to Total column shows that 
the internal commitment in sequence 7 is low (0.26).
Table 2.2: Alpha coefficients for all items on the Commitment to Belief scale
Scale Inter-item r’s Item to Total
Internal (sequence 1) 0.9135 0.6464
Stable (sequence 1) 0.9160 0.5176
Global (sequence 1) 0.9148 0.5775
Internal (sequence 2) 0.9125 0.6905
Stable (sequence 2) 0.9143 0.6036
Global (sequence 2) 0.9146 0.5842
Internal (sequence 3) 0.9122 0.7002
Stable (sequence 3) 0.9151 0.5627
Global (sequence 3) 0.9151 0.5630
Internal (sequence 4) 0.9127 0.6813
Stable (sequence 4) 0.9128 0.6760
Global (sequence 4) 0.9142 0.6028
Internal (sequence 5) 0.9134 0.6531
Stable (sequence 5) 0.9136 0.6367
Global (sequence 5) 0.9158 0.5284
Internal (sequence 6) 0.9137 0.6306
Stable (sequence 6) 0.9139 0.6217
Global (sequence 6) 0.9137 0.6386
Internal (sequence 7) 0.9339 0.2593
Stable (sequence 7) 0.9142 0.6035
Global (sequence 7) 0.9145 0.5907
N of Cases = 128 Alpha = .9187
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Further examination of the Commitment to Belief scale can be achieved by exploring the 
factor structure of the scale. Given the suggested one-factor (component) model as 
indicated by the high alpha reliability statistic, table 2.3 shows a principal component 
analysis (Harman, 1967) with unrotated solution. Similarly to the item-to-total 
correlations, all loading on component 1 are above .4, with the exception of one (Internal 
seq, 7.). Thus, suggesting that all items, bar one, are salient to the unrotated component.
Table 2.3: Principal components analysis with unrotated solution
Component
1 2 3
Internal (seq. 1) 0.68 -0.41 0.28
Stable (seq. 1) 0.57 -0.09 -0.46
Global (seq. 1) 0.61 0.35 0.18
Internal (seq. 2) 0.73 -0.30 0.29
Stable (seq. 2) 0.66 -0.12 -0.47
Global (seq. 2) 0.63 0.51 0.11
Internal (seq. 3) 0.74 -0.36 0.25
Stable (seq. 3) 0.62 -0.09 -0.36
Global (seq. 3) 0.61 0.44 -0.02
Internal (seq. 4) 0.73 -0.33 0.19
Stable (seq. 4) 0.73 -0.05 -0.37
Global (seq.4) 0.66 0.47 0.12
Internal (seq. 5) 0.71 -0.27 0.22
Stable (seq. 5) 0.70 -0.02 -0.39
Global (seq. 5) 0.59 0.51 0.09
Internal (seq. 6) 0.66 -0.34 0.34
Stable (seq. 6) 0.68 -0.07 -0.35
Global (seq. 6) 0.68 0.37 0.16
Internal (seq. 7) 0.29 -0.21 0.39
Stable (seq. 7) 0.66 -0.19 -0.32
Global (seq. 7) 0.64 0.36 0.26
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However, the next stage of the analysis was to rotate the items to simple structure.
Table 2.4 shows the eigenvalues for all the items on the Commitment to Belief scale. 
Child (1969) suggests that all eigenvalues above 1.00 are of importance for extraction.
Table 2.4: Eigenvalues for all items above 1.00 for the Commitment to Belief scale
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 8.99 42.79 42.79
2 2.12 10.09 52.89
3 1.81 08.63 61.52
Also Cattell (1966) suggest the Scree Test may be a better indicator of the number of 
factors to be extracted, with the number of factors extracted determined by the number 
of points above the point at which the Scree begins to level out.
Figure 2.1: Scree Test showing the performance of Eigenvalues
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As can be seen from table 2.4 and the Scree test (Figure. 2.1), results suggest that three 
components are to be extracted.
Table 2.5: Extracted method of Principal component analysis with oblomin rotation 
(extraction method) for the three factors.
Component
1 2 3
Internal (seq. 1) 0.79 -0.06 -0.15
Stable (seq. 1) -0.04 -0.03 -0.76
Global (seq. 1) 0.10 0.69 0.02
Internal (seq. 2) 0.75 0.08 -0.12
Stable (seq. 2) 0.03 -0.02 -0.83
Global (seq. 2) -0.06 0.84 -0.09
Internal (seq. 3) 0.77 0.07 -0.19
Stable (seq. 3) 0.05 0.04 -0.69
Global (seq. 3) -0.11 0.71 -0.16
Internal (seq. 4) 0.69 0.01 -0.24
Stable (seq. 4) 0.05 0.12 -0.73
Global (seq.4) -0.01 0.81 -0.02
Internal (seq. 5) 0.65 0.08 -0.18
Stable (seq. 5) 0.01 0.13 -0.73
Global (seq. 5) -0.09 0.81 -0.01
Internal (seq. 6) 0.79 0.04 -0.05
Stable (seq. 6) 0.06 0.09 -0.69
Global (seq. 6) 0.11 0.72 -0.02
Internal (seq. 7) 0.56 0.04 0.21
Stable (seq. 7) -0.17 -0.04 -0.69
Global (seq. 7) 0.18 0.73 0.09
As can be seen in table 2.5, rotating to simple structure using oblique direct oblimin 
rotation (Jenrich and Sampson, 1966) suggests that the first component contains one
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item, that of internal belief (sequence 1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6, and 7). The second component 
contains one item, that of stable belief (sequence 1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6, and 7). The third 
component contains one item, that of global belief (sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7).
This gives strong support for a three-factor (component) model. Therefore, it seems 
prudent to carry out all subsequent analysis using both 1-factor and 3-factor models.
Subsequently, items from the Commitment to Belief Scale were computed into 
four scales for the analysis. All items were used to compute an overall score measuring 
Commitment to Belief (‘Commitment to Belief [CTB]); and three subscales were 
computed representing the 3-factor model; Internal, Stable and Global. Additionally, to 
examine for possible overall response bias for these four scales, skewness statistics were 
computed. All of the four scales did not demonstrate skew by being outside +1 or -1 
(Commitment to Belief, skew=.635; Internal, skew=.703; Stable, skew=.328; Global, 
skew=.432).
Table 2.6 (overleaf) shows the mean scores, by sex, and an independent samples 
t-test for all the scales. Women score significantly higher than men on the measures of 
self-esteem, extraversion, and social desirability. Men score significantly higher than 
women on the measures of depression, internal attributions, and psychoticism.
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Table 2.6: Mean scores (Standard Deviations) by sex, and Independent Samples t-test 
for total sample, for all the scales (*p<0.05; ** p<0.01)
Scale Men (N=52) Women(N=100) t
1. Somatic symptoms 02.00 (01.83) 01.95 (02.08) 0.13
2. Anxiety 01.64 (01.79) 02.29 (05.19) -0.76
3. Social dysfunction 01.14(01.73) 00.89 (01.54) 1.67
4.Depression 01.56 (01.98) 00.83 (01.46) 2.25*
5.Internal Attributions 43.34 (14.99) 37.15 (11.43) 2.43*
6. Stable Attributions 50.37 (14.55) 49.13 (12.35) 0.47
7. Global Attributions 53.75 (15.20) 52.56 (12.24) 0.44
8. Self-Esteem 28.26 (08.79) 31.08 (05.97) - 2.05*
9. Neuroticism 04.26 (05.46) 03.35 (02.38) 1.26
10. Extraversion 03.31 (02.19) 04.62 (02.38) - 2.86*
11. Psychoticism 02.92 (01.63) 01.76 (01.69) 3.49**
12. Lie Scale 01.54 (01.50) 02.32 (01.74) - 2.38*
13. Optimism 19.58 (05.99) 20.38 (04.35) -0.82
14. Internal Belief 24.38(12.18) 22.38(10.86) 0.95
15. Stable Belief 24.71 (11.08) 25.04 (09.52) -0.17
16. Global Belief 25.76 (10.92) 26.26 (09.52) -0.27
17. Commitment to Belief 74.84 (28.32) 73.68 (24.79) 0.24
Table 2.7 (overleaf) shows the Pearson product moment correlations computed 
between internal, stable, and global beliefs, overall commitment to belief, age and the 
psychological well-being scales. The table shows internal, stable, and global beliefs are 
all significantly related to each other, as well as overall commitment to beliefs. Also, 
that scoring higher on internal and global beliefs, and overall commitment is 
significantly associated with age. Overall commitment to beliefs, and internal, stable, 
and global beliefs, are significantly associated to self-esteem, and significantly 
negatively associated with somatic symptoms, anxiety, social dysfunction and 
depression.
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Table 2.7: Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between internal, stable, and 
global beliefs, overall commitment to beliefs, age and psychological well-being 
measures.
OC INT STA GL SE SS ANX SD DEP AGE
l.OC 1 0 0
2.INT .84** 1 . 0 0
3.STA 84** .54** 1 . 0 0
4.GL oo * * 4 9 ** .55** 1 . 0 0
5.SE .36** .25** .36** .32** 1 . 0 0
6 .SS -.33** -.29** -.31** -.24** -.31** 1 . 0 0
7ANX -.2 2 * -.2 1 * -.18* -.14 -.15 .30** 1 . 0 0
8 SD -.30** -.2 2 * -.28** -.28** -.51** .43** .28** 1 . 0 0
9DEP -.36** -.28** -.32** -.32** -.59** .39** .16 .72** 1 . 0 0
10. AGE 23** .23** .15 .19* .15 -.14 - . 1 1 -.06 - . 0 2  1 . 0 0
*p<.05, **p<.01
Key: OC=Overall Commitment to Beliefs: INT=Intemal Beliefs: STA=Stable Beliefs: 
GL=Global Beliefs: SE=Self-Esteem: SS=Somatic Symptoms: ANX=Anxiety: SD=Social 
Dysfunction: DEP=Depression: AGE=Age.
Table 2.8 (overleaf) shows the Pearson product moment correlation coefficients 
computed between internal, stable, and global beliefs, overall commitment and 
attribution and personality. The table shows that no significant relationship is found 
between overall commitment to beliefs, internal, stable, and global beliefs, and 
personality and stable and global attributions. A significant association is found 
between overall commitment to beliefs, and internal beliefs and internal attribution.
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Table 2.8: Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between structure of beliefs, 
commitment, age and attribution and personality
OC INT STA GL N EXT PSY LIE IA SA GA
l.OC 1 . 0 0
2.INT .84** 1 . 0 0
3.STA 84** .54** 1 . 0 0
4.GL .81** 4 9 ** .55** 1 . 0 0
5.N -.04 - . 0 2 -.03 -.05 1 . 0 0
6 .EXT -.06 - . 1 2 -.06 .04 -.18 1 . 0 0
7.PSY .03 .05 .08 -.06 .14 .07 1 . 0 0
8 .LIE -.04 -.08 . 1 2 -.03 .13 . 0 2 . 0 2 1 . 0 0
9.IA .19* .2 2 * . 1 0 .18 -.03 -.16 -.04 -.09 1 . 0 0
1 0 .SA - . 0 2 -.13 . 0 1 .08 - . 0 1 .04 -.32** . 1 2 .48** 1 . 0 0
11.GA . 0 1 - . 1 2 .05 . 1 1 -.06 -.05 -.31** -.03 .45** .75** 1.00
* p< 0.05; **p< 0.01
Key: OC=Overall Commitment to Beliefs: INT=Intemal Beliefs: STA=Stable Beliefs: 
GL=Global Beliefs: N=Neuroticism: EXT=Extraversion: PSY=Psychotocism: LIE=Lie Scale: 
IA:Intemal Attribution: SA=Stable Attribution: GA=Global Attribution.
Discussion
The aim of this chapter was to develop a psychometric measure that would take into 
account a commitment to belief, and its effects on mental health and well-being. The 
scale should (i) measure all underlying core belief (beliefs that are central to the person), 
and must not be reliant upon one type of belief; (ii) be able to measure the size of 
commitment within that belief (i.e. its strength of belief, whether it is evident within all 
aspects of one’s life); and (iii) be considered alongside measures of health and well­
being.
Firstly, the reliability statistics give some information on how the scales are 
functioning within the present sample. It is generally accepted that a reliability statistic
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of above 0.7 is satisfactory for multi-item scales (Kline, 1986). As all reliability 
statistics for each factor (internal, stable, and global) of the Commitment to Belief scale 
are above 0.7 this suggests that all the scales are demonstrating satisfactory internal 
reliability among the present sample. However, the internal commitment within 
sequence 7 is low. This may simply be due to the present sample, however, it may 
suggest that by sequence 7, all core beliefs have been extracted and the seventh sequence 
is unnecessary. However, it may also suggest that the respondents have, by this time, 
become despondent, or bored, of the task. Table 1, showing overall internal reliability 
(a=.9187) suggests that all 3 factors (internal, stable, and global) perform well together.
This is further supported by a principal components analysis that suggests a 1 
factor and 3-factor model can be used. Both these interpretations are consistent with the 
theoretical model presented, that there is a 1-factor model, an overall commitment to 
belief that is fundamental to the effects of belief, i.e. it is the core belief that is 
important. Also, the principal component suggested a 3-factor model, showing the 
important elements to belief, i.e. that to become committed to a belief you must have all 
3 elements -  internal, stable, and global. As support is found for both models, and 
considering that the development of the scale is in its early stages, it seems prudent to 
proceed with research using both solutions, and examine the scale structure using 
confirmatory factor analysis at a later stage.
In terms of exploring the wider context of the Commitment to Belief scale, a 
number of findings emerge which have implications for the scales’ construct validity.
Comparisons of mean scores on the scale suggest that there is no significant 
difference in scores between men and women. Given the intended individual difference 
nature of the scale (rather than sex differences) and no a-priori suggestion of sex 
differences in commitment to belief, this finding supports the construct validity of the 
scale. There is some evidence of a significant positive correlation between a higher 
level of commitment to beliefs and age, among overall scores on the Commitment to 
Belief scale (and two of the subscales, internal commitment and global commitment). In
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finding these relationships, some support is found within Jungian theory, regarding the 
process of individuation (Jung, 1963), in which individuals are thought to develop a 
higher commitment to their beliefs as they move toward self-fulfilment later in life. 
However, the significant positive relationship between age and commitment to beliefs 
may simply reflect that, as individuals get older, they may develop less flexibility in 
beliefs and, thus, stronger commitment to their beliefs. Notwithstanding this debate, 
these speculations warrant further research, particularly as the present sample comprised 
students rather than a full age range.
In terms of the Commitment to Belief scale and its relationship to psychological 
well-being and health, commitment to belief (both for overall scores on the Commitment 
to Belief Scale, and internal, stable, and global factors of belief) is significantly 
associated with higher self-esteem, lower depression, lower anxiety, lower levels of 
somatic symptoms and a lower level of social dysfunction (with one exception, global 
commitment to belief is not significantly associated with anxiety). Though these 
correlations are small, with significant correlations accounting for between 3% and 13% 
of the variance, the present findings suggest some general support for the theory that a 
commitment to belief will result in better psychological well-being.
In terms of establishing the scales validity outside personality space, the 
Commitment to Belief scale is found to be largely located outside Eysenck’s theory of 
personality, and the cognitive personality variable of attribution style, with no significant 
relationships between overall and subscale scores on the Commitment to Belief scale 
and neuroticism, psychoticism, extraversion (and social desirability, identified by way of 
Lie scores), and stable and global attributions. However, a significant relationship is 
found between internal attribution style and internal commitment to belief (which also 
accounts for the significant relationship between internal attribution style and overall 
scores on the Commitment to Belief scale). This relationship accounts for no more than 
5% of the relationship, however, it suggests that internal commitment to belief may not 
be separate from internal attributions. It may be expected that an internal commitment 
to beliefs, shares a small relationship to the use of internal attribution to explain good
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and bad events, as a person who is internally focussed may apply personal values to a 
number of situations. However, if this is the case, we might also expect the other 
aspects of commitment to belief (global, stable) to be related to their theoretical 
attribution style counterpart. Whether internal aspects of commitment to belief, are 
different to the other aspects of the Commitment to Belief scale needs further 
investigation, and as such this post-hoc hypothesising would be better furnished with 
further empirical investigation.
Notwithstanding, the present findings show some initial support for a 
commitment to belief construct, and its measurement through the Commitment to Belief 
scale. Therefore, there is some confidence in using a measure that uses personal 
construct theory and attribution style as a basis for measuring individuals’ commitment 
to a set of beliefs. Exploratory factor analysis suggests a one factor and three-factor 
model of commitment to belief, in which both models are related to better psychological 
well-being, and is not related to personality and attribution style. In summary, the 
present findings suggest confidence in continuing to explore the commitment to belief 
construct, the relationship between commitment to belief and psychological well-being, 
and the relationship of commitment to belief to psychological theory.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Commitment to Belief Scale: Further consideration and exploration
of reliability and validity
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Chapter two involves the development of the Commitment to Belief Scale (CTB). 
Chapter three involves 6 studies aimed to further explore the scale, and to provide 
further validity and reliability for its use.
For this purpose, chapter three is divided into three parts. Part one regards 
the administration of the scale, concentrating on; the generation of personal 
constructs (studies 1 and 2); and the use of attitudinal constructs to examine 
commitment to beliefs (study 3). In study one, frequency tables show that 23 
undergraduate students rated the importance of constructs generated by the 
Commitment to Belief scale as ‘quite a lot’ to ‘very much so’, thus suggesting that 
these generated constructs are actually ‘central’ to the person. In study two, findings 
show significant positive relationships with constructs generated by the scale and 
attitudes of good luck and religion, thus constructs generated are reflective of the 
attitudes of the person. In order for a further validation check to be made, as to 
whether constructs generated by the scale are, in fact, representative of a person’s 
beliefs, participants in study three were asked to rate the applicability of the beliefs 
generated. Findings show significant positive correlations with internal beliefs on 
the Commitment to Belief scale and the statement ‘My beliefs are very personal to 
me’, with stable beliefs and the statement ‘My beliefs are something that will persist 
through time’, and with global beliefs and the statement ‘My beliefs are important to 
all aspects of my life’. Thus part one presents findings to suggest that the constructs 
people are producing, from the scale, are important and relevant.
Part two involves further exploration of the reliability and factor structure of 
the Commitment to Belief scale as a one or three factor model (study 4) and whether 
scores on the Commitment to Belief scale are consistent over time (study 5). For 
study four, replication of findings in chapter two, using exploratory factor analysis, 
was not confirmed, and, in fact, points towards a 1-factor model; however, 
confirmatory factor analysis suggests neither model is prominent. In study five 16 
undergraduate students are re-administered the Commitment to Belief scale after a 
period of 4 months, findings support for test - re-test validity
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Part three investigates an aspect of the construct validity of the scale by 
examining the Commitment to Belief scale’s relationship with measures of irrational 
and just world beliefs (study 6). Here, from a sample of 128 undergraduate students, 
findings suggest no association with the Commitment to Belief scale and the 11-item 
Irrational Beliefs scale (Watson, Vassar, Plemel, Herder & Manifold, 1990), and the 
Just World scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975), and it is suggested that findings provide 
further construct validity for the scale.
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The findings in the previous chapter present some initial support for a Commitment 
to Belief scale, which uses adaptations of personal construct theory and attribution 
style as a basis for measuring individuals’ commitment to a set of beliefs.
Exploratory factor analysis suggests one factor (an overall commitment to belief) and 
three factor models (internal, global, and stable aspects to belief) of commitment to 
belief, in which both models are related to better psychological well-being, and 
largely falls outside personality space, and attribution style. In summary, the findings 
so far, suggest confidence in continuing to explore the commitment to belief 
construct, the relationship between commitment to belief and psychological well­
being, and the relationship of commitment to belief to psychological theory.
However, although a scale has now been developed in order to enable 
investigations of positive effects on mental health, it was considered necessary to 
investigate the scale, itself, a little deeper in order to build confidence in its use.
Thus, the purpose of chapter three is to carry out a series of small studies aimed to 
further establish reliability and validity of the Commitment to Belief scale, as well as 
further consideration to a one or three factor model.
Therefore, in order to further explore this new concept, there are a number of 
research questions that can be suggested in regards to the use, and confidence, of the 
Commitment to Belief scale. These research questions can be largely split into three 
main parts,
(i) Part one: research questions related to examining the validity and 
usefulness of the constructs generated by the Commitment to Belief scale.
(ii) Part two: further exploration of the Commitment to Belief scale’s factor
structure and reliability
(iii) Part three: how scores on the Commitment to Belief scale are related to 
other psychological variables reflecting underlying beliefs.
Considerations of reliability and validity will be considered within all three parts.
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PART ONE:
VALIDITY AND USEFULNESS OF THE CONSTRUCTS GENERATED FOR 
THE COMMITMENT TO BELIEF SCALE.
Research questions related to the administration of the scale.
Part one involves a series of three small studies, each aimed to address a specific 
research question. All the following three research questions are generated from the 
aims of the scale, concentrating first on the generation of personal constructs to the 
use of attitudinal constructs to examine commitment to belief.
STUDY ONE
Are the constructs, generated by the Commitment to Belief scale, central to the 
person?
The first research question is related to the generation of constructs within the scale. 
It has been argued in the previous chapter that, in order to measure commitment to 
belief, the Commitment to Belief scale must reflect core beliefs, i.e. beliefs that are 
central to the person. As such, as Kelly (1955) argued that constructs are the key 
concepts and values used by the individual to construe and organise their world, the 
methodology of the Commitment to Belief scale is designed to generate significant 
constructs using personal construct theory. However, although personal construct 
theory is an established methodology for generating constructs, in the Commitment 
to Belief scale, parts of this methodology have been adapted for its own purposes. It 
is, therefore, necessary to expand the exploration of this method. Thus, as the 
generation of important constructs, or constructs that are central to the person, are 
crucial to the theory of commitment to beliefs, it is prudent to examine whether the 
constructs generated by the participants during the administration of the 
Commitment to Belief scale are, in fact, representative of the individual participants’ 
belief systems, and are, indeed, important, or central, to the individual.
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Method
Participants
23 undergraduate volunteer students (9 male, 14 female) of ages 18 to 51 years 
(Mean = 29.1; SD=11.1) were administered the Commitment to Belief scale.
Procedure
After completion of the scale, participants were asked to consider the constructs they 
had generated, and to examine whether these constructs were actually representative 
of their belief systems, and if so, how important, or central, were these beliefs to 
them. For this purpose, they were asked to rate on a 5-point scale the importance of 
those beliefs, l=not at all; 2=a little; 3=somewhat; 4=quite a lot; 5=very much so.
Results
To allow comparisons with future research, the means and standard deviations by sex 
for internal, stable, global beliefs, and overall commitment to belief are given in table 
3.1. No sex differences were found.
Table 3.1: Mean Scores for internal, stable, global beliefs, and overall commitment 
to belief by sex
Scale Men Women t
Internal Beliefs 24.56 (10.5) 30.69 (12.9) -1.18
Stable Beliefs 26.44 (12.0) 28.85 (13.3) -0.43
Global Beliefs 31.00(11.2) 30.38(11.2) 0.13
Overall Commitment 82.00 (14.7) 89.92 (30.4) -0.72
Table 3.2 shows a frequency table of how participants rated their beliefs. It can be 
seen clearly that most people are rating the constructs generated at 4 or 5, with only 2
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people rating at 3, and only 2 people rating one construct at below 2. The table also 
shows the average mean scores, which gives the lowest score of 2.86, and the highest 
score is 5.00. Therefore, the Commitment to Belief scale is allowing participants to 
measure commitment to belief generally at least ‘somewhat’. Further, the average 
rating across respondents is no less than 4, suggesting that, on average, each 
construct means ‘quite a lot’. Therefore, the Commitment to Belief scale can be said 
to be successfully generating the constructs that are central to the individual.
Table 3.2: Frequency table showing ratings for each construct generated, and means 
for each construct and for each individual overall mean score.
Each 
Persons 
Ratings 
given for 
each
construct; 
l=not at 
all;
through 
5=very 
much so
Frequencies of ratings for each construct generated
Construct 1 Construct2 Construct3 Construct4 Construct5 Construct6 Construct?
Person’s
Mean
Score
4 5 3 4 5 4 4 4.14
2 2 3 3 4 4 2 2.86
5 1 5 3 4 2 5 3.57
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00
5 2 4 4 4 4 4 3.86
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5.00
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5.00
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5.00
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5.00
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5.00
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5.00
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5.00
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5.00
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5.00
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5.00
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5.00
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.00
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5.00
Construct
Mean 4.48 4.22 4.43 4.39 4.52 4.39 4.43
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The first research question to be addressed is whether the constructs generated by the 
Commitment to Belief scale are in fact central to the person.
Because the Commitment to Belief scale is attempting to measure how the 
underlying construct of belief is functioning in itself, and not how a manifested, or 
specific, belief (such as religion) functions, it was important to realise whether the 
scale was in fact drawing on this underlying (or central) belief construct. In order to 
draw on these beliefs, the development of the scale involved the use of aspects of 
Kelly’s Construct theory (1955), and attribution theory (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996; 
Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982; Rotter, 
1966). It was decided that the best way to check whether the scale had, indeed, 
achieved this purpose, was to simply ask the participants. Here, participants rated 
the importance of the belief constructs (that they had generated) as ‘quite a lot’ to 
‘very much so’, and thus, suggesting evidence that the scale is in fact measuring 
what it is supposed to be measuring.
However, it must be remembered that 23 participants is a small sample, by 
any means, and, although it suggests confidence in the scale, replication of these 
findings within a larger sample would give greater satisfaction to answering this 
research question.
Nevertheless study one adds greater confidence in the usefulness of the 
Commitment to Belief scale.
STUDY TWO
Are the constructs generated by the Commitment to Belief scale related to 
general attitude sets?
The second research question, in this section, is also related to the generation of 
constructs. The Commitment to Belief scale involves the measurement of beliefs, and
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it has been argued that these beliefs should be apparent within all aspects of their life 
(i.e. showing commitment to those said beliefs). Therefore, of further interest, is 
whether the constructs generated during the administration of the Commitment to 
Belief scale are, indeed, reflecting the general attitude sets of the individual. Thus, 
for example, we would expect a religious individual to generate religious constructs, 
a conservative individual to generate constructs that are conservative in nature, etc. 
Therefore, there is an opportunity to compare constructs generated for the 
Commitment to Belief scale against scores on a number of measures of attitudes.
For the purpose of this investigation, then, it was decided that only general 
attitude sets would be necessary. There are a multitude of attitudes and beliefs, 
however, within the literature, there are considered to be general attitude sets, that 
‘umbrella’ many smaller, or lesser, attitudes. This is a point made vehemently by 
Wilson (1973a; 1973b; 1985) in the measurement of conservatism, in which he 
argues that most dimensions can be captured within the measurement of 
conservatism-versus-liberalism. Present day studies also support this view 
(Henningham, 1996; Lewis & Maltby, 2000; Maltby, 1997). However, it would also 
be prudent to extend the present consideration beyond just the measurement of 
conservatism. In order to do this, 4 measures (conservatism; irrational beliefs; 
religious orientation; and luck) with themes that regularly appear within the 
psychological literature (specifically within the literature dealing with individual 
differences, within the 1990’s), were deemed appropriate; although length of 
administration time for respondents also informed the decision of the number of 
scales used.
The aim of the present study was to see whether the constructs generated 
within the Commitment to Belief scale reflected general attitude sets of respondents.
Method
Participants
97 undergraduate students (20 men, 75 women, and 2 unidentified) of ages 18 to 44 
(mean=21.8, SD=5.6) were administered the Commitment to Belief scale.
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Procedure
After participants had completed the Commitment to Belief scale, these completed 
questionnaires were then given to three separate individuals for assessment (See 
Appendix 2 for a copy of the assessment sheet). These people were asked to look at 
each completed questionnaire, and consider the constructs that each participant had 
generated. They were then asked to decide on the nature of these constructs, on 
whether the participant had generated a religious construct, a luck construct, a 
conservative construct, or an irrational beliefs construct, or, indeed, none of these. 
For example, the construct ‘religious’ would obviously be rated as a religious 
attitude; the construct ‘ability to change’ could be rated as an opposite of the 
conservatism attitude, etc. These decisions, then would allow a comparison between 
the type of constructs generated by each individual questionnaire and their scores on 
other attitude scales. For this purpose, only the Belief in Good Luck Scale, the ‘Age- 
Universal’ I-E Scale, the 12-item measure of social conservatism, and the 11-item 
Irrational Beliefs scale were used. Other scales present in the original study 
presented in chapter two were considered inappropriate, as they can be considered as 
personality style measures, and therefore, not representative o f ‘beliefs’.
The decisions made by each rater, i.e. as to whether a belief construct was 
conservative in nature, etc, was down to each individual rater’s own opinions. These 
decisions were then pooled, and only constructs that had been rated with the same 
attitude, from all three raters, were taken forward for analysis. However, in order to 
give some guidance as to the meanings of each attitude set, a brief description of 
each was presented to the raters, as shown on the next page.
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DESCRIPTIONS OF ATTITUDE SETS j
RELIGION -  divided into 3 dimensions: Intrinsic (where individuals are j
described as living their religious beliefs, the influence of which is evident in j
every aspect of their life); Extrinsic-Personal (individuals look to religion j
for comfort, relief, and protection, and using religious practices, such as 
prayer, for peace and happiness); and Extrinsic-Social (individuals look to j
church for making friends, creating social status, and being part of an in­
group). |
1IRRATIONAL BELIEFS -  evaluative cognitions, as internal and stable j
factors, couched in the form of rigid, dogmatic, and absolute musts, shoulds, J
have to’s, got to’s, and oughts. j
CONSERVATISM -  attitudes which include; religious fundamentalism, j
pro-established politics, advocacy of strict rules and punishment, militarism, \
intolerance of minority groups, conventional tastes in art or clothing, j
restrictions on sexual activity, opposition to scientific progression, and the j
tendency to be superstitious.
LUCK -  a belief in fate, or a higher power that influences the outcome of \
events; considered as either bad luck or good luck.
t —   _: — — ____ ^ ________________
Questionnaires
1. The Commitment to Belief Questionnaire: see Chapter two for full description 
of this.
2. The Belief in Good Luck Scale (Darke & Freedman, 1997b). This scale
contains 12-items (e.g. ‘I consider myself to be a lucky person’) and responses 
are scored on a 6-point scale anchored by ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘strongly 
agree’. The scale demonstrates satisfactory reliability and validity across a 
number of samples (Darke & Freedman, 1997; Day, Maltby, & Macaskill, 
1999; Day & Maltby, in press).
3. The 11-item Irrational Beliefs Scale (Watson, Vassar, Plemel, Herder &
Manifold, 1990). The scale is derived from a previous well-used measure of 
irrational beliefs (MacDonald & Games, 1972), but uses simplified language to 
measure irrational beliefs. Examples of the scale’s items include ‘I feel it is a 
catastrophe when things are not the way I would very much like them to be’
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[item 4] and ‘I am often upset over other people’s problems’ [item 10]. 
Responses to items on the Irrational Beliefs scale are scored on a five-point 
response format (l=Strongly Disagree, through to 5=Strongly Agree). Possible 
respondents scores range from 11 to 55, with higher scores indicating a higher 
degree of irrational beliefs. Though reports on this version of a measure of 
irrational beliefs are limited, available evidence suggests the scale represents 
one factor among non-clinical samples (Mahoney, 1997; Maltby & Day, 2001).
4. The 12-item measure of social conservatism Questionnaire (Henningham, 
1996). The scale is modified from the original 50-item Wilson-Patterson 
Conservatism Scale (1968), with some item changes and amendments. 
Henningham (1996), Maltby (1997), and Maltby, Day and Edge (1997) have 
reported that scores on the scale show a good internal reliability and correlate 
significantly with other measures of political attitude and behaviours, and fits 
well within Wilson’s (1973) full descriptions of conservatism (Maltby, 1997).
5. A measure of intrinsic and extrinsic orientation towards religion. Respondents 
were administered the ‘Age-Universal’ I-E Scale -  12 (Gorsuch & Venable, 
1983; Maltby, 1999), which is a derived, revised, and amended measure of the 
Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967). Since the inception of the 
Religious Orientation Scale, a number of suggestions have been made to 
improve psychometric confidence in the measurement of the intrinsic and 
extrinsic religious constructs. Suggestions have included item changes, 
changes in response format, and scoring methods (Gorsuch & McPherson, 
1989; Gorsuch & Venable, 1983; King & Hunt, 1969; Kirkpatrick, 1989; 
Leong & Zachar, 1990; Maltby & Lewis, 1996). In the main, consideration of 
such changes suggest that the intrinsic orientation is a constant feature of 
religious orientation, while an extrinsic orientation towards religion represents 
two separate factors; extrinsic-social and extrinsic-personal. The present scale 
administered is a 12-item ‘Age-Universal’ version of the Religious Orientation 
Scale (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983) that adopts items suggested by Gorsuch and 
McPherson (1989) and changes to the response format (Maltby & Lewis, 
1996). Maltby (1999) reports, among 300 USA, English and Irish adults, a 
psychometric confidence in combining these suggestions to measure intrinsic
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orientation towards religion (6-items), an extrinsic-personal orientation towards 
religion (3-items) and an extrinsic-social orientation towards religion (3-items).
Results
To allow comparisons with future research, the means and standard deviations by sex 
for internal, stable, global beliefs, and overall commitment to belief are given in table 
3.3. No sex differences were found.
Table 3.3: Mean Scores for internal, stable, global beliefs, and overall commitment 
to belief by sex
Scale Men Women t
Internal Beliefs 19.38(06.1) 18.79 (06.9) 0.31
Stable Beliefs 24.69 (09.1) 22.87 (06.1) 0.96
Global Beliefs 23.81 (07.5) 24.67 (08.2) -0.38
Overall Commitment 67.88 (17.8) 66.33 (14.3) 0.37
All individual ratings (from the three raters) were added together and considered for 
internal reliability. Table 3.4 shows alpha coefficients for all ratings for constructs of 
luck, conservatism, religion, and irrational beliefs (Cronbach, 1951). The alpha 
coefficients for both belief in good luck and religion were above 0.7, suggesting 
satisfactory internal reliability for each rater’s opinions of constructs. The alpha 
coefficient for conservatism was, however, less reliable at 0.5188. These types of 
attitudes, however, may be more difficult to identify, as conservatism is thought to 
subsume a number of other belief sets; i.e. attitude of religion or just world beliefs. 
Finally, the ratings for irrational beliefs were dropped as no rater had identified any 
of the constructs generated as those of irrational beliefs.
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Table 3.4: Inter-rater reliability for all ratings for constructs of luck, religion, and 
conservatism.
Construct a
Luck .8969
Religion .7074
Conservatism .5188
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were then computed 
between each rating’s total (all three raters totalled together) for the three constructs 
of luck, religion, and conservatism, and their corresponding attitude scale (the Belief 
in Good Luck scale, Darke & Freedman, 1997b; the ‘Age-Universal’ I-E Scale, 
Gorsuch & Venable, 1983; Maltby, 1999; and the 12-item measure of social 
conservatism, Henningham, 1996). Significant positive relationships were obtained 
for ratings of constructs on luck, and total scores on the Belief in Good Luck scale 
(r=.352, p<.01); and ratings of constructs on religion and intrinsic religion (r=.280, 
p<.01) and extrinsic personal religion (r=.266, p<.01). No significant relationships 
were found between ratings of constructs on religion and extrinsic social religion 
(r=.l 13, p>.05) and ratings of conservatism and total scores on the 12-item measure 
of social conservatism (r=-.102, p>.05).
Discussion
The second research question to be addressed is whether the constructs generated by 
the Commitment to Belief scale are related to the general attitude sets of the 
participants.
Because the Commitment to Belief scale is involved in measuring beliefs that 
are central to the person, and thus, should be apparent within all aspects of a person’s 
life (commitment), it was important to realise whether the scale was in fact drawing 
on belief constructs that reflected a person’s everyday attitudes. Therefore, the 
number of constructs generated should be correlated to their general attitude sets.
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Findings show that significant positive relationships were obtained for ratings 
of constructs on luck (generated by the Commitment to Belief scale), and total scores 
on the Belief in Good Luck scale; also significant positive correlations were found 
for ratings of constructs on religion, intrinsic religion, and extrinsic-personal religion 
(generated by the scale), and appropriate scores on the Age-Universal I-E scale.
This suggests, then, that some validity can be assumed for the Commitment 
to Belief scale, as constructs generated of a lucky or religious (intrinsic, extrinsic 
personal) nature can be compared to responses on the corresponding general attitude 
scales. However, this cannot be seen for those of conservatism and extrinsic-social 
religion. Such findings do not support the construct validity sought in this study, but 
however there are some reflections to be made on the findings.
With the benefit of hindsight, it can be argued, that one of the reasons for 
selecting conservatism as a criterion, may indeed be the reason for the lack of 
correlation. When considering conservatism, as a validity construct, it may not be as 
straight forward as first thought, as the descriptions used by respondents could be 
interpreted into different attitude styles. For instance, descriptions of conservatism 
could easily be considered as a just world belief (e.g. the construct “idealism”), or as 
a religious belief (e.g. “morality”). This lack of clarity may be reflected in the low 
reliability of rater scores. Therefore, future research testing the validity of the 
Commitment to Belief Scale, in this way, may seek to be more specific in the attitude 
sets chosen to test (e.g. attitudes towards money) to ensure that the measurement of 
all the constructs are clear, not only to respondents but also, to raters.
Notwithstanding these speculations, there is some evidence to show that the 
constructs generated by the Commitment to Belief scale are related to general 
attitude sets, and therefore, the constructs generated in the scale may reflect 
individual’s wider beliefs; though further research is needed using a variety of 
attitude sets to provide further confidence in the scale.
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The Commitment to Belief scale should be related to general statements 
regarding individual’s commitment to belief:
The third research question further relates to respondents’ ratings of constructs in 
terms of how committed they are to their beliefs. As such, from adding together 
responses to whether constructs generated by the scale reflect something about 
themselves, persist across time and is something that affects all situations in life, a 
commitment to belief score is calculated. In order for a further validation check to 
be made, as to whether these ratings are, indeed, representative of the depth of their 
belief, scores can be examined against other reports by the individual that relate to 
statements regarding the commitment to their beliefs. In other words, does the 
respondent agree that the constructs generated are indeed representative of their said 
beliefs.
Method
Participants
This study was carried out using the original data set of 154 undergraduate students 
(52 men, 100 women, of ages 18 to 51) presented in chapter two. Of these, 20 pieces 
of data were returned incomplete, and will not be included in the final analysis.
Procedure
After completion of the Commitment to Belief scale, respondents were then asked to 
rate their generated constructs as to the applicability to their personal beliefs via a 
short measure. This short measure was designed to offer general statements on belief 
which are rated on a 5-point scale, from (l)=Disagree Strongly, through (5)=Agree 
Strongly. Statements include (i) ‘My beliefs are very personal to me’; (ii)‘My beliefs 
are something that will persist through time’; and (iii)‘My beliefs are important to all
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aspects of my life’. These broad statements are designed to reflect the general 
hypotheses of commitment to belief, and are not computed into a scale.
Results
To allow comparisons with fixture research, the means and standard deviations by sex 
for internal, stable, global beliefs, and overall commitment to belief, and all three 
belief statements are given in table 3.5. No sex differences were found.
Table 3.5: Mean Scores for internal, stable, global beliefs, and overall commitment 
to belief, and all three belief statements by sex
Scale Men Women t
Internal Beliefs 24.38 (12.2) 22.38 (10.9) 0.95
Stable Beliefs 24.71 (25.0) 25.04 (09.5) -0,17
Global Beliefs 25.76(10.9) 26.26 (09.5) -0.27
Overall Commitment 74.84 (28.3) 73.68 (24.8) 0.24
Belief Statement 1 02.89 (01.3) 03.89 (01.2) -4.57
Belief Statement 2 02.53 (01.1) 02.35 (00.9) 0.99
Belief Statement 3 02.48 (01.0) 02.32 (00.9) 0.89
Pearson product moment correlations were computed for each of the three aspects of 
internal, stable, and global beliefs from the Commitment to Belief scale, and the 
three broad statements of belief. Significant positive correlations were found for 
internal beliefs on the Commitment to Belief scale and the first statement ‘My beliefs 
are very personal to me’ (r=.413, p<.01); for stable beliefs on the Commitment to 
Belief scale and the second statement ‘My beliefs are something that will persist 
through time’ (r=.458, p<.01); and for global beliefs on the Commitment to Belief 
scale and the third statement ‘My beliefs are important to all aspects of my life’ 
(r=.381, p<.01).
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The third research question was a further validation check as to whether belief 
constructs generated by the Commitment to Belief scale were actually beliefs that 
participants agreed were very important to them.
Therefore, it was considered that the belief constructs generated, and rated as 
internal, stable and global should relate to general statements made by the 
participants regarding their individual commitment.
Findings show that significant positive relationships were obtained for each 
of the three aspects of internal, stable, and global beliefs from the Commitment to 
Belief scale, and the three broad statements of belief (‘My beliefs are very personal 
to me’; ‘My beliefs are something that will persist through time’; and ‘My beliefs are 
important to all aspects of my life’) respectively.
The three Commitment to Belief scale dimensions (of internal, stable, and 
global), then, demonstrate significant correlations to the broad likert-scale type 
statements of belief, and as such, must suggest further confirmation that the 
constructs generated are applicable to respondents’ said beliefs, and, therefore, 
demonstrates further validity.
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PART TWO:
FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
COMMITMENT TO BELIEF SCALE
STUDY FOUR
Does the Commitment to Belief Scale measure a one factor or three factor 
model?
The previous chapter’s findings suggested that both a 1-factor and 3-factor model of 
the Commitment to Belief scale could be used. And, indeed, both these 
interpretations are consistent with the theoretical models proposed; first, that the 1- 
factor model demonstrates an overall commitment to belief as fundamental to the 
effects of belief, i.e. it is the core belief that is important; and second, that a 3-factor 
model shows the important elements to belief, i.e. that to become committed to a 
belief you must have all 3 elements -  internal, stable, and global. Therefore, , as 
support was found for both models, it seems prudent to further examine the scale’s 
structure by replicating the exploratory factor analysis with another sample, and, if 
necessary by using confirmatory factor analysis, in order to identify whether a 1- 
factor, or 3-factor model is more appropriate.
Method
176 undergraduate students at Sheffield Hallam University (65 males, 111 females) 
aged between 18 and 58 years (Mean=28.9, SD=10.4) were administered the 
Commitment to Belief Scale (see chapter 2 for full details). These respondents are 
the same sample that is reported in Chapter 6 and 8 of this thesis.
Results
Cohen (1969) suggests that all eigenvalues above 1.00 are of importance for
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extraction, therefore, Table 3.6 shows only those Eigenvalues performing for all the 
items on the Commitment to Belief scale, that achieve this criteria. Thus, the table 
suggests that a three-factor model, of internal, stable, and global aspects to 
commitment to belief is still possible. A Scree test (Cattell, 1966) also suggests that 
three components should be extracted.
Table 3.6: Eigenvalues for all items above 1.00 for the Commitment to Belief scale
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 10.99 52.19 52.19
2 1.76 8.39 60.58
3 1.15 5.49 66.07
Given the consideration of a one-factor or three-factor model, a principal 
components analysis with unrotated solution, with three components extracted, was 
performed. Table 3.7 shows all numbers within component 1 are above .4, 
components 2 and 3 were not relevant. Thus, suggesting that all items are salient to 
that one component, and all load together to produce a one-factor model of overall 
commitment to belief.
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Table 3.7: Principal components analysis with unrotated solution
Component
1
Internal (sequence 1) .74
Stable (sequence 1) .66
Global (sequence 1) 71
Internal (sequence 2) .76
Stable (sequence 2) .65
Global (sequence 2) .63
Internal (sequence 3) .74
Stable (sequence 3) .66
Global (sequence 3) .66
Internal (sequence 4) .76
Stable (sequence 4) .77
Global (sequence 4) .74
Internal (sequence 5) .74
Stable (sequence 5) .78
Global (sequence 5) .79
Internal (sequence 6) .79
Stable (sequence 6) .65
Global (sequence 6) .60
Internal (sequence 7) .77
Stable (sequence 7) .74
Global (sequence 7) .77
As can be seen in table 3.8, when rotating to simple structure using oblique direct 
oblomin rotation (Jenrich & Sampson, 1966) that the items load above .4 on the first 
factor. Therefore, giving strong support for the one-factor model.
76
Chapter 3: Reliability and validity of scale 
Table 3.8: Extracted method of Principal component analysis with oblomin rotation
(extraction method) for the three factors.
Component
1 2 3
Internal (seq.l) 0.22 -0.69 -0.07
Stable (seq.l) 0.85 -0.04 -0.08
Global (seq. 1) 0.71 -0.12 0.05
Internal (seq. 2) -0.13 -0.87 0.13
Stable (seq. 2) 0.26 -0.15 0.40
Global (seq. 2) 0.15 -0.02 0.64
Internal (seq. 3) 0.11 -0.89 -0.17
Stable (seq. 3) 0.76 -0.04 0.05
Global (seq. 3) 0.64 0.16 0.38
Internal (seq. 4) -0.06 -0.75 0.20
Stable (seq. 4) 0.37 -0.11 0.48
Global (seq. 4) 0.26 -0.04 0.65
Internal (seq. 5) -0.09 -0.77 0.19
Stable (seq. 5) 0.63 -0.28 0.03
Global (seq. 5) 0.27 -0.45 0.23
Internal (seq. 6) -0.06 -0.88 0.09
Stable (seq. 6) 0.03 -0.14 0.65
Global (seq. 6) -0.14 -0.05 0.87
Internal (seq. 7) 0.20 -0.82 -0.15
Stable (seq. 7) 0.42 -0.26 0.22
Global (seq. 7) 0.36 -0.23 0.35
Thus, findings for the replication of exploratory factor analysis demonstrates 
a leaning towards a one-factor model, however, the original exploratory factor 
analysis (see chapter 2) demonstrates a leaning toward a three-factor model. 
Therefore, findings are confusing, and give no clear indication of which factor 
structure is of best fit. Therefore, to provide further understanding, confirmatory 
factor analysis was performed.
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The models were analysed using PRELIS and LISREL 8. The following 
LISREL analysis was assessed on the co-variance matrices. PRELIS analysis was 
used to assess the univariate and multivariate normality of the measured variables. 
Kurtosis statistics to assess univariate and multivariate normality were all non­
significant. The model parameters were estimated using LISREL 8. Co-variances 
were all found to be less than 1 and none of the negative error variances were found 
to be approaching zero, suggesting the parameters were free within the subsequent 
analysis.
Table 3.9 shows the goodness of fit statistics reported for each of the models. 
Using cut-off criteria of .95 for the ML based statistics (TLI, IFI, CFI), .08 for 
SRMR and .06 for RMSEA (Hu & Bentler, 1999), neither of the models 
demonstrates a goodness of fit.
Table 3.9: Good fit statistics for 1 and 3 factor models of the Commitment to Belief 
Scale.
X2 SRMR RMSEA GFI AGFI PGFI NFI TLI
(NNFI)
CFI IFI
(BL89)
1-factor 
model
1321.15 .09 .19 .56 .47 .46 .61 .60 .64 .65
3-factor 
model
1032.07 .07 .15 .66 .58 .53 .70 .70 .73 .74
Discussion
Study four involved further exploration as to whether the Commitment to Belief 
scale contains a one or three factor model.
The findings in chapter two suggested that both a 1-factor and 3-factor model 
of the Commitment to Belief scale could be used, and, indeed, both these 
interpretations are consistent with the theoretical models proposed; i.e. a 1-factor
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model demonstrates an overall commitment to belief; and a 3-factor model shows 
three important aspects of belief (internal, stable, and global).
Therefore, as support was found for both models, it seemed prudent to further 
examine the scale structure by, firstly, replicating the exploratory factor analysis, 
and, if necessary by using confirmatory factor analysis, in order to identify which 
model presented the best fit.
However, when attempting to replicate findings in chapter two (by using 
exploratory factor analysis), findings were directed towards a one-factor model, 
rather than a suggestion that both models were appropriate. Further, when 
confirmatory factor analysis was performed, neither model seemed to present best fit.
Therefore, findings here are confusing at best, with no model showing 
prominence. It is, therefore, suggested that both models should continue to be used 
throughout the subsequent chapters, that is, to use both overall scores and subscale 
scores of the Commitment of Belief Scale, until further examination can be carried 
out.
STUDY FIVE 
Test -  Re-test Reliability -  Commitment to belief should be stable over time.
The fifth research question relates to reliability of the scale, i.e. the stability of scores 
on the Commitment to Belief scale over a period of time. As well the consideration 
of stability for validity purposes, however, is the added consideration of theoretical 
implications of commitment to belief needing to be stable, in other words, it has been 
established, so far, that committed beliefs (core) should also be stable over time.
Indeed, Jung stated that beliefs can actually be detrimental to health, and 
indeed, may be the root to neurosis if beliefs attempted by the individual are 
inconsistent (i.e. constantly seeking for, and failing to gain, a strong belief).
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Therefore, the commitment to a belief is fundamental to it being long and established 
within the individual.
The Commitment to Belief scale has, so far, shown that the stable factor is 
involved within a three-factor model of belief from self-reports on the scale. 
However, it would be prudent to the validity of the scale to check that a belief is 
indeed stable. Therefore, the fifth research question can be established by 
examining the test-retest reliability of the scale.
Method
Participants
16 undergraduate volunteer students (4 male, 12 female) of ages 18 to 30 years 
(Mean=23.0 years; SD=4.9) were administered the Commitment to Belief scale on 2 
separate occasions, the second time was administered 4 months after the first. (See 
chapter 2 for details of questionnaire).
Results
Using Pearson product moment correlation coefficients, test -  re-test reliability was 
established over a 4-month interval for the scores on each of the three individual 
aspects of the Commitment to Belief scale (internal, stable, and global dimensions). 
Values are given in table 3.10 where it may be seen that the correlations for the 
internal, stable, and global scores ranged between .73 for the internal dimension and 
.85 for the global dimension. These results provide support for test -  re-test 
reliability (Kline, 1986).
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Table 3.10: Test -  Re-test Reliability for the three aspects to belief, of internal, 
stable, and global dimensions, of the Commitment to Belief scale over a 4-month 
interval.
Dimensions of Belief Pearson r P
Internal .727 <.01
Stable .829 <.01
Global .845 <.01
Discussion
The fifth research question relates to the reliability of the scale, considering whether 
there is stability of scores on the Commitment to Belief scale over a period of time, 
as well as the theoretical suggestion that commitment of belief should be stable over 
time.
Findings show significant positive correlations with scores on the internal, 
stable, and global dimensions of commitment to belief from the first administration 
of the scale, and the second administration of the scale.
These test -  re-test reliabilities indicated high congruence in participants’ 
responses over a period of 4 months, supporting the notion that the scale measures 
stable aspects of belief rather than fluctuating short-term states, and is also evidence 
for the view that belief contains a stable dimension towards commitment. Further 
testing would be recommended for more extended periods of time such as one year, 
to confirm this.
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PART THREE:
RESEARCH QUESTIONS RELATING THE COMMITMENT OF BELIEF 
SCALE TO OTHER CONSTRUCTS
The remaining research question is generated from suggestions relating to how the 
Commitment to Belief scale is related to other psychological variables.
STUDY SIX
Discriminant Validity: The relationship between commitment to belief, . 
irrational belief, and just world beliefs
The sixth research question is concerned with the relationship between commitment 
to belief, irrational beliefs, and just world beliefs. Kline (1986) stated that the degree 
to which a scale has validity will depend on the extent to which scores on the test 
should, not only correlate well with expected related factors, but also should 
correlate poorly with factors that they, in principle, should correlate poorly with.
Irrational beliefs represent the central interest and the core of rational- 
emotive theory and therapy (RET) of Albert Ellis (1971; 1973); more recently re­
named Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT: see Ellis, 1995). RET 
represents a special theoretical and application approach to human cognition and 
emotions within a broader cognitive-behavioural view of the individual, primarily 
focused on the explanation of the effect of cognitive factors (especially evaluative 
thinking and beliefs) on emotions and behaviour in the context of mental health and 
disorder (Chang, 1997; Kordacova, 1994). Kordacova argues that it was inspired 
with the philosophy of stoics who stressed the importance of personal life 
philosophies of an individual within the subjective look at the world, including 
hypotheses; and beliefs concerning the character of the world created by every 
individual. Epictetus’s (1948) statement that ‘people are disturbed not by things, but 
by the views they take of them’ represents a fundamental part of the present-day 
cognitive behavioural approaches to psychopathology and psychotherapy (e.g. Ellis, 
1973; Ellis & Dryden, 1987). Irrational beliefs, then, are considered to have
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underlying detrimental effects on mental health regardless of what type of irrational 
belief, i.e. whether of a religious, or self-defeating belief in nature.
Lemer and associates (Lemer, 1965; 1980; Lemer & Miller, 1978) introduced 
the concept of a ‘just world’ to explain the results of investigations wherein subjects 
would denigrate a victim in a situation where the subject could not re-establish an 
equity condition (Couch, 1998). Just world beliefs have demonstrated correlations to 
self-esteem, depression, and self-blame; coping; and helplessness (Lemer, 1980; 
1992; Miller & Porter, 1983; Seligman, 1975). Lemer (1980) and Rubin & Peplau 
(1975) argue that just world beliefs are apparent in all domains of life, i.e. both for 
the self and others. Belief in a just world, then, can result in a general pattern of 
attribution in which victims are deemed responsible for their misfortune: poverty, 
oppression, tragedy, and injustice all happen because they are deserved by their 
victims, whether the victim is themselves or another. This theory again considers 
that ‘just’ beliefs have underlying global effects on mental health regardless of the 
persons other attributes.
These two theories, then, can be considered to hold theoretical parallels to the 
theory being proposed around commitment to belief, i.e. that all three theories argue 
that they underpin many different dimensions to belief. However, the Commitment 
to Belief scale attempts to take a further step, in arguing that it is the commitment to 
a belief, whether, for example, ‘irrational’ or ‘just’ in nature, that is the cmcial factor 
to mental health. Therefore, it is prudent to examine whether commitment to belief 
is correlated with either irrational or just world beliefs. It is suggested, for the 
purposes of construct validity then, that no significant correlations will exist between 
the Commitment to Belief scale, and irrational, and just beliefs.
Method
128 undergraduate students (45 men, 81 women, 2 not reported) of ages 18 to 51 
years (Mean=23.39, SD=7.09) were administered the Commitment to Belief scale 
and measures of irrational beliefs and just world beliefs.
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Respondents were administered
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1. The Commitment to Belief Scale
2. The 11-item Irrational Beliefs Scale (Watson, Vassar, Plemel, Herder & 
Manifold, 1990). The scale is derived from a previous well-used measure of 
irrational beliefs (MacDonald & Games, 1972), but uses simplified language 
to measure irrational beliefs. Examples of the scale’s items include ‘I feel it 
is a catastrophe when things are not the way I would very much like them to 
be’ [item 4] and ‘I am often upset over other people’s problems’ [item 10]. 
Responses to items on the Irrational Beliefs scale are scored on a five-point 
response format (l=Strongly Disagree, through to 5=Strongly Agree). 
Possible respondents scores range from 11 to 55, with higher scores 
indicating a higher degree of irrational beliefs. Though reports on this 
version of a measure of irrational beliefs are limited, available evidence 
suggests the scale represents one factor among non-clinical samples 
(Mahoney, 1997; Maltby & Day, 2001).
3. A measure of just world beliefs. The most commonly used measure of a just 
world is the Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975). However, since its 
development, there have been conflicting issues as to whether it represents a 
measure of uni- or multi-dimensionality (Couch, 1998). The present sample 
was administered the 20 items from the Just World Scale using equivalent 
items to those suggested by Couch (1998), and considered in the context of a 
2-dimensional scale, belief in a ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ world, as suggested by 
Whatley (1993) and Couch (1998). The measure is scored on a 5-point 
response scale: l=Disagree Strongly, through 5=Agree Strongly. Authors 
have also commented upon the low internal reliability, ranging from .56 to 
.72, (Ambrosio & Sheehan, 1990; Caputi, 1994; Couch, 1998; Whatley, 
1993), and thus, more accurate measurement is called for. However, in spite 
of the scale’s psychometric problems, the Just World scale is, at present, the 
best predictor of just and unjust beliefs.
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To allow comparisons with future research, the means and standard deviations by sex 
for internal, stable, global beliefs, overall commitment to belief, irrational belief, and 
just and unjust belief are given in table 3.11. No sex differences were found.
Table 3.11: Mean Scores for internal, stable, global beliefs, overall commitment to 
belief, irrational belief, and just and unjust belief by sex
Scale Men Women t
Internal Beliefs 24.38 (12.2) 22.38 (10.9) 0.95
Stable Beliefs 24.71 (11.1) 25.04 (09.5) -0.17
Global Beliefs 25.76 (10.9) 26.26 (09.5) -0.27
Overall Commitment 74.84 (28.3) 73.68 (24.8) 0.24
Irrational Belief 28.72 (08.6) 30.16(05.9) -1.06
Just Belief 31.79(11.0) 32.21 (08.3) -0.23
Unjust Belief 25.21 (08.1) 25.28 (04.5) -0.07
Pearson Product moment correlation coefficients were computed between internal, 
stable, and global beliefs, overall commitment to belief, irrational beliefs, and just 
and unjust world beliefs.
Table 3.12: Pearson Product moment correlations computed between internal, stable, 
and global beliefs, overall commitment to belief, irrational belief, and just and unjust 
belief.
INTB STAB GLOB COB IRR JUST UNJUST
1 .Internal Belief 1.00
2.Stable Belief 0.54** 1.00
3.Global Belief 0.49** 0.55** 1.00
4.Commitment of Belief 0.84** 0.84** 0.81** 1.00
5.Irrational Beliefs -0.12 -0.05 -0.11 -0.11 1.00
6.Just Beliefs -0.04 0.04 0.24 0.01 -0.10 1.00
7.Unjust Beliefs -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.70 0.09 -0.64 1.00
* p< .05; ** p<.01
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As can be seen in Table 3.12, no significant correlations were found for any of the 
factors of the Commitment to Belief scale and irrational beliefs, and just and unjust 
beliefs, and therefore, supporting construct validity for the Commitment to Belief 
scale.
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General Discussion and Final Comments
The aims of this chapter were to examine a number of reliability and validity aspects 
of the Commitment to Belief scale, through a series of small studies. These research 
questions could be largely split into three parts;
(i) Part one: research questions related to examining the validity and 
usefulness of the constructs generated by the Commitment to Belief scale.
(ii) Part two: further exploration of Commitment to Belief scales’ factor 
structure and reliability
(iii) Part three: how scores on the Commitment to Belief scale are related to 
other psychological variables reflecting underlying beliefs.
In all, there are five main findings. First, there is evidence that the constructs people 
are producing from the Commitment to Belief scale are important and relevant to the 
respondents. In study one subjects rated the importance of the constructs that they 
had generated from the Commitment to Belief scale as ‘quite a lot’ to ‘very much 
so’. In study two, significant positive relationships were obtained for ratings of 
constructs on luck, and total scores on the Belief in Good Luck scale (r=.352, p<.01); 
and ratings of constructs on religion and intrinsic religion (r=.280, p<.01) and 
extrinsic personal religion (r=.266, p<.01), when raters were asked to consider 
constructs obtained by the Commitment to Belief scale, in relation to general attitude 
sets. These results demonstrate confidence in the Commitment to Belief Scale being 
used to measure a person’s actual beliefs, but not only that it does measure beliefs, 
but that the beliefs are reflective of the attitudes of the person. This gives confidence 
in using the scale to further explore the theory around commitment.
Second, some concurrent validity is found for the Commitment to Belief 
scale against 1-item statements of commitment to belief. Study three showed 
significant positive correlations for internal beliefs on the Commitment to Belief 
scale and the first statement ‘My beliefs are very personal to me’ (r=.413, p<.01); for 
stable beliefs on the Commitment to Belief scale and the second statement ‘My 
beliefs are something that will persist through time’ (r=.458, p<.01); and for global 
beliefs on the Commitment to Belief scale and the third statement ‘My beliefs are
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important to all aspects of my life’ (r=.381, p<.01). Therefore, these findings suggest 
some concurrent validity for the Commitment to Belief scale.
Third, commitment to belief seems to be fairly stable over time. From study 
5, the Commitment to Belief scale shows satisfactory test -  re-test reliabilities in 
participants’ responses over a period of 4 months, supporting the notion that the scale 
measures stable aspects of belief rather than fluctuating short-term states, and is 
evidence for the view that belief contains a stable dimension within commitment to 
belief. Further testing would be recommended for more extended periods of time 
such as one year, to confirm this.
Fourth, the construct validity of the scale is supported by its absence of an 
association with measures of irrational and just world beliefs. As such, it can be 
suggested that commitment to belief does not vicariously reflect a wider set of beliefs 
that can be understood within another theoretical perspective. This point highlights 
an important aspect to the present studies in that they examine what psychological 
variables the Commitment to Belief scale is not related to. Such a consideration is 
important, though sometimes lengthy and seemingly redundant with the benefit of 
hindsight, as it remains important to ensure that the Commitment to Belief scale is 
not simply replicating what is measured within another psychological domain. 
Therefore, the findings of no relationship between the Commitment to Belief scale 
and other general belief sets (irrational and just world beliefs) adds to the construct 
validity of the scale.
The fifth finding is not so conclusive, as to whether the Commitment to 
Belief scale comprises one-factor or three-factors. The previous chapter 
demonstrated evidence for both a one-factor (overall commitment to belief) and a 
three-factor model (internal, stable, global aspects of belief) for the Commitment to 
Belief scale. However, replication of these findings by using exploratory factor 
analysis on a different sample was not confirmed. Instead, the findings, here, pointed 
to a one-factor model. Further, when confirmatory factor analysis was performed, 
the findings showed neither model as prominent. Therefore, future work should 
continue to report correlations for both the 1-factor and 3-factor solutions to present a
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full consideration. Clearly, further examination of the factor structure of the 
Commitment to Belief scale is required.
Nevertheless, studies 1 to 6 show that the Commitment to Belief scale shows 
satisfactory reliability and validity against the criteria used.
Final Comments
In summary, this chapter has detailed further consideration of a measure of 
commitment to belief. Constructs generated by the scale have been shown to be 
valid, and in turn ratings of these constructs’ relationship to some other attitudes set 
suggest confidence in this part of the test. The scale was shown to have a stable 
factor structure, high test -  re-test reliability, and construct validity with respect to 
the 1-item measure of commitment to belief and the a lack of a significant correlation 
with irrational and just world beliefs. However, exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analysis has been unable to identify whether a one or three-factor model is more 
appropriate.
Despite some reservations in the present study, the implications of the 
findings from the studies in this chapter build on findings in the previous chapter and 
are envisaged to be positive. The present findings suggest emerging support for the 
Commitment of Belief Scale that can be used to measure commitment to belief 
regardless of individuals’ specific beliefs. This has certain advantages, none so more 
than the fact that this scale can be used to measure beliefs, without employing a 
number of different measures of belief. Therefore, given the confidence in this new 
measure, studies of the effects of commitment to belief, and the implications of this 
commitment on theoretical underpinnings can now be established.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Commitment to belief and Jungian Theory (Part I): Jung’s typology and 
concepts surrounding Individuation.
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Chapters 2 and 3 involved the development of the Commitment to Belief scale; chapter 
4 begins to consider the concept of commitment to belief within a more theoretical 
framework.
The aim of the following studies was to examine the relationship between 
commitment to belief and measures of individuation and self-actualisation, derived from 
Jungian theory, to further provide evidence for a theoretical context for recent findings 
with the Commitment to Belief scale. In study 1, among 43 respondents, the findings 
suggest that aspects of commitment to belief are related to words associated with some 
aspects of individuation, but not necessarily symbols associated with individuation.
In study 2, among 178 respondents, commitment to belief is related to self- 
actualisation as measured by the Measure of Actualization of Potential (Leclerc, 
Lefrancois, Dube, Hebert, & Gaulin, 1998), with more detailed relationships being 
revealed by the Commitment to Belief scale’s association with some of the scale’s 
subscales.
To sum, the present findings suggest that those individuals who show a high 
level of commitment to belief associate themselves with concepts that can be described 
in the process of individuation and self-actualisation, and suggests some evidence that 
Jungian concepts can be used to further explain the concept of underlying belief.
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Introduction
In the previous two chapters a measure of commitment to belief has been developed that 
shows good reliability and validity. However, at present, there is little support for a 
theoretical context for this measure. As the theory behind the development of the 
measure was, in essence, derived from Jungian theory, a programme of research is 
necessary to test ideas around a commitment to belief, against ideas that can be derived 
from Jungian theory. Given, then, that this thesis has established the measurement of 
commitment to belief within individuals, it seems proper to attempt to consider the 
mechanisms behind it. Two primary ideas emerge. The first is the possible relationship 
between commitment to belief and the Jungian concept of individuation. The second is 
the possible relationship between commitment to belief and other aspects of self- 
fulfillment.
1. Commitment to belief and individuation
Jung’s term “individuation” applies to a deep inner coming together that symbolizes the 
union of consciousness with the unconscious (Casement, 2001). Perhaps paradoxically, 
on the one hand, individuation means becoming wholly and indivisibly one’s self in 
distinction to others, but on the other hand, it also means gathering the world to oneself 
in order to fulfill collective qualities more completely and satisfactorily. The 
individuation principle is seen as the highest achievement, the human psyche in its 
fullest possible development. In Jungian terms this means; overcoming the divisions 
imposed by family and society, to divest oneself of “the false wrappings of the persona” 
(Jung, 1953, para. 269) [persona -  the public face that a person assumes when relating 
to others]; to abandon one’s ego-defenses; and rather than projecting one’s shadow on to 
others, strive to know it and acknowledge it as part of one’s inner life [shadow -  the 
unconscious part of the personality that contains characteristics which one cannot 
recognize as one’s own]; come to terms with contra sexual personality living within the 
personal psyche [anima and animus -  the feminine and masculine sides to personality]; 
and attempt to bring to conscious fulfillment the supreme intentions of the Self [Self -
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the archetype of wholeness of the psyche which transcends the ego]. Complete 
achievement of these objectives within an individual’s lifetime is rarely possible, of 
course, but that is not the point. “The goal is important only as an idea” wrote Jung;
“the essential thing is the opus which leads to the goal; that is the goal of a life time” 
(Jung, 1954, para. 400)
One of the main sources of misunderstanding of Jung’s work is that of an 
overriding interest in "the collective unconscious". Ultimately, it was the mystery of 
consciousness and its relationship with the unconscious that, to him, was of greatest 
importance (Van Der Post, 1994). Thus, he proposed that the unconscious and the 
conscious exist in a profound state of interdependence of each other and the well-being 
of one is impossible without the well-being of the other. If ever the connection between 
these two great states of being is diminished, then the individual becomes sick and 
deprived of meaning (Jung, 1958). Consciousness for Jung, then, is not merely an 
intellectual and rational state of mind.
Jung produced evidence from his work among his schizophrenic and "neurotic" 
patients that most forms of insanity and mental disorientation were caused by a 
narrowing of consciousness and that the narrower and more rationally focused the 
consciousness of the individual, the greater the danger of antagonizing the forces of the 
collective unconscious to such a point that they would rise to the surface and overwhelm 
consciousness (Van Der Post, 1994). Jung argued it was only by continually working at 
an increase of consciousness that the individual found their greatest meaning and 
realization of the highest values. He suggested that consciousness is the abiding and 
deepest dream of the unconscious and that, as far back as one could trace the history of 
the spirit of people, it has incessantly strived to achieve ever greater and greater 
consciousness; a consciousness which Jung preferred to call "awareness." This 
"awareness," for him, included all sorts of non-rational forms of perception and 
knowing, which are considered by the individual as all the more important because they 
lead to an endless wealth of, as yet, unrealized meaning in the collective unconscious, 
always ready to carry reinforcements for expanding and strengthening the consciousness
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of the individual, and the engagement in an unending campaign against the exactions of 
life in the here and now (Jung, 1953). This, then, demonstrates clearly that, in Jung’s 
view, a deep commitment to one’s beliefs is paramount in order to strive forwards 
toward individuation and the understanding of the Self.
From these preceding descriptions and conclusions, an individual reaching 
individuation is thought to demonstrate a certain ‘completeness’ in which the individual 
believes they have an understanding of the world and their place within it. One resulting 
feature of this ‘completeness’ for the individual is a belief system that the individual will 
be deeply committed to, as this helps them better understand the world, giving them 
meaning and purpose. Therefore, it is expected that someone who is high in 
individuation will also have a high commitment to belief. Therefore, if Jungian theory 
has some bearing on the present consideration of commitment, an individual who shows 
higher levels of commitment to belief will be expected to show higher levels of 
individuation.
It is with this in mind, then, that the following studies will consider whether there 
is a significant relationship between commitment to belief and Jung’s process of 
individuation.
Issues of measurement
The process of individuation has been shown to be an unconscious process, showing 
itself and the desire for growth through dreams etc (Jung, 1945; 1960), which eventually 
work their way through to consciousness. The first problem, then, in psychometrically 
testing this hypothesis, is how best to operationalise this study, and attempt to measure 
individuation. Indeed, Kline (1988) and Sjoback (1992) have substantially warned of 
the dangers of measurement when examining the unconscious (i.e. at best it is very 
difficult, at worst impossible; it is probably not possible) when considering Freudian 
defence mechanisms, though these critiques are probably just applicable to all 
psychoanalytic concepts that deal with the unconscious; including Jungian concepts that 
deal with the unconscious. The problems are rightly defined; firstly, when attempting
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to measure a specific theory that is grounded within the unconscious, researchers have to 
be aware that they are actually measuring the unconscious and not some other process. 
Secondly, the use of questionnaire measures, no matter how formulated to embrace the 
unconscious mechanism, cannot directly tap the issue, simply because the responses 
have to be made conscious. Kline (1987), however, when speaking about the measure of 
defence, does suggest that the use of Projective Tests could be used to measure the 
unconscious, with well-substantiated methodology.
Thus, with the consideration of Projective Tests, Jung (1959a) himself gives 
insight into how it may be possible to operationalise this hypothesis. Jung believed that, 
when considering the process of individuation, that the understanding of the nature of 
consciousness could only be renewed and enlarged, as life demanded it to be renewed 
and enlarged, by maintaining its non-rational lines of communication with the collective 
unconscious. For this reason, he rated very highly all non-rational ways along which 
individuals in the past have tried to explore the mystery of life and stimulate their 
conscious knowledge of the universe around them into new areas of being and knowing. 
This is the explanation of Jung’s interest, for instance, in astrology, alchemy, and the 
significance of the Tarot (Lauren Van der Post, 1984).
Jung argued that, since all symbolic material derives from a level of human 
experience, which is common to all of us, therefore, valid connections could be made 
between some of the Tarot symbols and those of other systems. But this deep layer of 
the psyche, which is termed the unconscious, is by definition not conscious. Its images 
do not derive from the ordered intellect, but rather, in spite of it. They do not present 
themselves in a logical manner. Indeed, Jung says, each philosophical system is merely 
an attempt on the part of the intellect to create a logical order out of the seeming chaos 
of imagery arising from the unconscious. Intellectual categories are a way of 
systematizing experiences of this non-verbal world. Each is a kind of grid system 
superimposed over the raw experience of human nature (Nicholls, 1984). This system, 
and therefore, the Tarot, is useful, viewed one by one, these various patterns offer 
convenient pigeonholes for organizing psychic experiences. The picture of the Tarot tell
95
Chapter 4: Commitment to Belief and individuation
a symbolic story, and just like dreams, come from a deeper level of consciousness (in 
defining the scope of a symbol, Jung often stressed the difference between a symbol and 
a sign. A sign denoted a specific object or idea which can be translated into words, e.g. 
a striped pole means barber shop; an X means railroad crossing. A symbol stands for 
something which can be presented in no other way and whose meaning transcends all 
specifics and includes many seeming opposites, e.g. the Sphinx, the Cross etc [Jung, 
1966]).
Jung (1959b) and Nicholls (1984) argue then, that the Tarot can be considered as 
‘projection holders’, meaning simply that they are hooks to catch the imagination. 
Projection is an unconscious, autonomous process whereby an individual will first see in 
the persons, objects, and happenings in their environment those tendencies, 
characteristics, potentials and shortcomings that really belong to them. As Nicholls 
(1984) says, we ‘people’ the exterior world with the witches, and princesses, devils and 
heroes of the drama buried in our depths.
Projecting the inner world onto the outer one is not a thing people do on purpose, 
it is simply how the psyche functions (Jung, 1912 onwards). In fact, projection happens 
so continuously and so unconsciously that individuals are usually totally unaware it is 
taking place. Nevertheless, these projections are useful tools toward gaining self- 
knowledge. Nicholls (1984) and Jung (1954) argue that the Tarot Trumps are ideal for 
this purpose because they represent symbolically those instinctual forces operating 
autonomously in the depth of the human psyche which Jung called the archetypes. 
Although the specific forms of archetypal images vary from culture to culture and 
person to person, their essential character is universal. People of all ages and cultures 
have dreamed, storied, and sung about the archetypal mother, father, lover, hero, 
magician, fool, devil, saviour, and old wise man (Nicholls, 1984). Since the Tarot 
Trumps picture all the archetypal images they are an appropriate tool for investigating 
the unconscious, and can be viewed, according to Jung, as a silent picture text 
representing the typical experiences encountered along the path of self-realisation, 
individuation (Jung, 1954). Therefore, Study One will consider the relationship between
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individuation and commitment to belief by using the Tarot pictures.
However, although a method considering the Tarot seems sound, it is worth 
raising, here, some possibly problematic issues that should be taken into account. First, 
the results could be typical of the problems raised by Kline (1987) and Sjoback (1992), 
who argue that, within empirical psychology, it is difficult, if not impossible, to. measure 
the unconscious, as all behaviour must be observable in order to measure it. Thus, the 
procedure in this experiment still may not directly address the unconscious process of 
individuation. Nevertheless, Kline did suggest that projection tests could be the way 
forward. With this in mind, then, research using the Tarot cards merits investigation.
Second, it is worth noting that there could be a problem with the use of the Tarot 
cards themselves. Over the last 20 years or so, the Tarot cards have become extremely 
popular, and are known, at least by reputation, by most people. However, this reputation 
may have distorted the pure projection theories mentioned by Jung. Throughout the last 
few decades the Tarot have been portrayed widely within film and television, and have 
become associated with Horror, and Thriller movies. The Death, Devil, and Tower 
cards, for instance, have often been displayed as horrific omens representing the 
outcome of their namesake. Intriguingly, however, the World card (which represents 
full individuation) is less known, i.e. less portrayed within film, and/or less threatening 
in nature, and thus, could show that the original meanings may not be lost. It is 
important to keep in mind then, that these issues may have a detrimental effect on the 
original purpose of the Tarot cards (as projection holders), as Jung saw them, and 
consequently, damage the possibility of the chance to measure the unconscious through 
projection methods. .
These possible problematic issues, then, may or may not affect the outcome of 
this experiment. Thus, because of the issues raised, another method will also be 
considered.
Because of the problems raised with the modem stereotypes attached to the Tarot
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cards, a different approach was also considered in order to attempt to measure 
individuation, that of word association. Jung (1902 onwards) first turned to the Word 
Association Test whilst studying schizophrenic patients in Zurich, and later developed it 
to show evidence for his theory on complexes (Jung, 1958). The test was first adapted 
by Sir Francis Galton (1865) to differentiate types of intelligence. In design it was quite 
simple: the person being tested was told that a series of words would be read aloud 
slowly, and that they were to respond immediately, to each, with the first word that came 
into their head. With a stop watch the examiner would note the reaction time, and 
record it. Jung introduced a simple, though important, modification in giving the test; 
when a delayed reaction occurred he asked the subject why they had hesitated before 
giving a reply. Through numerous tests, it became evident to Jung that the response to 
the test words was influenced by the subject’s emotion, and that the test was useful as a 
pointer to hidden (unconscious) emotion (Bennet, 1983). The Word Association Test 
was not only invaluable because of its simplicity, but because of the additional 
advantage of making a fairly accurate quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the 
person’s response to a certain situation. According to Jung, this was because, by its 
form, the test reproduces the psychological situation of the dialogue. When a stimulus 
word is used it is more than a word, it becomes a condensed action, as though the subject 
were in a certain situation and responding to it.
Thus, Word Association has become a well-established technique, in 
psychotherapy, that claims to tap the emotions of the unconscious. Although the Word 
Association Test would be a prolonged and time-consuming test, it is possible to 
consider the theory behind Word Association, and adapt it for the purposes of a simple 
experiment. For this purpose, then, considering simply the emotional responses to 
words, it could be possible to offer participants a series of meaningful words (involved 
with the individuation process), and asked to respond to them on the feelings they evoke,
i.e. whether they felt a dislike or affinity with each word.
Therefore, Jungian theory suggests two ways (symbolism, through the use of the 
Tarot, and Word Association) that can be used to consider whether there is a relationship
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between the process of individuation and commitment to belief using two methods of 
investigation.
2. Other measures of self-fulfillment
Actualisation is a term originally introduced by the orgasmic theorist, Kurt Goldstein 
(1939), for the motive to realize all of one’s potentialities. In his view, it was the master 
motive. Indeed, the only real motive a person has, all others being merely 
manifestations of it.
Self-actualisation was further developed by Maslow (1956). In Maslow’s theory 
of personality, it is the final level of psychological development that can be achieved 
when all basic and meta needs are fulfilled and the “actualization” of the full personal 
potential takes place. The two theories of self-actualisaiton are similar, however, for 
Goldstein, it was a motive and for Maslow, it was a level of development. For both, 
however, roughly the same kinds of qualities were expressed: independence, autonomy, 
a tendency to form few but deep friendships, a “philosophical” sense of humour, a 
tendency to resist outside pressures and a general transcendence of the environment 
rather than a simple “coping” with it (Reber, 1985).
Although self-actualisation theory is a unique concept, from the description, it 
has similarities to that of Jung’s theory of individuation, where Jung believed that 
individuation was fundamentally the process of becoming an individual who is aware of 
his or her individuality.
Therefore, because this research question is involved with considering whether 
aspects of commitment to belief are related to Jung’s concept of Individuation, and 
given the rather speculative methodology using the Tarot, and word association, it was 
considered worthy to further explore this question through a measure of self- 
actualisation (as yet there are no specific measures of Jung’s individuation, only related 
concepts such as actualizing potential). There have, within the literature, been a number 
of measures for self-actualisation, namely the Personal Orientation Inventory (Shostrom,
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1974), which is a forced-choice test comprising 150 items; the Personal Orientation 
Dimension (Shostrom, 1975), a revised version of the POI comprising 260 items: and 
the Short Index of Self-Actualisation (SISA) (Jones & Crandall, 1986), which has 15 
items. However, in general, researchers report low internal consistency (e.g. Weiser & 
Myers, 193); Weiss (1987) argues that these measures show unsatisfactory validity; and 
Burwick and Knapp (1991) indicated the lack of uniform definition of self-actualisation; 
while others reported other, and different, methodological flaws (Fogarty, 1994; Ray, 
1984; Whitson & Olczak, 1991b). Therefore, when the Measure of Self-Actualisation: 
MAP (Leffancois, Leclerc, Dube, Hebert, & Gaulin, 1997; 1998; 1999) was published in 
order to counteract previous problems with actualization measures, it was deemed to be 
an appropriate opportunity to use a psychometric measure to gain clarity, or further 
explore, the findings alongside the first two suggested methodologies.
Aims of the study
This thesis has proposed, so far, that a theory of a commitment to belief can gain 
theoretical guidance through the writings of Jung. Therefore, it seems necessary to 
consider whether, in fact, commitment to belief stems from, and is part of, Jungian 
theory. Further, it has been proposed that Jung’s concept of individuation presents 
certain similarities, or parallels, with the commitment to belief concept, and that this 
concept is part of the archetypal unconscious.
Therefore, the aim of the following two studies was to investigate whether the 
concept of individuation; using the Tarot cards, and word association (study 1), to 
attempt to ‘tap’ the unconscious; and the Measure of Self-Actualisation: MAP 
(Lefrancois, Leclerc, Dube, Hebert, & Gaulin, 1997; 1998; 1999: study 2) is related to 
the Commitment to Belief scale.
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Method
42 undergraduate volunteer students (9 men, 33 females) of ages 18 to 51 years 
(Mean=25.4 years; SD=9.90) took part in this experiment.
Procedure
Each participant was shown a picture of each of the 22 major Tarot cards. They were 
asked to consider each card on how the picture made them feel, in other words, whether 
they liked the picture or not. Each response was rated using a 5-point Likert scale of (1) 
= ‘I strongly dislike this picture,’ through to (5) = ‘I strongly like this picture’. Because, 
in this experiment, interest lies with the process of individuation, only the last seven 
cards, which, according to Jung, specifically relate to individuation, were considered for 
statistical analysis (Devil, Tower, Star, Moon, Sun, Judgment, World). High scores 
correspond to an affiliation with these seven pictures, hence showing strong 
individuation.
Because, it has been demonstrated that the Tarot cards hold archetypal 
properties, and clearly, according to Jung (1954), mapped out the individuation process, 
it was also considered that descriptive terms for the meaning of each card would be 
appropriate for use in this test, as a means of word association. Thus, ten descriptive 
words, or phrases, (used by Jung to describe each card’s meaning) were selected for 
each of the seven Tarot trumps to reflect their characteristics. The number of words 
used was arbitrary, but it was decided that ten would be ample by which to create the 
desired response. A full list of the words used is shown below. It should also be made 
clear that the descriptions used for this experiment are well established, both within 
Jungian psychology (Nicholls, 1984), and within more traditional uses of the cards, i.e. 
books on divination (e.g. Douglas, 1988; Gwain, 1994).
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After rating the pictures, then, participants were given the series of words and 
asked to consider how each word made them “feel”, i.e. their emotional response. These 
words represented concepts to do with each aspect of individuation: Devil, Tower, Star, 
Moon, Sun, Judgment, and World
1. ‘Devil’: (1) Acceptance of Limitations; (2) Acceptance of Failings; (3) Hidden 
Forces; (4) Materialism; (5) Worldly Pleasures; (6) Unconscious Desires; (7) Removal 
of Mental Blocks; (8) Instinct; (9) Abundance; and (10) Procreation.
2. ‘Tower’: (1) Catharsis; (2) Testing of Values and Ideas; (3) Forces of Destiny; (4) 
Catastrophe; (5) Unexpected Events; (6) Havoc; (7) Setback; (8) Loss of Stability; (9) 
New ways of life; and (10) Breaking of Convention.
3. ‘Star’: (1) Good Fortune; (2) Promise; (3) Optimism; (4) Joy; (5) Hope; (6) 
Inspiration; (7) Sense of Purpose; (8) Renewal of Energy; (9) Insight; and (10) Good 
Health.
4. ‘Moon’: (1) Uncertainty; (2) Fluctuation; (3) Illusion; (4) Intuition; (5) Unconscious; 
(6) Fantasy; (7) Unpredictability; (8) Psychic Forces; (9) Vulnerability; and (10) Higher 
Self.
5. ‘Sun’: (1) Strength; (2) Energy; (3) Success; (4) Prosperity; (5) Wealth; (6) 
Happiness; (7) True Friends; (8) Good Cheer; (9) Health; and (10) Triumph.
6. ‘Judgment’: (1) Reward for Past Effort; (2) Settling of Matters; (3) Rejoicing; (4) 
Renewal; (5) Growing Awareness; (6) Resolution; (7) Completion; (8) Final Outcome; 
(9) Self-appraisal; and (10) Evaluation.
7. ‘World’: (1) Triumphant Achievement; (2) Harmony; (3) Realisation of Goals; (4) 
Reward; (5) Completion; (6) Attainment; (7) Perfection (8) Success; (9) Satisfaction; 
and (10) Wholeness.
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Participants were asked to immediately rate each word, or phrase, due to their 
affiliation with it. This was done using a 5-point Likert scale of (1) = ‘Strongly Dislike’ 
through (5) = ‘Strongly Like’. High scores correspond to positive emotional affiliation 
with these seven cards, hence showing strong leanings toward individuation.
Participants were then asked to complete the Commitment to Belief 
Questionnaire.
Questionnaires
The Commitment to Belief Questionnaire. This scale measures commitment to belief by 
generating constructs. These constructs are then rated as to their importance on a 7- 
point scale from (1) = ‘Strongly Agree’, through (7) = ‘Strongly Disagree’ (see Chapter 
2 for full description of the scale).
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A brief definition o f the Tarot Trumps (Nicholls, 1984)
FOOL -  the wanderer, or hero 
(Represents the individual setting out on their life’s journey)
The Top Row is called the Realm of Gods as it pictures many of the major archetypes 
MAGICIAN HIGH EMPRESS EMPEROR POPE LOVER
PRIESTESS
(Virgin (Mother (Father (Old wise man (Eternal triangle)
archetype) archetype) archetype) archetype -
institutional)
CHARIOT
(Ego king)
Then, in the journey, the Hero’s chariot carries him to the Second Row -  the Realm of Earthly Reality and Ego 
Consciousness i.e. sets out to find vocation, family, social position (concerned with equilibrium i.e. harmonious 
relationship between opposing forces)
JUSTICE
(Moral
problems)
HERMIT
(Further
enlightenment
outside
established
religion)
WHEEL of STRENGTH HANGED DEATH
FORTUNE
(Things 
beyond our 
control
(Confronting 
animal nature)
MAN
(Helplessness) (Re-growth)
TEMPERANCE
(Energies and 
hopes begin to 
flow again)
Next, with Temperance, the Fool, or Hero, is ready to turn his energies more consciously toward the inner world -  
from ego development -  to -Self.
The Third Row is called the Realm of Heavenly Illumination and Self-Realisation
DEVIL TOWER STAR MOON SUN JUDGMENT WORLD
(Flashes o f - Illumination in ascending order - (Re-birth) (The Self)
Inspiration)
The map above shows a brief summary of the journey of the Self through the Tarot 
cards, as established by Jung, and advanced by Nicholls (1984) (actual pictures shown to 
participants can be seen in appendix 3). Definitions will concentrate on the cards 
specifically related to the individuation process.
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As can be seen, the final row of Tarot Trumps are particularly concerned with the 
process of individuation.
The Devil -  represents those first flashes of inspiration towards self-realisation, i.e. the 
confrontation with the Shadow. Jung goes on to say that the classic picture of the Devil 
as half man, half beast “exactly describes the grotesque and sinister side of the 
unconscious, for we have never really come to grips with it and consequently it has 
remained in its original savage state” (Jung, 1971, p.208). This card threatens the very 
order of things, i.e. the routine of life, or the rut and shackles people make for 
themselves. It is only when facing and dealing with this Shadow archetype that a person 
begins the journey towards turning inwards and individuation. It is only when 
individuals break from convention that they move on to a conscious relationship with the 
Self. One is driven by the Self to move away from the original identifications in order to 
establish a reunion with the Self on a different level of awareness.
The Tower - represents the first steps of illumination. The Tower picture contains an 
image of lightning striking. According to Jung, this is a symbol of divine energy, a 
numinous force, and represents naked power and illumination in its most primitive form. 
This lightning strikes at the ivory tower that a person creates for themselves, opening 
their eyes to the unknown and forcing their journey to individuation further onwards.
The Star -  represents the second step to illumination, and pictures an important step 
toward a more conscious and active participation in the process of individuation. In the 
Tower, enlightenment comes in a blinding flash, which is dazzling, and cataclysmic to 
be faced directly (i.e. still unconscious), much less assimilated (Nicholls, 1984). In the 
Star, the central figure is pictured as a naked human being, humbly kneeling. In her 
calm, natural setting there is room for contemplation and space for silent growth. In the 
psychology of a man, the Star represents his anima, or unconscious feminine side. In a 
woman’s journey this figure, being of the same sex, would symbolize a shadow aspect 
of the personality. Since the Star woman is drawn on the grand scale, larger than life, 
she could, according to Nicholls, personify a quality far beyond the personal shadow and
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more akin to the Self. In either case, the kneeling figure represents a hitherto 
inaccessible aspect of the psyche (Jung, 1963a).
The Moon -  represents the third step towards illumination, and represents the bleakest 
moments of the journey, where the individual sinks deepest into the unconscious, 
possibly suffering depression, as the individual loses contact with every aspect of their 
conscious ego, or self; the darkest hour is before the dawn. This is the final 
confrontation with the shadow, that which allows the individual to incorporate his 
unconscious side in with the conscious self.
The Sun -  represents the final stage to illumination. Here, the individual can recapture 
the lost spontaneity of their natural selves, rediscovering the inner harmony they felt as 
children before the opposites of the personality were split, in order to live within the 
ordered demands of their social realms. It is the archetype of the ‘eternal child’.
Judgment -  represents rebirth. Here, for the first time, a human figure (the one rising 
from the tomb) faces the source of illumination. This was not the case in any of the 
‘illuminating’ cards above, in these; the archetypal realm took place above and behind 
the earthly figures. They felt its effects, but only indirectly, via the unconscious. In 
Judgment the central figure consciously perceives and hears the call from the trumpet.
In the Tarot series, Judgment heralds the beginning of a new order -  a new interaction 
between conscious and unconscious, which will become manifest in the final card, the 
World.
The World -  represents the Self, the realization of individuation, and the center of 
psychic wholeness. The picture shows a dancer holding the wands of positive and 
negative energy. She is released from neurotic conflict and more open to the 
fundamental experience of opposites, which Jung calls ‘divine conflict’. As Jung (1958) 
frequently emphasized, and as the Tarot dramatizes, to be filled with divine conflict is a 
privilege and burden specifically human. It offers no escape into ‘another world’ but 
presents the individual with the challenge of living in this world in a meaningful way.
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Content within the framework of her natural boundaries, the World dancer is concerned, 
as with alchemy, in turning the base metal of her everyday existence into golden 
experiences of lasting value (Nicholls, 1984).
Results
Initial Analysis o f Individuation Words
The 10 individual ratings for words corresponding to each card were added together and 
considered for internal reliability. The following results show the process of considering 
which items were of best use in this word association scale by removing the lowest item 
to total correlations each time an alpha coefficient (Cronbach, 1951) was computed for 
each set of items (each card). According to Kline (1986), when considering the worth of 
a new scale, this is the best method to use over techniques such as factor analysis for 
defining scales of a small sample size.
Words corresponding to the ‘DeviP
The 10 words, or phrases, used for rating that are associated with the Devil aspect of 
individuation are as follows: (1) Acceptance of Limitations; (2) Acceptance of Failings; 
(3) Hidden Forces; (4) Materialism; (5) Worldly Pleasures; (6) Unconscious Desires; (7) 
Removal of Mental Blocks; (8) Instinct; (9) Abundance; and (10) Procreation.
Computing Alpha coefficients for all ten words was 0.6546. In line with Kline 
(1986), the lowest item to total was removed and recalculated. Removal of item 4 
(materialism) led to an alpha coefficient of 0.7050, suggesting satisfactory internal 
reliability for the remaining 9 items for the scale.
Words corresponding to the ‘Tower’
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The 10 words, or phrases, used for rating that are associated with the Tower aspect of 
individuation are as follows: (1) Catharsis; (2) Testing of Values and Ideas; (3) Forces of 
Destiny; (4) Catastrophe; (5) Unexpected Events; (6) Havoc; (7) Setback; (8) Loss of 
Stability; (9) New ways of life; and (10) Breaking of Convention.
Computing Alpha coefficients for all ten words was 0.6380. In line with Kline 
(1986), the lowest item to total should be removed and recalculated until satisfactory 
internal reliability is reached. However, with this set of words, removing any 
subsequent items would in fact reduce the alpha coefficient statistic. Therefore, although 
satisfactory reliability was not reached, it was considered that the statistic is perhaps 
high enough to carry forward for the scale, but with caution.
Words corresponding to the ‘Star’
The 10 words, or phrases, used for rating that are associated with the Star aspect of 
individuation are as follows: (1) Good Fortune; (2) Promise; (3) Optimism; (4) Joy; (5) 
Hope; (6) Inspiration; (7) Sense of Purpose; (8) Renewal of Energy; (9) Insight; and (10) 
Good Health.
Computing Alpha coefficients for all ten words was 0.9077, suggesting 
satisfactory internal reliability for all items to be taken forward for the scale.
Words corresponding to the ‘Moon’
The 10 words, or phrases, used for rating that are associated with the Moon aspect of 
individuation are as follows: (1) Uncertainty; (2) Fluctuation; (3) Illusion; (4) Intuition; 
(5) Unconscious; (6) Fantasy; (7) Unpredictability; (8) Psychic Forces; (9)
Vulnerability; and (10) Higher Self.
Computing Alpha coefficients for all ten words was 0.3140. In line with Kline 
(1986), the lowest item to total was removed and recalculated. Removal of item 9
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(vulnerability) led to an alpha coefficient of .6198, therefore, the next lowest item to 
total was removed and recalculated. Removal of item 1 (uncertainty) led to an alpha 
coefficient of 0.6352, which was also unsatisfactory. Removal of item 2 (fluctuation) 
led to an alpha coefficient of 0.6438. Removal of item 7 (unpredictability) led to an 
alpha coefficent of 0.6629. Unfortunately, the removal of any more items again began 
to reduce the coefficient, therefore, although not totally a satisfactory internal reliability 
statistic, the statistic is perhaps considered high enough to carry forward for the scale, 
but with caution. Thus, the remaining 6 items (illusion, intuition, unconscious, fantasy, 
psychic forces, higher self) were taken forward for the scale. The reduction in the 
amount of words needed to create a reliable scale may raise questions around the 
individuation construct related to the ‘Moon’, or it may suggest problems with the 
original set of words chosen, however, the words used are of a long established nature 
corresponding to this card. Nevertheless, it is worth noting, here, however, that the 
words deemed unreliable were words that reflect levels of uncertainty or doubt to the 
individual (for example: uncertainty; fluctuation; unpredictability; and vulnerability), 
and perhaps not surprisingly were not liked by the participants involved.
Words corresponding to the ‘Sun’
The 10 words, or phrases, used for rating that are associated with the Sun aspect of 
individuation are as follows: (1) Strength; (2) Energy; (3) Success; (4) Prosperity; (5) 
Wealth; (6) Happiness; (7) True Friends; (8) Good Cheer; (9) Health; and (10) Triumph.
Computing Alpha coefficients for all ten words was 0.8410, suggesting 
satisfactory internal reliability for all items to be taken forward for the scale.
Words corresponding to ‘Judgment’
The 10 words, or phrases, used for rating that are associated with the Judgment aspect of 
individuation are as follows: (1) Reward for Past Effort; (2) Settling of Matters; (3)
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Rejoicing; (4) Renewal; (5) Growing Awareness; (6) Resolution; (7) Completion; (8) 
Final Outcome; (9) Self-appraisal; and (10) Evaluation.
Computing Alpha coefficients for all ten words was 0.9075, suggesting 
satisfactory internal reliability for all items to be taken forward for the scale.
Words corresponding to the ‘World’
The 10 words, or phrases, used for rating that are associated with the World aspect of 
individuation are as follows: (1) Triumphant Achievement; (2) Harmony; (3) Realisation 
of Goals; (4) Reward; (5) Completion; (6) Attainment; (7) Perfection (8) Success; (9) 
Satisfaction; and (10) Wholeness.
Computing Alpha coefficients for all ten words was 0.9528, suggesting 
satisfactory internal reliability for all items to be taken forward for the scale.
Again, it seems worth noting here, that when cards demonstrated “unlikable” 
qualities in themselves, they performed less well on internal reliability, than when cards 
demonstrated “likeable” or successful qualities.
Main Analysis
Table 4.1 shows the mean scores by sex for internal, stable, global dimensions, and 
overall commitment to belief; the seven Tarot pictures; and the total word scores for 
each of the seven Tarot cards.
Here, table 4.1 shows that females scored significantly higher for the liking of 
the Tower words, than males. No other significant differences were found between 
gender and any of the Tarot pictures and words, and all aspects of the Commitment to 
Belief scale. Therefore, subsequent analysis was performed with men and women 
combined.
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Table 4.1: Mean Scores by sex for internal, stable, global, and overall commitment to 
belief; the seven Tarot pictures; and the total word scores each of the seven Tarot cards.
Scale Mean (SD) 
Males(N=9)
Mean (SD) 
Females(N=33)
t
Internal Belief 36.13 (13.5) 31.55(11.8) 0.95
Stable Belief 35.00 (05.3) 31.35(11.5) 0.87
Global Belief 31.13(10.1) 31.03 (10.2) 0.23
Overall Commitment to Belief 102.25 (24.8) 93.94 (28.6) 0.75
Devil card 03.78 (01.4) 04.00 (01.1) -0.51
Tower card 03.67 (01.1) 03.91 (01.1) -0.59
Star card 02.67 (01.0) 02.78 (01.0) -0.32
Moon card 03.11 (01.1) 03.06 (01.1) 0.12
Sun card 03.00 (01.0) 02.47 (01.2) 1.19
Judgment card 03.22 (01.1) 03.42 (01.0) -0.50
World card 02.67 (01.2) 02.97 (01.2) -0.65
Devil words 32.67 (03.7) 33.06 (04.8) -0.23
Tower words 32.13 (02.6) 27.90 (04.1) 2.76**
Star words 37.56 (06.1) 39.23 (08.0) -0.58
Moon words 34.56 (06.6) 31.74 (04.4) 1.51
Sun words 36.11 (07.2) 39.17(09.7) -0.87
Judgment words 35.89 (06.8) 35.67 (07.8) 0.07
World words 39.11 (06.6) 39.35 (10.1) -0.07
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Pearson Product moment correlations were computed for each of the three 
aspects of internal, stable, and global beliefs, and an overall commitment to belief for the 
Commitment to Belief scale, and the total scores for each of the seven Tarot Trumps and 
each rating total for each set of words. Table 4.2 shows significant positive correlations 
were found for the ‘World’ card and all aspects of the Commitment to Belief scale 
(internal, stable, global, and overall commitment to belief). However, no significant
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correlations were found for the ‘Devil’, ‘Tower’, ‘Star’, ‘Moon’, ‘Judgment’ card and 
each of the three aspects of belief, and overall commitment to belief.
Also, significant positive correlations were found for the sum of ‘Devil’ words 
and all aspects of the Commitment to Belief scale (internal, stable, global, and overall 
commitment to belief). No significant correlations were found for the sum of ‘Tower’ 
words and each of the three aspects of belief, and overall commitment to belief. 
Significant positive correlations were found for the sum of ‘Star’ words and all aspects 
of the Commitment to Belief scale (internal, stable, global, and overall commitment to 
belief). A significant positive correlation was found for the sum of ‘Moon’ words and 
internal beliefs, but no significant correlations were found for, stable, global, and overall 
commitment to belief. Significant positive correlations were found for the sum of ‘Sun’ 
words and internal, and global beliefs, and overall commitment to belief, but no 
significant correlation was found for stable belief. Significant positive correlations were 
found for the sum o f ‘Judgment’ words and internal, and global beliefs, and overall 
commitment to belief, but no significant correlation was found for stable belief. No 
significant correlations were found for the sum of ‘World’ words and each of the three 
aspects of belief, and overall commitment to belief.
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Discussion
The aim of study one was to examine the relationship between commitment to belief 
and aspects of individuation, whilst attempting to measure aspects of the 
unconscious.
The first thing to note is the inter-relationships between the measures of 
individuation. These are not encouraging if the present study is looking for some 
construct validity for either of these measures. Though there are some high 
correlations between the individuation measures through the use of words (of star, 
moon, sun, judgment and world), significant correlations between the picture 
representations of individuation and their corresponding word scale rarely occur, and 
if they do they are negative (e.g. sun picture and sun words). Though these 
significant negative relationships are interesting; the present findings suggest some 
further work is needed to exact what is measured in responses to Tarot cards and the 
individuation words using larger samples and other criteria variables.
However, in terms of commitment to belief and these measures of 
individuation, the results show, that none of the Tarot pictures, with the exception of 
the World, show a significant correlation with internal, stable, global, and overall 
commitment to belief. However, all aspects of belief were found to be significantly 
correlated to the Tarot picture of the World, that of the end result of individuation.
There could be two possible reasons for these results. Firstly, the results 
could simply show that there is no relationship between individuation and 
commitment to belief, and that commitment to belief is working totally independent 
of this Jungian process. Secondly, the results could be typical of the problems raised 
by Kline (1987) and Sjoback (1992), and that the procedure in this study may not 
have directly addressed the unconscious process of individuation.
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The findings, however, could also be due to the problems raised concerning 
people’s awareness, and misconceptions, of the Tarot meanings. For instance, 
popularity of the Tarot may have distorted the original meanings, e.g. the meaning of 
the Death or Devil cards, thus allowing pure projection, mentioned by Jung, 
impossible. Nevertheless, some support is found between commitment to belief and 
liking of the World picture. Given this, alongside Kline’s comments suggesting that 
projection tests could be the way forward, further research, should be considered 
using the Tarot cards, perhaps by using some more stringent measure.
However, more support is found for a possible relationship between 
commitment to belief and individuation with the use of words. The Devil and the 
Star words showing significant correlations to all aspects of belief (internal, global, 
stable, and overall commitment), the Sun and Judgment words showing significant 
correlations to all aspects of belief except stable belief, the Moon words showing only 
a significant correlation with internal belief, and the Tower and the World showing 
no significant correlations to all aspects of belief. From these findings then, two 
issues can be raised:
Firstly, the findings are certainly intriguing, as the results show some 
correlations between some sets of words and the Commitment to Belief scale. The 
findings certainly do not show an unconscious individuation process, but they do 
suggest that people who show higher levels of commitment to belief are attracted to 
words and phrases such as Strength, Energy, Happiness, Triumph, Reward for Past 
Effort, Settlement of Matters, Renewal, Growing Awareness, and Self-appraisal.
Secondly, using the words or phrases as a description of a type of person, the 
people that are scoring highly on the Commitment to Belief scale like, or show 
affiliation for, the kinds of concepts and ideas demonstrated by the words on the 
Tarot. Thus, this places these individuals inside the ideas of Jungian theory, liking 
concepts of completion and wholeness. However, the findings are far from
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conclusive, and the present consideration suggests little understanding of whether 
these people are driving for individuation. However, for the purposes of this thesis 
the findings are intriguing and worth further study, particularly beginning by attempts 
to examine a factor structure to the word/phrases with a larger sample.
STUDY TWO
So far, study one has investigated whether a relationship exists between aspects of the 
Commitment to Belief scale and Jung’s concept of individuation, as an unconscious 
process. However, given the problems raised about measuring the unconscious, it 
was deemed appropriate to also use a psychometric measure of self-actualisation 
(considered a similar concept to individuation in parts) to gain clarity, or further 
explore the findings of study one. Therefore, study two aims to consider the 
relationship between commitment to belief and self-actualisation.
Method
156 undergraduate students (58 men, 98 women) of ages 18 to 58 years 
(Mean=29.31, SD=10.55) were administered the Commitment to Beliefs scale and 
the Measure of Actualization of Potential: MAP (Leclerc, Lefrancois, Dube, Hebert, 
and Gaulin, 1998)
Questionnaires
1. The Commitment to Belief Scale: see chapter 2 for full Details
2. Measure of Actualization of Potential: MAP (Leclerc, Lefrancois, Dube, 
Hebert, and Gaulin, 1998). The MAP is a self-report inventory composed of 
27 items scored on a 5-point response format describing typical traits of self- 
actualizing individuals. The scale was subjected to factor analysis and results
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suggest two main ways in which the scale breaks down; (i) items comprise 2 
main dimensions; and (ii) that items can be further broken down into 5 sub­
dimensions. The two main dimensions are Openness to Experience (17 items) 
and Self-Reference (10 items). These items then can be broken down into 
five sub dimensions: Adaptation (items 5, 10, 15,20) e.g. “I adapt to 
change... with great difficulty, through to ... very easily”, and Autonomy 
(items 1, 6,11,16,21,25) e.g. “I am a person who values him/herself... very 
little, through to ... enormously”, under the Self-Reference dimension: and 
Openness to Self (items 2, 7, 12, 17, 22, 26) e.g. “I can express my emotions 
in any circumstances... with great difficulty, through to ... very easily”, 
Openness to Others (items 3, 8, 13,18, 23, 27) e.g. “I can predict my 
reactions... very rarely, through to ... very often”, and Openness to Life 
(items 4, 9, 14,19,24) e.g. “For me, the present moment counts...very little, 
through to ... extremely”, under the Openness to Experience dimension. In 
addition an overall score for the scale can be computed (Actualisation 
Potential) by adding all the scores. This is a new scale, and thus, at present, 
no validity has been presented. The final score is a number between 1 and 5 
and is obtained by summing the item scores and dividing the result by the 
number of valid responses.
Results
Table 4.3 shows the Cronbach alpha statistics (Cronbach, 1951) computed for all the 
scales between the present sample and mean scores for all the variables by sex.
Alpha coefficients for the Commitment to Belief scale (internal, stable, global, and 
overall commitment), adaptation, and the dimension of openness to experience are 
equal to or above the .7 criteria suggested for satisfactory reliability (Kline, 1986). 
Autonomy, openness to self, openness to others, openness to life, and the dimension 
of self-reference are below .7, however, Lefrancois, Leclerc, Dube, Hebert, and
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Gaulin (1997) report that these subscales show similar reliability statistics in their 
study.
Further, no differences were found between any of the scales by sex. 
Therefore, the following analysis was performed with men and women combined.
Table 4.3: Alpha coefficients for all the scales and mean scores for all the variables
by sex
Scale a Men Women t
Internal Beliefs .94 18.96 (12.3) 19.84 (10.2) -0.48
Stable Beliefs .88 26.22(10.6) 23.77 (08.5) 1.59
Global Beliefs .88 26.19(11.1) 23.19(08.1) 1.94
Overall Commitment .95 71.38(30.6) 66.80 (23.8) 1.04
Autonomy .50 03.31 (00.6) 03.26 (00.5) 0.45
Adaptation .71 03.35 (00.7) 03.30 (00.6) 0.35
Openness to Self .69 03.28 (00.6) 03.36 (00.6) -0.79
Openness to Others .56 03.35 (00.6) 03.49 (00.5) -1.60
Openness to Life .63 03.37 (00.7) 03.38 (00.5) -0.15
Self-Reference .58 03.33 (00.5) 03.28 (00.5) 0.55
Openness to Experience .83 03.34 (00.6) 03.41 (00.4) -0.89
Actualisation Potential - 03.34 (00.5) 03.36 (00.4) -0.34
* p<.05; ** p<.01
Pearson product moment correlation coefficient statistics were computed for 
each of the three aspects of internal, stable, and global beliefs, and an overall 
commitment to belief, for the Commitment to Belief scale, and all aspects of the 
actualization potential scale.
Table 4.4 shows significant positive correlations were found for the internal 
aspects of commitment to belief and all self-actualization sub-scales except
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autonomy, adaptation, and self-reference. Significant positive correlations were 
found for the stable aspects of commitment to belief and all self-actualization sub­
scales except adaptation and openness to others. Significant positive correlations 
were found for the global aspects of commitment to belief and all self-actualization 
sub-scales except adaptation, openness to others, and openness to life. Also, 
significant positive correlations were found for overall commitment to belief and all 
self-actualization sub-scales except openness to others.
Table 4.4: Pearson Product moment correlation coefficient matrix for all the variables 
of the measure of actualization potential, and internal, stable, global, and overall 
commitment to belief.
Int Sta GL OC Aut Ada SR OS 0 0 OL OE AP
l.Int -
2.Sta 71 ** -
3.G1 70** .86** -
4.0C 89** .93** 92** -
5.Aut .12 .22** .24** .21** -
6.Ada .16 .14 .14 .17* .53** -
7.SR .16 .21* .22** .22** 9] ** .84** -
8.0S .19* .17* .16* .19* .58** .45** .60** -
9.00 .18* .12 .09 .15 .34** 49** .45** .59** -
10.OL .26** .22** .15 .24** .33** .50** .46** .57** .62** -
11.OE 28** .24** .20* .28** 49** .56** .59** 86** .86** .84** -
12.AP .25** .27** .24* .29** .72* .74** .84** .85** .77* 77** 94**
*p<.05, **p<.01
Key: INT=Intemal Beliefs: STA=Stable Beliefs: GL=Global Beliefs: OC=Overall 
Commitment to Beliefs: AUT=Autonomy: ADA=Adaptation: SR=Self-Reference: 
OS=Openness to Self: 00= Openness to Others: OL=Openness to Life: OE=Openness to 
Experience: AP=Actualisation Potential.
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Discussion
The aim of the studies was to examine the relationship between commitment to belief 
and individuation (study one), thus attempting to ‘tap’ the unconscious; and the 
similar concept of self-actualisation (study two), through psychometric measurement.
In terms of commitment to belief and individuation, the results are conflicting, 
showing that none of the Tarot pictures, with the exception of the World, show a 
significant correlation with internal, stable, global, and overall commitment to belief. 
However, all aspects of belief were found to be significantly correlated to the Tarot 
picture of the World, that of the end result of individuation. It has been suggested 
that these results may be due to two reasons; (1) there is no relationship between 
individuation and commitment to belief, thus, commitment to belief is working 
totally independent of this Jungian process; (2) results could be typical of the 
problems raised by Kline (1987) and Sjoback (1992), who suggest that measuring the 
unconscious is, as yet, impossible. It has been suggested that findings could also be 
due to the modem day popularity of the Tarot cards. However, given the somewhat 
limited support, it has been proposed that projection tests could be the way forward, 
and that further research, should be considered using the Tarot cards, perhaps using 
some more stringent measure.
More support, however, is found for a relationship between commitment to 
belief and individuation with the use of word association. These findings are 
intriguing, as the results show some correlations between some sets of words and the 
Commitment to Belief scale. The findings certainly do not show an unconscious 
individuation process, but they do suggest that people who show higher levels of 
commitment to belief are attracted to words and phrases such as Strength, Energy, 
Happiness, Triumph, Reward for Past Effort, Settlement of Matters, Renewal, 
Growing Awareness, and Self-appraisal. It has also been found, here, that people 
who score highly on the Commitment to Belief scale like, or show affiliation for, the
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kinds of concepts and ideas demonstrated by the words on the Tarot. Thus, placing 
these individuals inside the ideas of Jungian theory, liking concepts of completion 
and wholeness. However, as previously mentioned, the findings are far from 
conclusive, and the present consideration suggests little understanding of whether 
these people are driving for individuation. Nevertheless, the findings are intriguing 
and worth further study, particularly by considering a factor structure to the 
word/phrases with a larger sample.
In considering the relationship between commitment to belief and self- 
actualisation (study two). Although self-actualisation is not the same concept as 
Jung’s individuation, it is considered within the literature as a similar concept and 
worthy of investigation. Commitment to belief shows a significant positive 
correlation with some aspects of self-actualisation, namely openness to life, openness 
to experience and overall scores for actualisation potential. These correlations are 
small (r<.3), however, they do provide support for the prediction that commitment to 
belief will be related to aspects of self-actualisation. The correlations between the 
subscales provide some further detailed description of the type of person who scores 
higher in their commitment to belief. Such persons will tend to believe that they can 
‘express their emotions in any circumstances very easily’ (Openness to Life) and that 
‘the present moment counts extremely’ (Openness to Experience). The reason why 
other aspects of self-actualisation do not correlate with commitment to belief may 
reflect theoretical differences between individuation and self-actualisation, however, 
the subscales of the self-actualisation scale that are related, provide further support 
for commitment to belief showing some level of openness and actualization. Further 
research might wish to extrapolate some of the theoretical distinctions between these 
concepts and investigate further the relationship between measures of self-fulfillment 
and commitment to belief.
In summary, the present findings suggest that those who score high in 
commitment to belief are attracted to words/phrases/statements relating to aspects of
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development, growth, wholeness, completeness, reflection, and self-actualisation as 
described by Jung in the process of individuation, and other theorists concerned with 
the development of the self. These present findings also suggest these relationships 
might be better measured by the use of clusters of words rather than symbolic images. 
These present findings do not place these people totally inside Jungian concepts, as 
the present consideration does little to establish whether these processes are 
unconscious. However, the present findings suggest that those who show a high level 
of commitment to belief associate themselves with concepts described in the process 
of individuation and self-actualisation.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Commitment to belief and Jungian Theory (Part II): personality types
and optimism
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Summary
After development of the Commitment to Belief scale in chapters 2 and 3, chapter 4 
began to consider the concept of commitment to belief within a more theoretical 
framework by examining the relationship between commitment to belief and 
measures of individuation and self-actualisation, derived from Jungian theory, to 
further provide evidence for a theoretical context for recent findings with the 
Commitment to Belief scale. Chapter five continues this exploration within Jungian 
theory.
Therefore, the aim of the following studies was to examine the relationship 
between commitment to belief and measures of Jungian personality types and 
optimism.
In study 1, among 43 respondents, the findings suggest that aspects of 
commitment to belief are related to extraversion, and sensing personality dimensions. 
In study 2, among 118 respondents, commitment to belief is related to optimism, and 
is consistent with a priori predictions.
The findings of significant relationships between commitment to belief and 
Jungian personality types can be explained within Jungian psychology. However, 
such speculations need to be further examined within more specific predictions 
relating to particular traits before any firm conclusions can be drawn. The positive 
relationship between commitment to belief and optimism suggests that optimism 
may provide a context for understanding the mechanisms that might be involved in 
the relationship between commitment to belief and psychological well-being.
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Introduction
In chapters two and three a measure of commitment to belief has been developed that 
shows reliability and validity for a scale that; adapts personal construct theory and 
attribution style as a basis for measuring individuals’ commitment to a set of beliefs; 
where a one and three-factor model are found to be related to better psychological 
well-being, and largely fall outside personality space, and attribution style; where the 
constructs people are producing are found to be important and relevant; that is 
consistent over time; and reflects a concept that cannot be explained outside of the 
commitment to belief context. In order to gain theoretical context for this measure, 
Jungian ideas have been proposed to enable some understanding of this concept. 
Thus, chapter four proposed a programme of research to test whether Jungian 
theoretical guidance is appropriate, by investigating commitment to belief against the 
notion of individuation and self-actualisation. Chapter five aims to extend this 
programme of research by considering two further ideas derived from Jung, the first 
focuses on personality types; the second focuses on optimism (both these theories are 
also considered to be embedded within individuation).
1. Jungian personality types and commitment to belief
Next to his theory of dreams and dream interpretation lies Jung’s most enduring 
contribution to the field of Psychology, his theory of Psychological Types 
(1913/1921/1971). Jung was interested in illustrating how consciousness works in 
practice, and also in explaining how it is that consciousness works in different ways, 
in different people (Jung, 1963). He formulated a general theory of psychological 
types hoping to distinguish the components of consciousness. The theory was first 
published in 1921. Because such an empirical classification of such a psychological 
typology lends itself well to quantitative measurement, an entire body of test 
instruments and related literature has since grown up around these types (1921). The 
most well known of these being the Myers-Briggs test which is based on Jung’s 
typology, with an extra category of ‘judgment/perception’ added to the function 
types.
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According to Jung, some individuals are more excited or energized by the 
internal world and others by the external world: these are introverts and extraverts 
respectively. Acknowledging that neither of these categories is fixed and exclusive, 
Jung sought merely to describe in a practical, observable way that someone’s 
dominant or typical attitude was toward people, the world, and oneself. But in 
addition to these basic attitudes to the world, there are also certain properties or 
functions of consciousness. Of function types, there are four, two categorized as 
rational, and two categorized as irrational. The two rational types are thinking and 
feeling. The term rational is used because both of these functions use criteria to 
organize and decide. Jung identified these as thinking -  by which he meant knowing 
what a thing is, naming it and linking it to other things, in other words organizing 
and deciding based on analysis and logic; feeling -  which for Jung means something 
more than affect or emotion, a consideration of the value of something, or having a 
viewpoint or perspective on something, in other words organizing and deciding on 
the basis of values and morality, and individual worth. The two irrational functions, 
in Jung’s system, are intuition and sensation. The term irrational is used because 
these function types do not decide primarily but rather experience first. Jung 
identified these as intuition -  which Jung uses to mean a sense of where something is 
going, of what the possibilities are, without conscious proof or knowledge; and 
sensation -  which represents all facts available to the senses, telling us that 
something is, but not what it is.
These definitions, then, describe a person’s overall style of consciousness and 
their orientation towards inner and outer worlds. Jung’s model is carefully balanced 
(Samuels, Shorter, & Plaut, 1997). A person will have a primary (or superior) mode 
of functioning; this will be one of the four functions. The superior function will 
come from one of the two pairs of rational or irrational functions. Of course, Jung 
argues, the person will not depend exclusively on this superior function but will 
utilize a second, or auxiliary function as well. This, according to Jung’s 
observations, will come from the opposite pair of rational or irrational functions 
depending on whether the superior function came from the rational or irrational pair. 
Thus, for example, a person with a superior function of feeling (from the rational 
pair) will have an auxiliary function of either sensation or intuition (from the 
irrational pair).
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Using the two attitudes and the superior and auxiliary functions, it is possible 
to produce a list of eight basic types. Jung sometimes represented the four functions 
on a cross-like diagram, thus clearly showing the diametrically opposed functions. 
The ego has energy at its disposal, which can be directed into any of the four 
functions, and of course, the extraversion-introversion possibility provides another 
dimension. In addition, Jung observed that the other function from the pair that 
provided the superior function often caused a great deal of difficulty for the 
individual. Thus, for example, if an individual has a superior function of feeling, 
then he may have a problem with the other function from the same, rational category, 
namely, thinking. Samuels et al. (1997) use the following example of a feeling 
individual who seems to have a mature, balanced attitude to life and seems stable. 
They are at home with emotions and value personal relationships. But they lack the 
capacity for sustained intellectual or systematic thinking. They may even regard 
such thinking as a terrible thing, hate logic and proudly talk of themselves as 
innumerate etc. But the pride may hide feelings of inadequacy and the problem may 
not be so easily resolved. Jung names the problematic function the inferior function. 
This will be the area of consciousness that is difficult for a person. On the other 
hand, the inferior function, which remains for the most part in the unconscious, 
contains enormous potential for change, which can be brought about by attempts to 
integrate the contents of the inferior function into ego-consciousness. Doing this, 
realizing one’s inferior function, is a prime element in individuation because of the 
‘rounding out’ of the personality that is involved.
Jung first defined individuation in 1913, in the initial version of his book on 
psychological types. He described individuation as “a person’s becoming himself, 
whole, indivisible and distinct from other people, or from collective psychology 
(although in relation to these)” (Jung, 1971). Jung emphasized the attributes of the 
process as follows (1) the goal of the process is the development of the personality; 
(2) it presupposes and includes collective relationships, i.e. it does not occur in a 
state of isolation; and (3) individuation involves a degree of opposition to social 
norms which have no absolute validity; the more a person’s life is shaped by the 
collective norm, the greater is their individual morality.
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Thus, according to Jung, the integration of personality is extremely important 
in the process of individuation, but a person’s personality, Jung argues, may also 
have a direct effect on their drive towards individuation. That is, that people of 
different psychological types grow and develop in different ways, each needing to 
integrate their inferior functions via a different developmental path.
So, it is established that Jungian personality types are inextricably linked to 
the process of individuation. Alongside this, the current chapter of this thesis is 
concerned with the theoretical underpinnings of commitment to belief. So far, the 
previous chapter has shown that there is conflicting, or far from conclusive, findings 
to whether commitment to belief has a place within individuation, or is in fact a 
separate indivisible concept. It is to further this exploration that the present research 
question will consider whether Jungian personality types are related to commitment 
to belief, and therefore, showing further evidence to commitment being rooted in, or 
outside, individuation.
2. Commitment to belief and optimism
When reading Jung’s work, an impression begins to form as to his idea of what a 
“healthy” individual should be like. Such a person aims to achieve individuation 
through the balancing of the psyche and the incorporation of the soul (1971) or spirit, 
and interpretation of the archetypes (Jung, 1912/1956; 1917/1953; 1934/1960).
These pursuits, according to Jung, aim to give enlightening or life-giving force that 
gives rise to those stabilizing, integrating powers that make a being whole, and a 
person fully ‘human’. Such a person can find meaning (1964) and purpose in life, 
and feel and experience optimism, sensitivity, receptivity, empathy and creativity. It 
is, on the other hand, according to Jung, that when a person cannot find meaning and 
purpose that neuroses and mental instability occurs (1973; 1958). These “healthy” 
individuals then, in order to strive for meaning, appear to have adopted a positive 
outlook on life, taking on the chin whatever life throws at them, and seeing it as a 
way of growth and development, for it is only by incorporating all difficulties of life 
and understanding one’s true personality and nature that one comes near to 
individuation (Jung, 1964). In Jung’s view (1964), the four highest achievements of 
human effort are faith, hope, love, and insight, and it is only when a person possesses
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these that the true meaning of life can be understood. Jung adds that when a person 
is “ill”, i.e. suffering from neuroses, that they must be understood as the suffering of 
a human being who has not discovered what life means for him. And this arises from 
his “having no love, but only sexuality; no faith, because he is afraid to grope in the 
dark; no hope, because he is disillusioned by the world and by life; and no 
understanding, because he has failed to read the meaning of his own existence”
(Jung, 1933, p.265).
It seems clear, then, Jung believes that an individual needs meaning to 
persevere with life and integration of the Self to reach individuation, which in turn, 
gives a person full meaning to life and a reason for being. In other words, a person 
needs to find belief and commit themselves with their whole being (Jung, 1958) in 
order to face/cope with life’s struggles openly and with courage, in order to 
understand themselves, and their own life’s meaning in order to achieve their 
answers to life through individuation. Also, that people, in order to strive for 
meaning and persevere, regardless of what life throws at them, appear to have 
adopted a strong positive outlook (optimistic) on life, seeing challenges etc as ways 
of developing and growing, which in turn leads to a healthier, deeper self.
This overall impression, then, of an individual who considers life in a positive 
way, looking for meaning, and perseveres regardless, is also identifiable within 
modem theory. Thus, in modem psychology, this “healthy” individual could come 
under the remit of the theory of optimism. Optimism has enjoyed a growing 
popularity recently (Carver & Scheier, 1981; 1982b; Scheier & Carver, 1985), 
particularly in regards to its relationship with health and overall well-being; as 
Chang, Maydeu-Oliveras, and D’Zurilla (1997) note, optimism and life satisfaction 
are highly related. Similarly, Smith, Pope, Rhodewalt, and Poulton (1989) believe 
that optimists’ holding of positive expectations for the future leads them to be better 
able to solve problems, and also experience better health. Carver and Scheier (1985; 
1994) argue that individuals who display positive or optimistic expectations are more 
likely to persist in goal-oriented efforts than those with a negative or pessimistic 
view if, and when, dismption of goal-oriented activities occur. Thus, there appears 
to be similarities between the two ideologies described here, i.e. those of Jung, and 
Carver and Scheier (optimism). Therefore, it could be said that Jung, when
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demonstrating how a person best deals with life, may be describing the coping 
mechanism of optimism, i.e. that a person could become/or is more optimistic. Thus, 
for the purposes of exploring Jungian concepts and their relationship to the 
Commitment to Belief Scale, it would be prudent to examine optimism. Therefore, 
the second research question will consider the relationship between dispositional 
optimism and commitment to belief.
Aims of the study
The aim of the following studies was to examine two things. The first is an 
exploratory study examining the relationship between commitment to belief and 
Jungian personality types. The second is to examine the relationship between 
commitment to belief and optimism using the prediction that there should be a 
significant positive correlation between the two variables, due to similarities between 
Jungian ideas around commitment to belief and optimism.
STUDY ONE 
Method
The 42 undergraduate volunteer students (9 men, 33 females) of ages 18 to 51 years 
(Mean=25.4 years; SD=9.90) were asked to complete the Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator after completing the Commitment to Belief Scale. These respondents were 
the same sample that completed the individuation measures outlined in Chapter 4.
Questionnaire
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI; Myers & Briggs, 1962) is a self-report 
personality inventory designed to measure Jungian psychological type preferences. 
The MBTI results indicate the respondents likely preferences on four dimensions; 
Extraversion (E) or Introversion (I); Sensing (S) or Intuition (N); Thinking (T) or 
Feeling (F); Judging (J) or Perceiving (P).
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Recent research applications of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator include such 
areas as counseling (Dilley, 1987; Myers & Myers, 1980; Newman, 1979). 
Communications (Yeakley, 1982; 1983), career counseling (Apostal & Marks, 1990; 
Pinkney, 1983), learning or education (Drummond & Stoddard, 1992), empathetic 
response (Jenkins, Stephens, Chew & Downs, 1992), creativity (Tegano, 1990), 
decision making (Davis, Grove & Knowles, 1990), business investing (Dogden & 
Rapp, 1992), and general theory of the inventory (Boyle, 1995; Gardner & Martinko, 
1996; Tzeng, Ware & Chen, 1989).
The reliability and validity of the MBTI scales are well established (Hill, 
2000). The four dimensions of the MBTI are reliable and independent (Kendall,
1998; Hill, 2000), and the scale demonstrates construct validity (Carlson, 1985; 
Comrey, 1983, Hicks, 1984; Lorr, 1991; Thompson & Borrello, 1986), and 
convergent validity with the scales with other personality constructs (Drummond & 
Stoddard 1992; MacDonald, Anderson, Tsargarakis & Holland, 1994; Morehouse, 
Farley, & Youngquist, 1990; Steele & Kelly, 1976; Zumbo & Taylor, 1993).
All questions on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator are presented in a forced- 
choice format. Results on the indicator are generally reported with letters 
representing each of the eight preferences. There are 16 possible ways to combine 
the preferences, resulting in 16 MBTI types (ISTJ, ISTP, ESTP, ESTJ, ISFJ, ISFP, 
ESFP, INFJ, INFP, ENFP, ENFJ, INTJ, INTP, ENTP, ENTJ). Each type is viewed 
by Myers-Briggs to represent a ‘gift,’ a unique quality, which has distinct 
advantages, and positive qualities (Myers & Myers, 1980). The aim of the inventory 
is to determine which of the two extreme functions or attitudes is preferred. The 
forced-choice format is used by Myers-Briggs with each item presented separately, 
with each pole representing a dichotomous extreme for one attitude or function 
(Myers & McCauley, 1985). So for example, for an introversion/extraversion item; 
one response choice will determine the respondent is introverted, the other 
extraverted. No items allow responses in the middle ground between the two 
extremes. The reason for this is that it is believed in theory that a distinct preference 
exists and can be measured dichotomously (Myers, 1962). It is apparent from this 
that the middle ground between the two extremes of each scale is not explored with 
this instrument (Barbuto, 1997).
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However, while the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator is designed to identify an 
individual’s type rather than measure proportional existence, many researchers have 
treated the scaled scores as continuous measures of personality (e.g. Apostal & 
Marks, 1990; Drummond & Stoddard, 1992; Jenkins, Stephens, Chew & Downs, 
1992; MacDonald, etal. 1994; Tegano, 1990; Zumbo & Taylor, 1993). This 
practice, then, is common, perhaps more common than using the inventory 
dichotomously as was intended when the instrument was developed (Myers, 1962). 
Since researchers interested in Jungian psychology continue to use the scores as 
continua, it seems that if the inventory were redefined for developing proportional 
continuous measures of each attitude and function, as has been suggested and 
explored (Tzeng, et al 1989), the practical usefulness of Jungian psychology could be 
better realized (Barbuto, 1997), particularly when Jung believed that all personality 
functions and attitudes were present in all of us, but to varying degrees of preference, 
and that the eight psychological types that Jung recognized represented the extremes 
of personality types. Recent research also supports this view (Amau, Green, Rosen, 
Gleaves, & Melancon, in press).
For the purposes of this study, then, three things are apparent; (1) the items 
for the MBTI can be identified as dichotomous; (2) using the MBTI is simply to 
consider Jungian personality variables alongside the Commitment to Belief scale; 
and (3) it is not necessary to identify each participant’s individual personality type. 
Therefore, results will be considered by using the ratings of each item on the MBTI 
on a continuum, and each individual function will be correlated separately to the 
Commitment to Belief scale.
Results
Because this study tries to consider each separate function alongside the 
Commitment to Belief Scale, each subscale was separated out and correlated 
separately. Thus, for the pairing E-I (extraversion-introversion), E was recoded so 
that higher scores on this subscale showed a higher leaning toward introversion; for 
the pairing S-N (sensing -  intuition), S was recoded so that higher scores represented 
a leaning toward intuition; for the pairing F-T (feeling-thinking), F was recoded so
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that higher scores represented a leaning toward thinking; and for the pairing J-P 
(judgment-perception), P was recoded so that higher scores represented a leaning 
toward j udgment.
Table 5.1 shows mean scores for all the variables by sex. No differences 
were found between men and women and scores on the Commitment to Belief scale 
and the four personality dimensions. Therefore, the following analysis was 
performed with men and women combined.
Table 5.1. Mean scores for all the variables by sex.
Scale Men Women t
Internal Beliefs 36.13 (13.5) 31.55 (11.8) 0.35
Stable Beliefs 35.00 (05.3) 31.35 (11.5) 0.39
Global Beliefs 31.13(10.1) 31.03(10.2) 0.98
Overall Commitment 102.25 (24.8) 93.94 (28.6) 0.46
Extraversion/Introversion 43.22 (14.2) 36.97 (12.3) 0.19
Sensing/Intuition 59.22 (13.5) 55.09 (11.8) 0.37
Feeling/Thinking 51.33 (14.7) 46.48 (09.9) 0.25
Judging/Perceiving 35.89(10.2) 41.55 (11.8) 0.19
Pearson Product moment correlations were then computed for each of the three 
aspects of internal, stable, and global beliefs, and an overall commitment to belief for 
the Commitment to Belief scale, and the total scores for each of the four pairings, or 
functions of E-I, S-N, F-T, and J-P (Table 5.2).
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Table 5.2: Pearson Product moment correlations computed between internal, stable, 
and global beliefs, overall commitment to belief, and the sum of the pairings E-I, S- 
N, F-T, and J-P.
Int Sta GL OC El SN FT JP
lin t 1.00
2.Sta .51** 1.00
3.GL .57** .67** 1.00
4.0C 83** .85** gy** 1.00
5.El -.42** -.17 -.06 -.27 1.00
6 .SN .23 .28 .35* .34* -.21 1.00
7.FT -.04 -.08 -.17 -.11 .06 -.07 1.00
8.JP -.18 -.06 -.02 -.11 .29 -.34** -.14 1.00
*p<.05, **p<.01
Key: INT=Intemal Beliefs: STA=Stable Beliefs: GL=Global Beliefs: OC=Overall 
commitment to beliefs: EI=Extraversion/Introversion: SN=Sensing/Intuition:
FT=Feeling/Thinking: JP=Judging/Perceiving.
Table 5.2 shows that a number of variables are significantly related to each 
other. A significant negative correlation was found for internal beliefs and the 
pairing E-I. No significant correlations were found for stable and global beliefs and 
overall commitment to belief and the pairing Extraversion-Introversion. Therefore, 
demonstrating the more extraverted a person is, the higher their commitment to 
internal belief.
Significant correlations were found for global beliefs and overall commitment 
to beliefs and the pairing Sensing-Intuition. No significant correlations were found 
for internal and stable beliefs and the pairing Sensing-Intuition. Therefore, 
demonstrating the more a person uses the function of sensing, the higher their 
commitment to global belief and overall commitment to belief.
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No significant correlations were found for the pairings Feeling-Thinking and 
Judging-Perceiving, each of the three aspects of belief, and overall commitment to 
belief.
Discussion
The aim of study one was to examine the relationship between commitment to belief 
and Jungian personality types.
In relation to commitment to belief and Jungian personality types there are 
some intriguing findings. Higher extraversion being related to internal beliefs, but no 
other aspect of belief; and higher use of the sensing function being related to both 
global beliefs and overall commitment to belief, but not related to either internal or 
stable beliefs. No other significant correlations were found for the other pairings of 
Feeling-Thinking and Judging-Perceiving.
From these findings then, three issues need to be addressed. Though this type 
of post-hoc hypothesizing should be taken with caution, particularly given the size of 
the sample, the present relationships can be explained within Jungian descriptions.
First is the relationship between extraversion and the internal commitment to 
belief subscale. Jung, when describing the two attitudes of personality (Extraversion 
-  Introversion) in conjunction with the path of individuation, commented that within 
each extravert there is always an introvert, albeit deep in the unconscious, and visa 
versa. He explains extraverts as living within the outer world; however, the more an 
extravert throws themselves into frenzied projects and relationships in the outer 
world, the more a pull toward quiet and reflection forms in the unconscious. Indeed, 
Von Franz (1971) comments that extraverts have a much purer relationship to the 
inside than the introvert, when they, indeed, choose to reflect. Similarly extraversion 
is not only thought to represent sociable traits, but also traits such as sensation 
seeking, optimistic and carefree behaviours. Therefore, the consideration of these 
traits suggests that an individual who is committed in their beliefs may also be 
demonstrating confidence and carefree behaviours. However, this present finding
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contradicts the findings in chapter two where no correlation was found between 
Eysenck’s extraversion dimension and commitment to belief.
Secondly, the findings suggest that the sensing function is correlated to both 
global belief and overall commitment to beliefs. As the sensing function operates via 
experiencing to make sense of the world, it seems proper that if these people have 
learned sensing as a primary function that they carry their beliefs as a way of 
perceiving the world into all life’s experiences (global), however, it is less easy to 
explain it’s correlation to overall commitment, unless this is simply a facet of a high 
enough correlation with the global subscale that is reflected in overall scores.
Thirdly, although some of the relationships between personality types and 
commitment to belief can be, to some, extent, explained, it is important to remember 
that the sample used in this study was relatively small (due to the fact the MBTI was 
given to participants taking part in the individuation measures in chapter 4 -  Tarot 
cards and words). Therefore, the findings given need to be considered with some 
caution. Further research would need to be carried out on a larger sample, and the 
findings replicated, to be considered evidence of some aspects of personality being 
related, and perhaps driving, commitment to belief.
STUDY TWO 
Method
118 undergraduate students (39 males, 79 females) of ages 18 to 51 years 
(Mean=23.40, SD=7.10) were administered the Commitment to Beliefs Scale and the 
Life Orientation Test (Carver & Scheier, 1989; 1994).
Questionnaire
The Life Orientation Test -  Revised: LOT-R (Scheier. Carver, & Bridges, 1994).
The original LOT (Scheier & Carver, 1985) was a 10-item scale with two filler 
items, four positively worded items, and four reverse-coded items. The LOT-R has
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been revised to remove colloquialisms, and to address any issues of neuroticism 
accounting for unique variance with mental health variables in place of optimism 
(Smith, Pope, Rhodewalt & Poulton, 1989). It is a 10-item measure with four filler 
items, three positively worded items, and three reverse-coded items. Respondents 
indicate their degree of agreement with statements such as, “In uncertain times, I 
usually expect the best”, using a five-point response scale ranging from “Strongly 
disagree” to “Strongly agree”. Negatively worded items are reversed, and a single 
score is obtained.
Results
Table 5.3 shows the Cronbach alpha statistics (Cronbach, 1951) computed for all the 
scales among the present sample, and mean scores for all the variables by sex. All of 
the alpha coefficients are equal to or above the .7 criteria suggested for satisfactory 
reliability (Kline, 1986). Further, no significant differences were found between any 
of the scales by sex. Therefore, the following analysis was performed with men and 
women combined.
Table 5.3: Alpha coefficients for all the scales and mean scores for all the variables 
by sex.
Scale a Men Women t
Internal Beliefs .83 24.89 (12.8) 22.35 (10.9) 1.11
Stable Beliefs .89 24.74 (10.4) 25.05 (09.4) -0.16
Global Beliefs .89 26.00 (10.4) 26.19(09.4) -0.11
Overall Commitment .92 75.63 (29.5) 73.59(25.1) 0.39
Optimism .85 19.58 (05.9) 20.38 (04.3) -0.82
p<.05*, p<.01**
Table 5.4 shows the Pearson Product moment correlation coefficients 
computed for each of the three aspects of internal, stable, and global beliefs, and an 
overall commitment to belief for the Commitment to Belief Scale, and the total 
optimism scores for the Life Orientation Test.
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Table 5.4: Pearson Product moment correlations computed between internal, stable, 
and global beliefs, overall commitment to belief, and the Life Orientation Test
COB INTB STAB GLOB Optimism
1. Commitment of Belief 1.00
2. Internal Belief 0.84** 1.00
3. Stable Belief 0.84** 0.54** 1.00
4. Global Belief 0.82** 0.49** 0.55** 1.00
5. Optimism 0.49** 0.44** 0.42** 0.39** 1.00
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
Significant positive correlations were found for all aspects of belief, internal, 
stable, global beliefs, and overall commitment to belief, and optimism.
Discussion
The aim of the preceding studies was to examine the relationship between 
commitment to belief, Jungian personality types, and commitment to belief and 
optimism.
In relation to commitment to belief and Jungian personality types there are 
some intriguing findings. Higher extraversion being related to internal beliefs, but no 
other aspect of belief; and higher use of the sensing function being related to both 
global beliefs and overall commitment to belief, but not related to either internal or 
stable beliefs. No other significant correlations were found for the other pairings of 
Feeling-Thinking and Judging-Perceiving.
These findings present three main issues for consideration; (i) it is speculated 
that extraverts could be seen as having a ‘purer’ relationship with their unconscious, 
and that an individual who is committed in their beliefs may demonstrate confidence 
and carefree behaviours (like extraversion). However, it must be remembered that 
findings in chapter two found no correlation between Eysenck’s extraversion 
dimension and commitment to belief, (ii) The sensing function operates via 
experiencing to make sense of the world, and thus, suggests that if these people have
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learned sensing as a primary function that they carry their beliefs as a way of 
perceiving the world into all life’s experiences (global). However, it is less easy to 
explain its correlation to overall commitment. (3) Further research should be carried 
out on a larger sample before results can be verified.
In terms of the relationship between commitment to belief and optimism, the 
findings show that there is a strong positive relationship between optimism and 
commitment to belief. This is indeed a finding that demands further study.
However, two issues arise here; Firstly, it is not clear whether commitment to belief 
is simply correlated with the modem cognitive theory of optimism, or whether it 
indeed, demonstrates evidence of Jungian thought. However, regardless of whether 
it places commitment to belief inside or outside of Jungian theory, it does support 
using Jungian concepts to guide the theory of belief.
Secondly, it is not clear whether commitment to belief is simply measuring 
optimism, or it is indeed a separate and unique concept, which, as mentioned when 
defining Jung’s overall theories, has an effect, and is affected by, optimism. For 
example, that a person who has deep commitment to belief gains optimism because 
of this, or that a person with an optimistic attitude to life spurs them to develop deep 
commitment to belief. Further, research has concentrated on the role of optimism 
and pessimism and the effect on health. Reker and Wong (1985), Robinson-Whelan, 
Kim, MacCallum, and Kiecolt-Glaser (1997), Scheier and Carver (1992), and Taylor, 
Buunk, and Aspinwall (1990) have found that those persons assessed as optimists 
have a more physical, psychological and general well-being than those persons 
assessed as more pessimistic. Measures of optimism are also negatively correlated 
with the reporting of physical and depressive symptoms across time (Carver & 
Scheier, 1985; Carver & Gaines, 1987; Chang et al, 1997). Therefore, optimism may 
be an important concept to help understand the relationship between commitment to 
belief and psychological health and may be a focus for future research.
Final Comments
To summarise, the findings demonstrate that aspects of commitment to belief are 
related to some aspects of Jungian personality dimensions (extraversion, and sensing)
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and optimism. Thus, the findings of significant relationships between commitment 
to belief and Jungian personality types can, to some extent, be explained within 
Jungian psychology. However, such speculations need to be further examined within 
more specific (or directed) predictions/hypotheses relating to particular personality 
traits before any firm conclusions can be drawn. Further, the consistent relationship 
between commitment to belief, its subscales and optimism are consistent with a- 
priori predictions. This finding may also suggest that optimism may provide a 
context for understanding the mechanisms that might be involved in the relationship 
between commitment to belief and psychological well-being. This consideration will 
be further examined within chapter eight of this thesis.
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CHAPTER SIX
Commitment to belief, spirituality and religiosity
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Summary
The commitment to belief hypothesis has been developed from Jung’s 
observations around individuals’ belief being deeply committed (internalised, 
solid, and used within all situations within one’s life). However, Jung’s ideas 
were deeply enveloped within religion and spirituality.
This thesis has argued that it is the strength of belief (commitment) that is 
important and not necessarily the type of belief (e.g. spirituality or religiosity). 
However, given the importance of religiosity and spirituality in Jungian theory, it 
is necessary to consider whether commitment to belief is related to religion and 
spirituality.
176 undergraduate students (65 males, 111 females) completed measures 
of commitment to belief, religious orientation (intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest), 
spiritual orientation, religious experience and religious coping. Pearson product 
moment correlations revealed no significant relationships existed between all 
aspects of commitment to belief and measures of religion and spirituality.
The present findings suggest that commitment to belief is separate from 
religiosity and spirituality, and, thus, demonstrates further support for the 
construct validity of commitment to belief.
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Introduction
The commitment to belief hypothesis has, as mentioned previously, grown from 
the theoretical underpinnings of Jung and his ideas on the nature of beliefs, i.e. 
that a person’s beliefs should be deeply committed (internalised, stable across 
time, and recognisable within all situations of their life), in order to be beneficial 
to that person’s mental health. However, Jung’s ideas were deeply embedded 
within his concepts of religion and spirituality, whereas the theory of a 
commitment to belief argues that it is the strength of belief (commitment) that is 
important and not necessarily the type of belief (e.g. spirituality or religiosity). 
However, given that commitment to belief has been found, in previous chapters, 
to be congruous with a number of Jungian concepts; and given that spirituality 
and religiosity were important concepts to Jung’s formulation of the importance 
of commitment to belief, it seems necessary to consider whether commitment to 
belief is, in fact, related to religion and spirituality.
Therefore, chapter six will examine whether commitment to belief is 
something that falls outside spirituality and religiosity, or whether commitment to 
belief is simply a different way of measuring Jung’s overriding theories of 
spirituality and religiosity.
With this purpose in mind, then, different theories/measures of religion 
and spirituality will be addressed. Jung’s theory surrounding the nature of beliefs 
has been fully outlined elsewhere within this thesis; however, due to the nature of 
this chapter, it is deemed necessary to summarise, and sometimes re-visit, his 
theory in regards to the emphasis made on religion and spirituality, as well as 
addressing modem theories of these religious and spiritual concepts.
Jungian theory surrounding religiosity and spirituality
Jung noted three pertinent facts with regard to religion and spirituality. First, 
there is no civilisation, present or past, which has not had a religion, a set of
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beliefs and sacred rituals. Thus, Jung (1958; 1959) posited that there exists a 
religious instinct within human beings, an inherent striving toward a relationship 
with a something, or a someone that transcends human limitations, in other words, 
a higher power.
Secondly, in Jung’s eyes, the irrationality of religious beliefs does not 
reduce their inherent value as irrefutable psychic facts. Jung noted the 
overwhelming importance of religious beliefs to individuals and entire societies, 
an importance depreciated and underestimated when these are dismissed as 
irrational or illusory. Refraining from the near-religious faith modem people have 
in salvation through the power of rational thinking and technology, Jung 
acknowledged that much of human experience was indeed irrational, ineffable, 
and symbolic. Jung believed psychology, as a discipline, could be capable of 
working rationally and scientifically with basically irrational data, only i f  these 
data, religion in this case, were not dismissed reductively but taken altogether 
seriously.
Thirdly, Jung’s broader and more sophisticated knowledge of 
mythological systems, religious practices, and comparative ethnology led him to 
see that by no means did Western religious beliefs, ancient or modem, constitute 
the whole of world religions. Though many elements of many religions might be 
interpreted as projections of personal family conflicts onto the heavens in a kind 
of cosmic transference (Freud, 1927/1961), Jung’s wider-ranging familiarity with 
world religions showed him that by no means was that all there was to religious 
beliefs, Eastern or Western.
Jung’s observations of the universality of religion led him to view religion 
as a manifestation of the collective unconscious. In this regard, he noted that 
religion actually referred to two distinct things. First, religion was religious 
experience, the direct contact with the divine, which he called the numinosum (a 
term he borrowed from Rudolph Otto, 1917), manifested in dreams, visions, and 
mystical experiences. Second, religion consisted of religious practice, the
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doctrines and dogmas as well as the rituals and enactments, which Jung saw as 
necessary to protect people from the awesome power of such a direct experience 
of the numinous. Both religious experience and religious practice were, therefore, 
for Jung, psychological phenomena that found their source inwardly and 
outwardly in the collective unconscious. Thus, to separate Jung’s discussion of 
specifically religious symbolism from his discussions of other types of symbols is 
difficult, since all manifestations of the collective unconscious are in a certain 
sense religious, objects of devoted attention that demand respect.
Many authors (Corbett, 1999; Hopke, 1999; Palmer, 1997; Storr, 1973) 
argue that, by separating religion from institutional churches and creeds, by seeing 
religion more as an attitude than as a set of beliefs, and by understanding religion 
as a psychological phenomenon of the first order, Jung’s writings on religion 
might, in a certain sense, have more of an effect on modem individuals who have 
“lost faith” than those who have found and practice a set of religious beliefs. 
However, Hopcke (1999) argues that Jung’s attitude towards religion is among his 
most brilliant contributions to modem thought and redeems religion for modem 
people as an aspect of human existence at one both vital to human fulfilment and 
amenable to investigation and understanding.
Jung’s writings on religion (1964; 1958; 1967) were extensive and ranged 
from technical to more popularly oriented discussions. While the more popular 
articles were aimed at helping the general public see how psychology and religion 
were not inimical but had many important points of contact, Jung’s more technical 
explorations of theological and religious imagery in the West are among his most 
famous achievements. For example, “Answer to Job” (1958), in which Jung 
grapples with the problem of good and evil biblically and psychologically, as well 
as his psychological interpretation of Roman Catholic ritual and theology in 
“Transformation Symbolism in the Mass” (1958) are famous for the controversy 
they provoked (Hopke, 1999). Much of Jung’s writings on Eastern religion are 
concerned both with the psychological exploration of these symbols and with the 
differentiation between Eastern and Western modes of thought and experience
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(considered more spiritual). It is clear from those pieces that Jung intended to 
offer a critique of those Europeans who believed that rejecting their own Western 
cultural and religious heritage and unthinkingly adopting Eastern religious beliefs 
and practices would automatically resolve their religious questions and unrest.
To summarise Jung’s overall theory, Jung saw religion as an attitude of 
mind, a careful consideration and observation in relation to certain ‘powers’; 
spirits, demons, gods, laws, ideals; or, indeed, an attitude toward whatever has 
impressed a person sufficiently so that they are moved to worship, obedience, 
reverence, and love. In Jung’s own words: “We might say, then, that the term 
‘religion’ designates the attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been 
changed by experience of the Numinosum” (1958, para. 9). The numinosum itself 
corresponded to a God-image in the individual with an archetypal propensity both 
to provoke expression and, when expressed, to take a recognisable form. This 
form, Jung observed, was approximate to that which has characterised the 
relationship between human beings and the so-called divine throughout the ages 
(archetype). He felt humans to be naturally religious, the religious function being 
as powerful as the instinct for sex or aggression. Being a natural form of psychic 
expression, religion was also, in his view, an appropriate subject for psychological 
observation and analysis.
The psychological carrier of the God-image, in a person, Jung called the 
Self. He saw it as something that acted as an ordering principle of the personality, 
reflecting the potential wholeness of the individual, prompting life enhancing 
encounters and verifying meaning. He noted that almost anything that connects a 
person with these attributes could be used as a symbol of the self. However, 
certain time-honoured and basic forms such as the cross and the mandala are 
acknowledged collective expressions of man’s highest religious value; i.e. the 
cross symbolising the tension of the ultimate opposition of human and divine, and 
the mandala representing the resolution of that opposition. Psychologically, Jung 
saw the transcendent function as fulfilling the task of linking man and God, or a 
person and his ultimate potential by way of symbol formation.
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Finally, the idea of the ego's being enjoined to respond to the demands of 
the self is central to Jung’s concept of individuation, the process of fulfilling 
oneself. Such fulfilment becomes of religious significance in as much as it 
conveys meaning to individual endeavour. All lives, Jung felt, involve the 
bringing together and resolution of heterogeneous and conflicting impulses. He 
saw a union between the individual and the collective psyche as being possible 
only when an alive and valid religious attitude exists.
Therefore, although this thesis has developed from Jung’s implications 
around belief being religious in nature, i.e. an individual’s belief needs to be 
deeply committed (internalised, solid, and used within all situations within one’s 
life), it is prudent to investigate the relevance of the theory of commitment to 
belief in light of Jung’s other implications, that this nature is directed toward a 
something, or someone that transcends human limitations, a higher power. This 
thesis has argued that it is the strength of belief in itself that is important and not 
necessarily the type of belief; and thus, has moved away from the direct concepts 
of religion and spirituality. Nevertheless, because Jung’s ideas greatly influenced 
the commitment to belief hypothesis, again it is necessary to consider whether 
commitment to belief is simply reflecting belief systems such as religion and 
spirituality. For this purpose, then, modem measurable theories of religion and 
spirituality will be considered alongside the Commitment to belief scale.
Modern theories of spirituality
Regardless of the substantial research carried out by authors on Spirituality 
(Allport, 1960; Frankl, 1978; Gartner, 1991; Jung, 1958; 1933; Maslow, 1971; 
Payne, Bergin, Bielma & Jekins, 1990; Seligman, 1990; Westgate, 1996; 
Worthington; 1989), modem research is still unclear on the nature of spirituality 
and, thus, how best to operationalise it. For example, Aldridge (1993) presented 
13 definitions focused primarily on spirituality. These can be largely summed up 
under four broader descriptions; (1) a need to transcend or rise above everyday
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material or sensory experience; (2) One’s relationship to God or some other 
higher universal power, force or energy; (3) Search for greater meaning, purpose 
and direction in living; and (4) Healing by means of non-physical kinds of 
intervention [e.g. prayer, meditation, religious beliefs (Thoreson, 1999)].
Others, however, have defined spirituality as largely part of organised 
religion, for example, the Judeo-Christian tradition that includes both institutional 
as well as personal factors (e.g. Koenig, 1997). From this perspective, religion is 
the more inclusive concept (Larson, Swyers & McCullough, 1998). Thus, it can 
be seen that spirituality is a somewhat unclear concept; yet, defining spirituality is 
essential to the study of this construct.
For the purposes of this chapter, religiosity and spirituality are viewed as 
distinct but overlapping concepts. Spirituality is the broader concept and 
represents beliefs and values, whereas religiosity is narrower, more focused, and 
refers to behaviours (Chandler, Holden & Kolander, 1992; Hinterkopf, 1994; 
Ingersoll, 1994; Westgate, 1996). Whereas religiosity is public and is often 
manifested in the context of a religious institution, spirituality is primarily a 
private matter and may or may not be expressed publicly. One may express 
spirituality in a religious context, but a person’s religiosity is not always a result 
of spirituality (Allport, 1960; Genia, 1991; Genia, 1993). The overlap between 
spirituality and religiosity can be found here in the realm of public expression. 
Recent theorising and research supports this view, suggesting that, although there 
are overlaps between certain religious and spiritual concepts (Hill, Pargament, 
Hood, McCullough, Swyers, Larson & Zinnbauer, 2000; Thoresen, 1999), 
religious items from religiosity and spirituality can be clearly shown to be either 
measuring religiosity or spirituality concepts (Maltby & Day, in press) and can be 
separated out by differing significant relationships with measures of personality, 
cognition, and mental health (Hill, et al. 2000; Maltby & Day, 2001a; 2001b; 
Mueller, Plevak, & Rummans, 2001).
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Despite the issues around the definition of spirituality, a wealth of research 
has focused around four main areas. A first, generally recognised aspect of 
spirituality, is meaning and purpose in life. For example, Carson, Soeken, and 
Grimm (1988) found that a sense of life purpose and satisfaction relate both to 
trait hope (hope as a personality characteristic; how one generally feels) and state 
hope (hope based on specific situations and times; how one feels at the moment). 
Also, in accord with Jung, studies in general show evidence for a negative 
relationship between meaning in life and depression (Carson, Soeken & Grimm, 
1988; Klein, Kupfer & Shea, 1993; Richards, Owens & Stein, 1993; Seligman,
1990). A second aspect of spirituality is intrinsically held value systems. For 
example, research shows that those with a personal spirituality show less 
depression than those who are more publicly, or socially, oriented (Bergin, 
Masters & Richards, 1987; Genia & Shaw, 1991; Spendlove, West & Stanish, 
1984; Watson, Hood, Foster & Morrison, 1988). A third recognised aspect of 
spirituality is Transcendence; research shows evidence that a belief in God 
strengthens feelings of hope, both state and trait hope (Carson, Soeken & Grimm, 
1988; Richards, Owens & Stein, 1993). The fourth aspect of spirituality is shared 
values and support. For example, Anderson, Maton, and Ensor (1991) argue that 
communities of faith, where actions of singing, praying, chanting, or meditating 
with others, allows one to experience a sense of unity (Travis, 1988), which in 
turn, has an empowering effect (Rappaport & Simkins, 1991).
Modern theories of religion
Religiosity is a multidimensional concept. Most agree that it involves a social 
institution with an organised system of beliefs, practices, rituals, and symbols 
designed to facilitate a relationship to an understanding of a deity [or deities] 
(Lowenthal, 1995; Thoreson, 1999; Wulff, 1997). Religions seek to promote 
understanding and harmony of a person’s relationship to oneself and to others in 
living together in a community, and to a transcendent power in the universe. 
Primarily research suggests three main religious orientations; Intrinsic, Extrinsic 
and Quest.
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First, is an intrinsic orientation toward religion, where individuals are 
described as living their religious beliefs, the influence of which religion is 
evident in every aspect of their life (Allport, 1966). Thus, those whose religion is 
intrinsic see religion as an end in itself; they really believe it, and take it very 
seriously (Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997). Allport argues that people with an 
intrinsic orientation find their master motive in religion, whereas other needs are 
regarded as less significant. Thus, having embraced a creed or religion, the 
individual endeavours to internalise it and follow it fully. It is in this sense that 
the individual lives their religion (Allport & Ross, 1967).
Second is an extrinsic orientation toward religion, which is defined as 
using religion to provide participation in a powerful in-group (Genia & Shaw,
1991); protection, consolation, and social status (Allport & Ross, 1967); religious 
participation (Fleck, 1981); and an ego defence (Kahoe & Meadow, 1981). This 
orientation, however, with the recommendation of authors such as Kirkpatrick 
(1989), and Leong and Zachar (1990), has more recently been divided into two 
dimensions of orientation; extrinsic-personal and extrinsic-social. An extrinsic- 
personal orientation towards religion is where individuals look to religion for 
comfort, relief, and protection, and using religious practices, such as prayer, for 
peace and happiness (Leong & Zachar, 1990; Maltby, Lewis & Day, 1999). An 
extrinsic-social orientation toward religion is when individuals look to church for 
making friends, creating social status, and being part of an in-group (Leong & 
Zachar, 1990; Maltby, Lewis & Day, 1999).
The third orientation toward religion, Quest was conceptualised by Batson 
(1976); Batson and Gray (1981); and Batson and Ventis (1982), in response to 
dimensions felt lacking in the other two, such as complexity, incompleteness, 
flexibility, and tentativeness. Thus, the concept of Quest represents the degree to 
which a person’s religion involves 4an open-ended, responsive dialogue with 
existential questions raised by the contradictions and tragedies of life’ (Batson & 
Ventis, 1982, p. 154).
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As well as three distinctions between religious orientations, researchers 
such as Pargament (1990,1996,1997; Pargament & Park, 1995) have 
reconceptualised some religious behaviours as ways of coping (Paragament,
1997). This theoretical perspective views religion as a coping process (Pargament, 
1990; 1996; 1997; Pargament, Olsen, Reilly, Falgout, Ensing, & Vanhaitsma, 
1992; Pargament & Park, 1995). Pargament (1990; 1997) suggests that a religious 
coping model might better explain the relationship between religiosity and 
psychological well-being. He argues that such a theoretical model would address 
the complex and continuous process by which religion interlocks with an 
individual’s life and allows them to deal with stresses in life. Pargament (1997) 
uses and extends coping theory, by arguing that religion may enter the coping 
process in a number of ways, with critical events, appraisals of situations, coping 
activities and outcomes, to which religion may be integral or external to these 
occurrences. Pargament views religious coping as a mediating factor in the 
relationship between religious orientation and psychological well-being. 
Pargament and his colleagues have developed a number of measures of religious 
coping, ranging from those that concentrate on problem areas of religious coping 
(Pargament, Zinnbauer, Scott, Butter, Zerowin, & Stanik, 1998) to identification 
of a number of dimensions of specific coping processes (Pargament, etak 1992, 
1996). However, Pargament, Smith, Koenig, and Perez (1998) suggest a two- 
factor model of religious coping in response to stressful life events; positive and 
negative religious coping. This model of coping encompasses a number of 
positive and negative religious coping styles including religious forgiveness, 
collaborative religious coping, spiritual connection, and religious purification. 
Religious coping is thought to be a stronger predictor than religious orientation 
measures for scores on psychological well-being; with religious coping mediating 
the relationship between religious orientation and psychological well-being 
(Pargament, 1997; Pargament, etal, 1998).
In addition to religious orientation and religious coping, one further aspect 
of religiosity seems congruous to Jungian ideas; that of religious experience.
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William James (1902) was the first to investigate intense experiences of 
individuals, later work sampled the whole population, and was not confined to 
solitary experiences. There are several ways of assessing religious experience, 
from single questions, to national surveys (Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997). 
Although, there are suggested varieties of religious experience (e.g. Greeley,
1975; Hay, 1982; Hood, 1975; Moehle, 1983; Proudfoot, 1985), there is 
considered to be a general core. Thus, religious experiences convey, to those who 
have them, that they have been in contact with a very powerful being or force, 
whether they call this God, or not, (Greeley, 1975; Hardy, 1979; Hay, 1982;
1990); that there is a unity in the whole of creation (Hay, 1982; Hood, 1975;
1995; Smith & Ghose, 1989; Thomas & Cooper, 1978); that they feel united and 
feel love towards other people (Hardy, 1979; Pahnke, 1966; Wuthnow, 1978); 
they feel more integrated, and perhaps “forgiven” (Pahnke, 1966; Spilka, Brown, 
& Cassidy, 1992); they are happier (Brown, 1994; Greeley, 1975; Hay, 1982; 
Poloma & Pendleton, 1991); they have had experience of timelessness, perhaps 
eternity (Downing & Wygant, 1964; Poloma & Pendleton, 1989; Spilka, Brown & 
Cassidy, 1992); and they believe that they have been in contact with some kind of 
reality (Hood, 1977; Wulff, 1991; Wuthnow, 1978). Research on religious 
experience is plentiful, however, Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle (1997) argue that it 
should be kept in mind that most research has been carried out on British and 
USA samples, and that many of the descriptions used to measure religious 
experience (e.g. A feeling of deep and profound peace; A certainty that all things 
would work out for the good; Sense of my own need to contribute to others) 
would not be considered religious in many cultures. Nevertheless, definitions of 
religious experience are, in essence, similar to Jung’s descriptions of a numinous 
experience, and, thus, warrant investigation in this chapter.
Aims of the study
To summarise, spirituality and religiosity were important concepts to Jung’s 
formulation of the importance of commitment to belief. At present, there is some 
support that commitment to belief is congruous with a number of Jung’s ideas.
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Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether commitment to belief is something 
that falls outside spirituality and religiosity, or whether commitment to belief is 
simply a different way of measuring spirituality and religiosity. Empirical 
evidence suggests that spirituality and religiosity can be separated out into 
numerous, but definable, definitions. The aim of this study, then, is to consider 
the relationship between commitment to belief and a number of measures of 
spirituality and religion.
Method
176 undergraduate students at Sheffield Hallam University (65 males, 111 
females) aged between 18 and 58 years (Mean = 28.9, SD = 10.4) completed the 
following questionnaires. These respondents were the same sample that is 
reported in Chapter 8 of this thesis.
Questionnaires
1. The Commitment to Belief Scale.
2. The Spiritual Involvement and Beliefs Scale (Hatch, Burg, Naberhaus, & . 
Hellmich, 1998). This scale was developed to create a more comprehensive and 
widely applicable instrument for the assessment of spiritual status, and the scale’s 
items were sought from a number of perspectives (Christianity, Judaism, Islam, 
and Hinduism). Thus, the scale is a 26-item measure with four subscales that 
measure underlying principles that are shared by multiple spiritual approaches. 
The four subscales are:
(i) External/Ritual, and typically address spiritual activities/rituals (e.g.
“spiritual activities have not helped me become closer to other people” 
-  item 5), or are consistent with belief in an external power (e.g. “a 
spiritual force influences the events in my life” -  item 7);
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(ii) Internal/Fluid, includes both items that refer to evolving beliefs (e.g. 
“in the future science will be able to explain everything” -  item 1) and 
many items that focus on internal beliefs and growth (e.g. “My 
spiritual life fulfills me in ways that material possessions do not” -  
item 14);
(Hi) Existential/Meditative, includes both items that refer to meditation 
(e.g. “meditation does not help me feel more in touch with my inner 
being” -  item 16), and many items addressing more existential issues 
(e.g. “I have a personal relationship with a power greater than myself’ 
-  item 17); and
(iv) Humility/Personal Application, dealing with humility (e.g. “when I
wrong someone I make an effort to apologise” -  item 20), and 
application of spiritual principles in daily activities (e.g. “I examine 
my actions to see if they reflect my values” -  item 23).
Responses are scored as follows: for positively worded items, i.e. where 
answers indicating agreement seem more spiritual, responses are scored on a 5- 
point format from (1) Strongly disagree, through to (5) Strongly agree; for 
negatively worded items, where agreement would seem less spiritual, responses 
are scored on a 5-point format from (1) Strongly agree, through to (5) Strongly 
disagree; and for items 24 (frequency of prayer), 25 (frequency of meditation) and 
26 (frequency of spiritual activity), responses are scored on a 5-point format from 
(1) Lowest frequency category, through (2) Next to lowest frequency, (3) Middle 
frequency, (4) Next highest frequency, to (5) Highest frequency. Hatch, Burg, 
Naberhaus, and Hellmich (1998) demonstrate that internal reliability statistics for 
three of the subscales are satisfactory (External/Ritual, a=.98; Internal/Fluid, 
a=.74; Existential/Meditative, a=.70, but perhaps, as Hatch, et al (1998) suggest, 
not for the Humility/Personal Application sub-scale (a=.51). Similar internal 
reliability statistics have also been reported by Maltby and Day (2001). Validity 
has been satisfactorily demonstrated with measures of personality and health 
(Hatch, etal. 1998; Maltby & Day, 2001a; 2001b).
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3. The Age-Universal I-E Scale-12 (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983; Maltby, 1999). 
This is a 12-item measure of intrinsic and extrinsic orientation towards religion 
that is based on the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967).
However, the Age-Universal I-E scale-12 differs from the Religious 
Orientation Scale in four ways. First, amendments to items that use simplified 
language to measure intrinsic and extrinsic orientation towards religion (Gorsuch 
& Venable, 1983). Secondly, suggestions that intrinsic and extrinsic orientations 
represent three religious dimensions; with an intrinsic orientation towards religion 
and the extrinsic dimension split into two dimensions, extrinsic-personal and 
extrinsic-social (Kirkpatrick, 1989; Leong & Zachar, 1990). Thirdly, changes to 
the response format of the scale (from an agree to disagree response format, to a 
Yes-No response format) that leads to a clear measurement of the intrinsic- 
extrinsic religious orientation (Maltby & Lewis, 1996). Fourthly, the original 
scale uses 20-items, however, after a factor analysis across 3300 USA, UK and 
Irish respondents, Maltby (1999) suggests that the intrinsic scale comprises 6 
items (e.g. I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs’, ‘My 
religion is important because it answers many questions about the meaning of 
life’), the extrinsic-personal scale comprises 3 items (‘What religion offers me 
most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow’; ‘Prayer is for peace and 
happiness’) and the extrinsic-social comprises 3 items (‘I go to church mainly 
because I enjoy seeing people I know there’; ‘I go to church mostly to sped time 
with my friends’).
4. The Quest Scale (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991b): The scale is a 12-item version 
of the measure incorporating some amendments to the response format (changed 
from an ‘agree’ to ‘disagree’ format, to a Yes-No response format) of the scale 
(Batson & Ventis, 1991a; 1999b; Maltby & Day, 1998) and two re-written items 
to adequately measure the Quest dimension among religious and non-religious 
persons (Maltby & Day, 1998). The scale yields three measures of Quest; 
complexity, religious doubt, and religious tentativeness or openness to change. 
Example items include ‘Questions are more central to my religious experience
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than are answers’ and ‘As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow 
and change’. Reported internal reliability statistics are above .7 and the scale 
shows adequate validity in its relationship to other measures of religiosity (Batson 
& Ventis, 1991a; 1999b; Maltby & Day, 1998).
5. The brief Religious Coping Scale tRCOPE [Pargament, Smith, Koenig, &
Perez, 1998a]). This religious coping measure is a 14-item indicator of a 2-factor 
model of positive and negative religious coping. This is a four-item scale and 
responses are scored on a four-point response format. Respondents are asked to 
identify how they respond to stress in accordance with a number of statements 
thought to reflect positive and negative coping. Positive coping items include; ‘I 
looked for a stronger connection with God’ [item 1], ‘Focused on religion to stop 
worrying about my problems’ [item 7], and negative religious coping items 
include ‘Wondered whether God had abandoned me’ [item 8], ‘Questioned the 
power of God’ [item 14]. The 4 point response format includes; l=Not a lot; 2=A 
little; 3=A lot; and 4=A great deal, with higher scores indicating a higher level of 
positive religious coping for the first seven items, and a higher level of negative 
religious coping for items 8-14. Reliability and validity for both scales have been 
shown across a number of studies in relation to other measures of religiosity and 
psychological well-being (Pargament, 1998; Pargament, etal., 1998).
6 . The Religious Experience Scale (Greeley, 1975; Maltby, 1999): The scale is an 
18-item measure, with two items reversed, which give descriptors of religious 
experience. Individuals who are conceptualized as high in religious experience 
are those who have undergone a number of religious experiences that are believed 
to lend themselves to self-fulfillment (Wulff, 1997). The items for the scale are 
descriptors provided by Greeley (1975), listing, from a U.S.A. sample, examples 
of religious experience. Example items include ‘Sense of my own need to 
contribute to others’ and ‘a conviction that love is the center of everything’. 
Maltby (1999) suggests the item usefulness as a measure of religious experience, 
when forwarded with the statement ‘Consider the statements below. Have you 
ever experienced any of these feelings?’ The scale demonstrates adequate
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reliability and validity with a number of religious and personality measures 
(Maltby, 1999; Maltby & Day, in press). Responses are scored on a Yes-No 
format with higher scores indicating a higher level of religious experience.
Results
Table 6.1 shows the Cronbach alpha statistics (Cronbach, 1951) computed for all 
the scales between the present sample and mean scores for all the variables by sex. 
All of the alpha coefficients are equal to or above the .7 criteria suggested for 
satisfactory reliability (Kline, 1986), with the exception of one, Humility/Personal 
application of spirituality. However, previous authors have reported that this 
subscale shows a similar low internal reliability (Hatch, etal., 1998; Maltby & 
Day, 2001a; 2001b).
Further, females were found to score significantly higher than males on 
religious experience and negative religious coping; whereas, males were found to 
score significantly higher than females on intrinsic orientation toward religion, 
extrinsic-social orientation toward religion, and extrinsic-personal orientation 
toward religion. Though among the present sample, sex differences were found 
for only some of the religious measures, there is a consistent view that there are 
sex differences in religiosity, usually with women being significantly more . 
religious than men (Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997; Francis & Wilcox, 1996; 
Wulff, 1997). Therefore, these differences, with the present sample, show some 
consistency with the present research, where women are scoring higher on 
religious measures. However, given that significant differences between the sexes 
for the scales did not occur for internal, stable, and global beliefs, and overall 
commitment to beliefs, and that previous chapters have also reflected no 
significant differences for sex with the Commitment to Belief scale, and given 
that there is no theoretical distinction proposed regarding sex differences and 
commitment to belief, the following analysis was performed with men and women 
combined.
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Table 6.1: Alpha coefficients for all the scales and mean scores for all the
variables by sex
Scale a Men Women t
Internal Beliefs .94 20.89 (13.4) 21.94 (11.6) -0.55
Stable Beliefs .88 27.15(11.0) 25.17(09.4) 1.26
Global Beliefs .88 26.83 (11.3) 24.71 (09.4) 1.34
Overall Commitment .95 74.87 (32.5) 71.82(27.9) 0.66
Religious Experience .70 27.86 (03.7) 28.91 (02.9) -2 .02*
Quest .83 18.06 (05.1) 19.56 (06.1) -1.64
External/Ritual Spirituality .93 39.93 (13.9) 43.53 (14.7) -1.53
Internal/Fluid Spirituality .88 38.88 (10.3) 41.02 (11.3) -1.21
Existential/Meditative .78 20.52 (05.6) 21.44 (06.0) -0.98
Humility/Personal Application .45 15.97 (03.4) 16.52 (03.1) -1.09
Intrinsic Religion .90 14.83 (03.8) 13.34 (03.9) 2.26*
Extrinsic-social .87 08.29 (01.3) 07.74 (01.7) 2.16*
Extrinsic-personal .83 07.28 (02.3) 06.46 (02.1) 2 .22*
Positive Religious Coping .97 11.08 (06.6) 12.43 (06.9) -1.14
Negative Religious Coping .80 08.02 (01.7) 08.96 (02.9) -2.06*
*p<.05; **p<.01
Pearson product moment correlation coefficient statistics were computed 
for each of the three aspects of internal, stable, and global beliefs, and an overall 
commitment to belief for the Commitment to Belief Scale, and all religious and 
spiritual measures.
Table 6.2 shows that a number of religious variables are significantly 
related to each other. Religious experience is positively significantly related to 
Quest, all subscales of spirituality, and positive religious coping; and is negatively 
significantly correlated to intrinsic, extrinsic-personal, and extrinsic-social 
orientations of religion. Quest is positively significantly related to all subscales of 
spirituality, and both positive and negative religious coping; and negatively 
significantly correlated to intrinsic, and extrinsic-personal orientations toward
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religion. The External/Ritual, Existential/Meditative, and Humility/Personal 
application subscales of spirituality are all significantly positively correlated to 
each other, and negatively significantly correlated to both positive and negative 
religious coping. The Internal/Fluid subscale of spirituality is also positively 
significantly correlated to all other subscales of spirituality, and negatively 
significantly correlated to positive religious coping. Further, all orientations of 
religion (intrinsic, extrinsic-personal, and extrinsic-social) are all positively 
significantly related to each other, and negatively significantly correlated to both 
positive and negative religious coping. Positive and negative religious coping are 
also significantly positively correlated to each other. However, when considering 
the Commitment to Belief scale; internal, stable, and global beliefs, and overall 
commitment to beliefs were found to have no significant relationships to any of 
the religious and spirituality measures.
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Discussion
The aim of the present study was to compare a number of different religious and 
spirituality measures with all aspects of the Commitment to Belief Scale (internal, 
stable, global, and overall commitment) in order to consider whether commitment 
to belief underlies actual beliefs of religion and spirituality, or whether 
commitment to belief lies as a similar principle, and is simply a different way of 
measuring these specific belief systems.
First, the comparison between the mean scores of the scales by sex among 
the present sample shows that there are sex differences when considering religion 
and spirituality, but no sex differences when considering all aspects of 
commitment to belief. This finding in itself suggests that, when measuring the 
specific scales of religion and spirituality, males and females perform differently, 
but not for commitment to belief
In terms of the main aims of the study, by using product moment 
correlation coefficients between all the measures, commitment to belief (internal, 
stable, global beliefs, and overall commitment to beliefs) is not correlated to any 
aspect of religion or spirituality. This is consistent with the view that commitment 
to belief can be used to measure strength within different types of belief, and the 
present findings suggest a move away from a direct comparison with Jung, and 
the emphasis he made on the importance of religion and spirituality. However, 
although the present findings suggest further construct validity for the 
Commitment to Belief scale, it is prudent to remember that the research was 
carried out on a university sample, and therefore, cannot be extrapolated to a 
wider population. Therefore, further research is needed to compare the present 
findings with different population samples.
Notwithstanding these speculations, the present findings support the 
argument for the concept of commitment to belief. Within this analysis, it has 
been demonstrated that commitment to belief is not simply another way of
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measuring the specific beliefs of religion and spirituality. The present findings 
suggest a departure from Jungian theory, and suggest confidence in using the 
measure with other belief sets without the worry that the scale may reflect deeper 
aspects of religiosity and spirituality.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Commitment to belief and stressful life events
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Summary
Chapters 2 and 3 consider the development and exploration of a measure of 
commitment to belief, chapters 4 and 5 consider Jungian concepts as theoretical 
guidance to commitment to belief, chapter 6 considers the implications on religiosity. 
Chapters 7 and 8 will aim to consider alternative models/explanations for the concept 
of commitment to belief, via modem cognitive variables.
The aim of the present study was to borrow aspects of Ellis’s model of ABC to 
investigate whether commitment to belief does have a positive effect on an 
individual’s mental health whilst dealing with a stressful life event. The purpose of 
this is twofold; (i) to consider whether Ellis (as a modem cognitive theorist) can 
provide further/better theoretical guidance to the theory of commitment to belief; and 
(ii) to operationalise commitment to belief, i.e. whether commitment to belief does, in 
fact, aid individuals to better deal with life’s problems.
115 undergraduate students (30 males, 85 females) completed measures of 
commitment to belief, life events, and measures of depression, anxiety, social 
dysfunction and somatic symptoms. To test the Ellis model, those respondents who 
indicated that they used their beliefs to deal with a life event were scored on how 
committed they were to that belief set using the Commitment to Belief scale.
The overall chapter shows very little evidence for Ellis’s model being able to 
give better theoretical guidance for the theory of commitment to belief, with 
commitment to belief only significantly correlated to somatic symptoms when related 
to a major life event. Discussions centre around prudence within the methodology, 
however, findings present some little support for Ellis’s theory aiding the 
conceptualization of the relationship between commitment to belief and better 
psychological well-being; much more work is needed.
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Introduction
This thesis has presented a concept of commitment to belief as a possible explanation 
for positive effects of belief on mental health (i.e. why intrinsic religiosity may better 
benefit an individual as opposed to extrinsic religiosity; why belief in good luck may 
be more beneficial than a belief in bad luck etc). It has also attempted to provide 
theoretical guidance for the concept of commitment to belief by considering similar 
concepts proposed by Jung. Here, chapters four, five, and six presented interesting 
findings to suggest Jungian theory can inform us, to some extent, as to why a 
commitment to belief is important to mental health. Thus suggesting support and 
theoretical guidance for commitment to belief through some very old ideas within 
psychology.
However, there is a need within modem psychology, when dealing with 
psychoanalytic ideas, to examine such findings within the modem context to consider 
simpler, or alternative, explanations or ideas. This point is made vehemently by both 
supporters, and critics of psychoanalytic theory (e.g. Kline, 1981; Eysenck & Wilson, 
1973), and, although these arguments are dealing specifically with Freudian theory, 
the points are valid within any psychoanalytic paradigms. Thus, the next two 
chapters will aim to consider alternative models/explanations for the concept of . 
commitment to belief. As well as this, however, it is important to remember that 
findings so far, although interesting and suggestive of Jungian thinking, have been 
inconclusive. Thus, adding to the need to investigate modem theory in order to better 
inform the concept of commitment to belief.
Therefore, chapters seven and eight will investigate whether the concept of 
commitment to belief can gain further, or alternative, support/guidance via modem 
paradigms, or indeed, whether commitment to belief fits best within Jungian theory. 
This will be considered in two main ways; (i) chapter seven will attempt to 
conceptualise what is happening with commitment to belief by borrowing a well- 
established model (Ellis’s ABC model of belief); chapter eight will consider 
alternative explanations for commitment to belief through the cognitive variables of 
coping and stress.
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Conceptualising commitment to belief and its positive effects on mental health
This thesis has, so far, presented the argument that a commitment to belief may help 
to understand why certain (specific) beliefs have a positive effect on mental health, as 
opposed to a detrimental effect. For instance, when considering the positive illusions 
around a belief in good luck, findings show an increase in feelings of confidence, 
control and optimism, increasing self-esteem, and reducing levels of depression and 
anxiety (Darke & Freedman, 1997a; Day, Maltby & Macaskill, 1999; Day & Maltby, 
in press; Taylor & Brown, 1988); as opposed to detrimental effects related to belief in 
bad luck. Similar findings have been found for an intrinsic orientation towards 
religion (e.g. Genia, 1991; 1996; Genia & Shaw, 1991; Maltby, 1999; 2000; Maltby, 
Lewis & Day, 1999), as opposed to an extrinsic orientation towards religion.
This commitment to belief becomes apparent through individuals who are 
defined as having an intrinsic orientation to religion, as they are described as living 
their religious beliefs, the influence of which, religion is evident in every aspect of 
their life (Allport, 1966). Within this perspective, an individual lives, and is 
committed to, their belief (e.g. intrinsic religion), thus internalising or making it 
personal, and using it to give meaning and control over their lives, as opposed to an 
individual who is using it to serve more external purposes (e.g. extrinsic religion). 
Therefore, it is argued that it is the commitment/strength of belief that may be integral 
to the positive effect on a person’s psychological well-being. Similarly, belief in good 
luck is seen as an attempt to understand the world, particularly in response to events 
in our lives that are largely beyond any direct attempts to control (Darke & Freedman, 
1999). The uncertainty associated with the possibility that such events may occur can 
be quite disconcerting, especially when the consequences are substantial. Rothbaum, 
Weisz & Snyder (1982) suggest that irrational beliefs about luck may allow 
individuals to remain optimistic even when it is objectively impossible to exercise 
direct control over one’s circumstances. As such, it is this belief that gives meaning 
to life and events, and adherence to this belief set helps the person interpret, 
understand and deal with the world.
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The aim of this chapter then is clear; by borrowing Ellis’s model of ABC, the 
model can be used to investigate whether commitment to belief does have a positive 
effect on an individual’s mental health whilst dealing with a stressful life event. The 
purpose of this is twofold; (i) to consider whether Ellis (as a modem cognitive 
theorist) can provide further/better theoretical guidance to the theory of commitment 
to belief; and (ii) to operationalise commitment to belief, i.e. whether commitment to 
belief does, in fact, aid individuals to better deal with life’s problems.
Can Ellis’s ABC model help understand the process of commitment to belief?
Within modem psychology, there are a number of concepts that could be considered 
to explain the mechanisms of commitment to belief, and its relationship to 
psychological well-being, that work outside, or alongside, Jungian theory. One such 
theory is Ellis’s model of ABC (Ellis, 1973; 1994).
Indeed, when considering Jungian theory, it is apparent that many aspects of 
his theory echoes elements of cognitive dynamics, in a number of ways; Ellis believes 
that belief is fundamental to mental health, as these goals, purposes, and values 
underlie attempts to be happy and satisfied. This is best demonstrated when 
considering his ABC format of human disturbance, within Rational Emotive therapy, 
where there are suggested effects on the activating experience and the consequence by 
the said belief, as well as these, then, effecting the belief. In other words, belief (B) is 
fundamental and affects both the activating experience, or perception (A) and the 
cause, or consequence (C), which in turn, A and C then reinforce B. This theory 
demonstrates a similar concept as to how Jung believes that strong belief has effects 
on both how a person sees the world, and how that person then deals with situations.
It is clear then, that the origins and dynamics of commitment to belief can not 
only be seen within Jungian theory, but could also be working within the realms of 
cognitive psychology. These similarities require further investigation, and will be 
considered by examining the impact of Ellis’s model of ABC to show a dynamic to 
commitment to belief, i.e. providing a basis for understanding the relationship of 
belief processes.
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However, it must be made clear, here, that Ellis is being considered as a way 
to help conceptualise what is happening with belief, and this thesis is not necessarily 
opposing the ideas of Ellis (i.e. with regards to his theory of irrational beliefs) or 
looking to replace it in the literature; put simply, it is a good model in which to enable 
investigations of belief to take place.
First, however, it is important to summarise the basic concepts of Ellis, 
considering both similarities and differences to Jungian concepts on belief, in order to 
better understand the relationship of belief processes.
Ellis: providing a basis for understanding the relationship of belief processes
Ellis’s Rational-Emotive Therapy (Ellis 1994; 1973) proposes both core beliefs, and 
goal-related beliefs, and assumes that all individuals have goals, purposes and values 
that underlie attempts to be happy or satisfied (Grieger & Boyd, 1980). Like Jung, 
Ellis also suggests a theory of self-actualisation, of realising one’s potential. Rational 
Emotive Behaviour therapists teach their clients how to overcome their emotional and 
behavioural problems in order to help them ‘actively to seek and arrange for a fuller, 
happier, and more self-actualising existence’ (Ellis, 1993a, p.25). Clients are 
encouraged to individually choose goals, which emphasise self-actualisation (e.g. 
becoming self-employed; Dryden & Neenan; 1997), and are taught how to tackle the 
various blocks standing in the way of such goals. Self-actualisation is more likely to 
occur if clients develop flexible beliefs in the form of preferences (evaluative belief 
couched in the form of a flexible wish, want, hope, desire, etc.) rather than rigid 
beliefs in the form of demands (rigid and dogmatic evaluative belief couched in the 
forms of an absolute must, should, ought, have to, got to).
Rational Emotive Therapy has become one of the major approaches to 
psychotherapy today, and in many respects, has a simple and easily exposited theory 
of human disturbance, and of effective methods for helping people overcome their 
emotional problems (Ellis, 1977b). At the same time, this theory has many
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ramifications and complications; however, Ellis states clearly the importance of 
belief.
The basic theory of Rational Emotive therapy has several important aspects, 
and includes a number of hypotheses, many of which have been supported in a 
number of empirical, controlled studies (e.g. Bernard & Guiseppe, 1989; Chang,
1997; Ellis, 1962; Ellis & Grieger, 1977; MacDonald & Games, 1972; Mahoney, 
1997; Watson, Vassar, Plemel, Herder & Manifold, 1990). For the purpose of this 
thesis, however, only his connection to beliefs will be presented. With first a brief 
overview of what is classed as an irrational belief.
Ellis assumes that all individuals have fundamental goals, purposes and values 
that underlie attempts to be ‘happy’ or ‘satisfied’ (Ellis, 1980) in all areas of life. 
According to Ellis, if people choose to stay alive and try to be happy, they act 
‘rationally’ or ‘self-helpfully’ (Ellis & Bernard, 1985) when they think, emote or 
behave in any way that abets these goals (Bordin, 1979); and when they act 
‘irrationally’ or ‘self-defeatingly’ then they sabotage their own goals. This general 
premise is the crux of Ellis’s therapy, and which, in brief, attempts to change 
irrational beliefs into rational ones.
Clearly, Ellis’s concept of belief is fundamental to mental health, 
demonstrated when considering his ABC model of human disturbance. Rational- 
emotive therapy holds that individuals practically never think, emote or behave in a 
pure or monolithic way (Grieger & Boyd, 1980). Instead, when they ‘emote’ they 
also think and act; when they ‘act’ they also think and emote; and when they ‘think’ 
they also emote and act. Ellis argues that what we conventionally label ‘emotions’ 
and ‘feelings of emotional disturbance’ are largely, but not exclusively, the direct 
concomitants of people’s thoughts, ideas, or constructs (Ellis, 1957; Ellis, 1962; Ellis, 
1975; Ellis & Harper, 1961a; Epictetus, 1899; Kelly, 1955; Phillips, 1956).
When people are consistently ‘emotionally disturbed’ or self-defeating, Ellis 
puts their disturbances into an ABC format. At point A, they have Activating 
Experiences of an unpleasant nature (e.g. they fail at a task they consider as 
important). They bring certain goals, purposes, or values to these A’s, and are
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thwarted in achieving these goals. They then feel and act ‘disturbedly’ at C -  their 
emotional and behavioural Consequences (e.g. they feel hurt and depressed at failing 
at A, and withdraw from attempting the task again). Reactions at C, according to 
Ellis, are caused by B -  people’s Belief System about what happens to them at A.
Mostly, according to rational-emotive therapy, people believe a set of rational 
beliefs, and if they stayed with these they would only tend to have appropriate 
consequences, e.g. feelings of annoyance etc., when failing at A; and would gain a 
determination to not have these consequences (annoyance) by going back to their 
Activating Experience (A) and trying again. However, when inappropriate 
Consequences occur (e.g. depression and withdrawal) they usually avoid the same 
Activating Experiences, and set up an irrational belief.
Rational-emotive therapy categorises the main irrational beliefs generally held 
by people into 10-12 major headings (Ellis, 1962; Ellis & Harper, 1961a), and more 
recently 3 major ones (Ellis, 1977a; Ellis, 1977b; Ellis, 1975; Ellis & Abraham,
1978), each with many derivatives. These are; 1) ‘I must do well and win approval 
for my performances, or else I rate as a rotten person’; 2) ‘Others must treat me 
considerately and kindly, in precisely the way I want them to treat me; if  they don’t, 
society and the universe should severely blame, damn, and punish them for their 
inconsiderateness’; and 3) ‘Conditions under which I live must get arranged so that I 
get practically everything I want comfortably, quickly and easily, and get virtually 
nothing that I don’t want’.
Ellis’s theory, then, shows clearly that beliefs are extremely important to 
mental health, albeit; he concentrates on ‘irrational beliefs’. However, some 
researchers have asserted that there are ambiguities surrounding what people classify 
as irrational; and whether these are actually representing a detriment to mental health 
(Darke & Freedman, 1997a; Day, Maltby & Macaskill, 1999). For example, if we 
consider some of the examples of irrational behaviour Ellis uses under his first major 
category, we can immediately see a conflict of opinions:
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Example 1: ‘I desperately need others to rely and depend upon; because I shall always 
remain weak. I also need some supernatural power on which to rely, especially in 
times of severe crisis.’
Example 2: ‘I must understand the nature or secret of the universe in order to live 
happily in it.’
Firstly, in the first example, it can be seen here that the person is looking for a 
belief in order to give strength in times of crisis, which can give them support and 
help, which then leads to better mental health. In the second statement there seems to 
be a mention of seeking for understanding and meaning in life, which, through 
research presented so far, leads to well-being. An explanation for why these 
statements are detrimental to a person could actually be that they are presenting a 
genuine attempt at achieving a needed belief, but failing. Jung (1958) presents 
neurosis as individuals who are constantly questioning their beliefs/religion, and 
frequently changing them. Thus, suggesting that it is not the belief itself that is 
detrimental, but that they have weak or faulty belief structures.
Alternatively, however, it may also be argued, here, that Ellis’ definition of 
rational/irrational is mostly subjective to the individual, i.e. Ellis is specifically 
interested in promoting attainment of a person’s goals in order to promote better 
mental health, and such, if a belief in luck, for example, helps a person to attain their 
goals then this belief should not necessarily be considered as irrational. Thus, luck is 
only irrational within a scientific model, and must be considered subjectively with 
each individual’s construct of this said belief.
Nevertheless, Ellis provides a sound model for how beliefs affect behaviour 
and mental health, demonstrating the great significance of the belief itself. In 
commitment to belief, it has been argued, and some evidence found in previous 
chapters, that it is the strength of the belief that is important, and not the type of 
belief. Ellis’s model of ABC gives a useful structure as to how this may be occurring, 
i.e. that commitment to belief may be working on the same principles as the ABC 
model. This could be demonstrated by the use of life events, or life changes, that are 
considered stressful, i.e. whether an individual suffering a stressful life event
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(activating experience) is better able to cope, thus leading to better mental health 
(consequence) due to a commitment to belief (belief).
Considering stressful Life Events
Life Events, or Life change, theory explains stress by reference to life changes that 
require major adaptations by the person. Death of a spouse, bankruptcy, loss of a job, 
or life-threatening illness fit the definition of major events that require substantial 
personal adjustment. Thus, change causes stress; and almost any change in our lives 
is a stressor because there is a demand on us to deal with the new situation (Selye, 
1982). Stress is thought to be both bad and good (Holmes & Rahe, 1967). Bad 
stresses (percentages estimate the difficulty in managing that particular stress relative 
to death of a spouse, which is 100%) include: death of spouse (100%), divorce (73%), 
serious illness (53%), loss of job (47%), change occupations (36%), have more 
arguments with spouse (35%), and so on. Good stresses include: falling in love and 
getting married (50%), reconciliation after a separation (45%), retirement (45%), 
having a baby (39%), buying a house (31%), get promoted (29%), having an unusual 
success (28%), graduate (26%), find new friends (18%), and take a vacation (13%). 
The more of these major life changes, good or bad, that have occurred in a person’s 
life during the last year or two, the greater the chances of that person becoming 
physically or emotionally ill (Holmes & Rahe, 1967).
However, there are criticisms to this theory; the Hassles and Up-lifts Model 
(Lazarus, 1984) reflects the view that micro-stressors, in the form of perceived minor 
irritations or demands, and pleasures, also have an impact on health outcomes. This 
view is in response to criticisms that life events theory ignores psychological 
mediators, such as the saliency of an event and the individual’s coping resources for 
dealing with the event. Given the relational view of stress and coping, Lazarus argued 
that the effects of life events on health outcomes vary depending on the meaning of 
the events to the individual. For example, divorce for one individual might be a major 
loss, whereas for another individual it might be a relief and an opportunity to grow 
and move forward in life. Lazarus argued that a difference in cognitive appraisal of 
the same event would likely lead to the event having different effects on health
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outcomes. In addition, the Hassles and Uplifts Model proposes that events that are 
perceived as negative versus those perceived as positive will have different effects on 
health, and that day to day events that have positive tones or uplifts act as buffers for 
the negative effects of stressors on health. This, again, is in contrast to the 
assumptions in life event theory that any change, no matter the emotional tone, would 
negatively affect health outcomes. Another criticism is that major life events do not 
consider the small stressors that may work on a more cumulative effect and so be 
more detrimental, i.e. a divorce is a major upset, but it is the smaller cumulative 
effects of, for example, changes in daily routines and patterns at meal time, household 
management, lack of constant companionship etc. that can have a greater effect than a 
distant life event. However, the life event theory argues, in return, that life event 
theory is not simply that major changes in life occur but it is because of all the 
cumulative changes that occur from this event that it is so stressful, and requires such 
major adaptations for this person.
However, when considering stressful life events in context of this thesis, the 
emphasis is made upon major life changes, i.e. using belief to give meaning and 
control over their lives, as opposed to an individual who is using it to serve more 
external purposes (e.g. extrinsic religion); similarly, the literature sees belief in good 
luck as an attempt to understand the world, particularly in response to events in our 
lives that are largely beyond any direct attempts to control (Darke & Freedman,
1999). Therefore, although it must be acknowledged that life event theory is not 
without criticisms, for the purpose of this study, i.e. to consider whether people can 
better cope with major upheavals, life event theory and not daily hassles was 
considered more appropriate.
Using life events with Ellis’s ABC format
One of the purposes of this chapter, then, is to consider whether Ellis’s model of 
beliefs can be used as an implement to investigate whether a commitment to belief is 
beneficial to mental health when an individual has to deal with a major life event. 
Thus, for example, when considering commitment to belief in the ABC context, a life 
event, such as divorce, could be seen as an activating experience (A), if the individual
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has a strong and committed belief system (B), such as believing that no matter how 
hurt they feel, they can find meaning to the experience (i.e. that all things happen for a 
good reason, or it happened because they need to further develop and were being 
restricted in doing so etc), then consequences of this life event (C), albeit stressful, 
will, in the long term, be beneficial to mental health, giving the individual added 
strength to deal with adversity, which in turn, reinforces their beliefs etc.
It is prudent, then, to examine the dynamics of Ellis’s ABC format whilst 
using the Commitment to Belief scale, to consider whether commitment to belief is 
related to the ABC model.
Therefore, by using the ABC format, a model can be devised:
A c= >  B < = >  C
(Life Event) (Commitment to Belief) (Better Mental Health)
Thus, the aim of this chapter is to investigate whether commitment to belief 
and its relationship to better psychological well-being can be considered within the 
ABC model.
Method
115 undergraduate students at Sheffield Hallam University (30 males, 85 females) 
aged between 18 and 58 years (Mean=29.07, SD=10.9).
Questionnaires
All respondents completed a questionnaire, which included the following scales;
(i) The Commitment to Belief scale: see chapter two for full details
(ii) Life Events Scale for Students: LESS (Clements & Turpin. 1996L The 
scale is a checklist measure of Life Events intended for use in stress
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research using undergraduate populations. Since undergraduate samples 
are readily accessible, and frequently experience periods of 
institutionalized stress (i.e. examinations), they provide a useful, if 
specialized, population for ‘stress’ research. Accordingly, several life 
event scales have been developed to assess the relationship between ‘life 
event stress; and health and psychological functioning in undergraduate 
populations (Constantini, Braun, Davis & Iervolino, 1974; Crandall, 
Preisler & Aussprung, 1992; Sarason, Johnson & Siegel, 1978; Zitzow, 
1984). However, these have been targeted at American students. The 
content of these scales appears to reflect differences in the lifestyles of 
British and American students. Some also include a large number of 
vague or nonspecific events. The LESS scale is a validated life event scale 
for use with British undergraduates. The scale comprises 36 items, which 
describe specific life events. Subjects are asked to rate the stressfulness of 
each event, in terms of the amount of adaptation they would require, for 
the average student. All ratings were to be in relation to event number one 
“Death of a Parent”, which was given a rating of 100. Reliability for the 
scale is consistent with those reported for other life event scales (Paykel, 
1987; Zimmerman, 1983), however it was reported that, in common with 
other life event scales, it is only likely to provide accurate reports when 
used to assess events happening in the recent past. Validity for the scale is 
found by students reporting high levels of stressful life events also 
reporting greater psychological disturbance on the General Health 
Questionnaire (Goldberg & Williams, 1991), also that the relationship 
between life events and psychological disturbance is not an artifact of 
stable individual differences in negative affectivity, vigilance or 
repression-sensitisation (trait measures).
However, because this study is only interested in measuring whether a 
person has experienced a major life event, in order to consider whether 
their beliefs helped them to deal with that event, it was considered 
unnecessary to measure how stressful that event was. Therefore, the 
responses to the scale were not computed.
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After completion of the LESS scale, students were then asked to consider 
one of the stressful events that they had indicated experiencing. Then, 
using the ‘desirable’ constructs that they had formulated from the 
Commitment to Belief questionnaire, they were asked to indicate whether 
any of the constructs formulated enabled/helped them deal with the 
problem, via a Yes/No response. If they marked a ‘yes’ response, they 
were then asked to indicate how many, and, specifically, which, constructs 
they had used.
(iii) The General Health Questionnaire: GHQ (Goldberg & Williams, 1991). 
This scale contains four sub-scales that measure aspects of general health. 
Each of these sub-scales comprise 7-item measures of; depressive 
symptoms (e.g. ‘Felt that life is entirely hopeless’ [item 23]); anxiety 
symptoms (e.g. ‘Been getting scared or panicky for no good reason’ [item 
12]); social dysfunction (e.g. ‘Been taking longer over the things you do’ 
[item 16]; and somatic symptoms (e.g. ‘Been feeling run down and out of 
sorts’ [item 3]). Scores are recorded on a four point response format, from 
0= ‘Better than usual’, 2 = ‘Same as usual’, 3 = ‘Worse than usual’, 
through 4 = ‘Much worse than usual’. The scale demonstrates satisfactory 
reliability and validity across a number of samples (Goldberg & Williams, 
1991).
Results
Table 7.1 shows the Cronbach alpha statistics (Cronbach, 1951) computed for all the 
scales between the present sample and mean scores for all the variables by sex. All of 
the alpha coefficients are equal to or above the .7 criteria suggested for satisfactory 
reliability (Kline, 1986), with the exception of stable and global beliefs. This is not 
consistent with previous studies within this thesis, where consistent satisfactory 
reliability has been found, thus present findings must be considered as due to the 
present sample, with caution to further reliability exploration in future studies. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this particular study only overall commitment to
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belief (the model only applicable to overall belief, and not to factors of belief) will be 
taken forward.
Further, females were found to score significantly higher than males on 
internal beliefs, somatic symptoms, anxiety, and depression. Again, internal beliefs 
have, so far, not been found to be dependent on sex differences, and may reflect a 
difference to the present sample. Also, the findings that females score higher on 
anxiety and depression are consistent with reports made by previous authors using the 
test (Goldberg & Williams, 1991). However, given that significant differences 
between the sexes for the scales did not occur for overall commitment to belief, and 
that previous chapters have also reflected no differences for sex, the following 
analysis was performed with men and women combined.
Table 7.1: Alpha coefficients for all scales and mean scores for all variables by sex.
Scale a Men Women t
Internal Beliefs .72 13.80 (10.4) 20.42 (10.7) -2.94**
Stable Beliefs .59 23.80(11.6) 24.75 (08.7) -0.47
Global Beliefs .67 25.13(11.5) 23.48 (08.5) 0.83
Overall Commitment .88 62.73 (28.9) 68.66 (24.9) -1.07
Somatic Symptoms .86 05.60 (02.8) 07.68 (04.6) -2.31*
Anxiety .89 06.73 (03.1) 09.66 (04.9) -3.03**
Depression .91 05.60 (02.9) 07.42 (03.4) -2.56*
Social Dysfunction .74 04.07 (02.9) 04.89 (04.1) -0.99
CTB helped with life events - 01.20 (00.4) 01.19(00.4) 0.14
No. of CTB with life events - 01.73 (01.7) 02.39 (01.9) -1.68
p<0.05*, p<0.01**
Table 7.2 shows how many generated constructs individuals actually used to 
help with their stressful life event. From the sample of 115 students asked to rate a 
yes/no response to whether any of the constructs formulated from the Commitment to 
Belief Scale helped them to deal with the event, 93 students (80.9%) answered ‘yes’, 
and 22 students (19.1%) answered ‘no5. Most people who answered ‘yes’ tended to 
use one strong belief (30 people), with only 3 people using all seven belief constructs.
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Because this study is concerned with considering the ABC model, which 
measures whether commitment to belief is related to mental health and a given life 
event, only people who answered ‘yes’ will be taken forward in the analysis.
Table 7.2: Frequency table showing number of beliefs used to help with stressful Life 
Event.
Number of constructs used Frequency of People Percentage of People
to help with Life Event %
0 22 19.1
1 30 26.1
2 18 15.7
3 14 12.2
4 18 15.7
5 6 5.2
6 4 3.5
7 3 2.6
Total using no beliefs 22 19.1
Total using beliefs 93 80.9
In order to measure the ABC model, the beliefs used to help with life events need to 
be taken forward to measure their relationship to mental health. This was done by 
calculating a commitment to belief score using only those ratings for internal, stable 
and global aspects for those beliefs identified as helping with life events.
However, as it stands, those people using one belief will score lower than 
those using seven, when in fact, they are equally valid and important when helping to 
overcome stressful life events. Therefore, an average score was calculated for each 
person by computing an overall score, and then dividing this by the number of belief 
constructs they used. Thus, for example:
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Person 1: States that they used one belief construct to help them.
Therefore the total score for the internal, stable and global ratings for 
that one construct was computed, and then divided by 1 (the number of 
belief constructs).
Person 2: States that they used 5 belief constructs to help them.
Therefore the total score for the internal, stable and global ratings for 
the five constructs was computed, and then divided by 5 (the number 
of belief constructs).
In addition, scores for the commitment to belief scale in its original format 
were computed to provide a comparison with previous research.
Pearson product moment correlation coefficient statistics were computed for 
overall commitment scores of belief used to help with the stressful life event, and all 
four dimensions of the General Health Questionnaire.
Table 7.3: Pearson Product moment correlation coefficient matrix for all the 
variables, and overall scores of beliefs used.
SS Anx Dep SD CTB
1. Total score of beliefs used -0.07 -0.17 -0.18 -0.31** 0.84**
2. Somatic Symptoms 0.63** 0.56** 0.42** -0.09 .
3. Anxiety 0.56** 0.38** -0.17
4. Depression 0.37** -0.08
5. Social Dysfunction -0.34**
p<.05*, p<.01**
CTB=Commitment to belief scale in original format.
Table 7.3 shows that all aspects of the General Health Questionnaire are all 
related to each other. However, overall scores of beliefs used to help individuals with 
stressful life events is negatively significantly correlated to social dysfunction, but not 
somatic symptoms, anxiety, or depression. This may suggest that using beliefs to aid
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life events only helps to alleviate social dysfunction. To confound this, however, 
overall commitment to belief scores, in its original format, were also significantly 
negatively related only to social dysfunction, and not to somatic symptoms, anxiety, 
or depression. This is not in keeping with findings in previous chapters, where 
overall commitment to belief has been found to significantly correlate with all the 
measures of general health, suggesting a failure to replicate previous findings among 
the present sample. This finding, then, could be unique to the present sample. 
However, when considering that social dysfunction is solely correlated to both overall 
scores of beliefs used to help individuals with a stressful life event and the original 
overall commitment to belief dimension; it is unclear which accounts for unique 
variance. In other words, whether or not the item of scored beliefs used to deal with 
life events is a real construct, or whether simply using the commitment to belief scale 
in its original format would have identified this finding. For this purpose, then, 
regression analysis was performed.
Table 7.4: Regression analysis for social dysfunction using overall commitment to 
belief in its original format and overall scores of beliefs used.
N=93
B B sr2
Social dysfunction
Factor 1 -  Overall -0.01 -0.68 0.46**
Commitment
Factor 2 -  Overall 0.21 0.26 0.07
scores of beliefs used
R2  
Adj R2  
R
=0.23
=0.21
=0.48**
Table 7.4 shows the results of the standard multiple regression analysis performed 
with social dysfunction used as the dependent variable and overall commitment to 
belief in its original format and overall scores of beliefs used for stressful life events 
considered as the independent variables. Included in this table are the unstandardized 
regression coefficient (B), the standardized regression coefficient (B), the semi-partial
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correlations (sr2), R, and adjusted R2. The regression statistic (R) for somatic 
symptoms was significantly different from zero (F(2,86)=12.73, pc.001). For social 
dysfunction, overall commitment to belief, in its original format, accounts for unique 
variance in the prediction of this well-being measure.
Discussion
This chapter has begun to explore the relationships between commitment to belief, 
and Ellis’s model of ABC, in order to identify whether this model could provide a 
further understanding to the relationship between commitment to belief and 
psychological well-being. In other words, a stressful life event (an activating 
experience: A) would be related to commitment to belief (belief: B), which would 
then be related to better psychological well-being (consequence: C).
Findings showed that most of the sample (80%) was actually using 
commitment to belief to help them with their stressful life events. However, findings 
demonstrated that this did not help participants alleviate somatic symptoms, anxiety 
or depression. Nevertheless, it was found that using their committed beliefs to aid 
them with the stressful life event did, in fact, alleviate social dysfunction. This 
finding suggests that among people who suffer a stressful life event, and use their 
beliefs to deal with this event, are those who have a strong commitment to belief, and 
are able to function with everyday tasks, and life, more easily. Further research is 
needed to examine whether this finding is peculiar to life events, or whether further 
consideration can be made with looking at a more everyday stressful event.
However, when considering that social dysfunction is solely correlated to both 
overall scores of beliefs used to help individuals with a stressful life event and the 
original overall commitment to belief dimension, a multiple regression shows that it is 
commitment to belief in its original format that actually accounts for unique variance. 
In other words, this suggests that the item of scored beliefs used to deal with life 
events may not be a real construct, and that simply using the commitment to belief 
scale in its original format would have identified this finding. Thus, this casts doubt 
on the usefulness of the theory put forward in this chapter, or perhaps, the method
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used to consider the theory. This can only be addressed by replicating the current 
findings.
There are also other problems to be considered with regards the actual sample, 
for instance, reliability statistics were not confirmed for global and stable aspects of 
belief; a gender difference was found for internal beliefs, with females scoring 
significantly higher than males on this dimension, where no gender differences have 
been found in all previous studies; and overall commitment scores, in its original 
format, were significantly related only to social dysfunction, whereas findings in 
chapter two found overall commitment to belief to be significantly correlated to all 
aspects of the general health questionnaire. These conflicting findings are hard to 
explain, they may simply be due to the present sample, in which case all findings 
should be examined with caution until replication can be established; other 
explanations for these findings are not so easily explained, and again needs further 
investigation.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that 80% of the total sample did 
report that they used their beliefs to help them deal with stressful situations. Thus, the 
issue may be one of methodology, i.e. it is assumed that effects on psychological well­
being are of long-term benefit as it is assumed that people use these beliefs again and 
again. However, when measuring beliefs effects on a specific event (i.e. stressful), it 
may need to be carried out much nearer to the event itself in order to establish the 
beliefs direct effect. Therefore, a much smaller time frame than 3 months should be 
considered in future research to tighten up the methodology used. Indeed, when 
measuring life events, authors report that assessing events in the recent past are 
essential, as after one month subjects report 0.6 fewer events, a decrease of 13%, after 
6 months the fall off is more substantial, subjects reporting just over 1.5 fewer events, 
a decrease of around 39% in the number of events reported (Clements & Turpin, 
1996).
It should also be considered, when using a measure of life events, the 
criticisms of this theory; that life events theory ignores psychological mediators, such 
as the saliency of an event and the individual’s coping resources for dealing with the 
event; that a major life event, for example, divorce for one individual might be a
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major loss, whereas for another individual it might be a relief and an opportunity to 
grow, thus different cognitive appraisals of the same event would likely lead to the 
event having different effects on health outcomes; and finally, it can be argued that 
positive tones or uplifts can act as buffers for the negative effects of stressors on 
health. Therefore, these issues may have an effect on individuals who use belief to 
aid them with stressful events, i.e. they may see the event as an opportunity to grow 
and move forward in life, thus not considering the event as particularly stressful. 
Lazarus’s theory of hassles and uplifts (1984) may perhaps be a better indicator in 
future research.
Methodology issues certainly seem to be an issue, here, and if this study is re­
visited, it should consider a more comprehensive research programme, looking at 
commitment to belief and stress. This study has established that people are reporting 
the use of beliefs to help them overcome stressful events in their life, but it does not 
inform us of the psychological mechanisms that they are using. This may not be 
possible through an Ellis explanation, indeed, it could be argued that testing this way 
oversimplifies Ellis’s process model, which is really immensely complex and seldom 
has only one belief operating at a time, but rather complex interactions of beliefs, not 
all of which are in consciousness. Although this study was only considering Ellis’s 
model as a way to operationalise commitment to belief, and not to test Ellis’ model 
per se, this may have added to the problems. Thus, other theories of stress may better 
help to explain this relationship; some of which are covered, and investigated, within 
the following chapter.
To sum, though intriguing, the present findings suggest little overall support 
for Ellis’s theory aiding the conceptualization of the relationship between 
commitment to belief and psychological well-being; with only some support that 
commitment to belief may aid an individual to engage in everyday life after a stressful 
event. Also, that, so far, modem paradigms of belief allow no further theoretical 
guidance to the theory of commitment to belief, and, as such, Jungian theory is still 
the better guide.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Commitment to belief, primary appraisals and coping
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Summary
Chapter seven began to consider alternative models/explanations for the 
concept of commitment to belief, via Ellis’s ABC model, with only some 
support that commitment to belief may aid an individual to engage in everyday 
life after a stressful event, and problems raised through the chapter’s 
methodology. Chapter eight proposes further consideration of alternative 
models for a theoretical context, by using a cognitive-phenomenological model 
of stress, and coping theory. Thus, consideration is made, as a basis for 
speculation, through the use of measurement and theory around (1) stress 
appraisals, (2) coping, and (3) optimism.
176 undergraduate students (65 males, 111 females) completed 
measures of commitment to belief, stress appraisals, coping style, optimism, 
and measures of depression, anxiety, social dysfunction and somatic symptoms. 
The present findings suggest that mechanisms, such as positive behaviours of 
optimism, challenge appraisals, positive reinterpretation and growth, are not 
only related to a strong commitment to belief, but may also help explain the 
relationship between commitment to belief and psychological well-being. 
Further, the relationship between commitment to belief and these positive 
behaviours provide further support that the relationship may be best 
conceptualised within Jungian psychology, rather than outside Jungian 
psychology.
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Introduction
Chapter seven presented an argument for the need to consider alternative 
models/explanations for the concept of commitment to belief. As well as this, it 
was argued that attempts to gain theoretical guidance from Jungian theory had 
produced findings that were interesting and suggestive of Jungian thinking, but 
had, so far, been inconclusive. Thus, adding to the need to investigate modem 
theory in order to better inform the concept of commitment to belief.
Therefore, it was suggested that chapters seven and eight should 
investigate whether the concept of commitment to belief could gain further, or 
alternative, support/guidance via modem paradigms (particularly cognitive 
theory), or indeed, whether commitment to belief fits best within Jungian 
theory. Chapter seven attempted to conceptualise what is happening with 
commitment to belief by borrowing a well-established model (Ellis’s ABC 
model of belief), however, although intriguing, findings suggest little overall 
support for Ellis’s theory aiding the conceptualization of the relationship 
between commitment to belief and psychological well-being; with only some 
support that commitment to belief may aid an individual to engage in everyday 
life after a stressful event. Also, that, so far, modem paradigms of belief allow 
no further theoretical guidance to the theory of commitment to belief, and, as 
such, Jungian theory is still the better guide. However, major problems with the 
methodology were raised, suggesting a need to consider other theories of stress 
to better explain this relationship.
Therefore, chapter eight will attempt to provide further/alternative 
theoretical and empirical support for the relationship between commitment to 
belief and psychological well-being through the cognitive variables of coping 
and stress. Here, consideration will be made, as a basis for speculation, through 
the use of measurement and theory around (1) stress appraisals, (2) coping, and 
(3) optimism.
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While acknowledging that the appraisal literature is large (e.g. Frijda, Kuipers 
& Schure, 1989; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Wiener, 1985) the theoretical 
framework for the analyses offered in this chapter will be based on the 
cognitive-phenomenological model of stress proposed by Lazarus and Folkman 
(1984), and expanded by Ferguson, Matthews, and Cox (1999). Lazarus and 
Folkman propose two types of appraisal process: primary and secondary 
appraisals. Primary appraisals are concerned with how individuals evaluate the 
nature and meaning of a particular transaction in relation to their well-being 
(Ferguson, et al, 1999; Lazarus & Smith, 1988). Thus, this process has to do 
with whether or not what is happening is relevant to an individual’s values, goal 
commitments, beliefs about self and world, and situational intentions and, if so, 
in what way. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) argue that, because we do not 
always act on them, values and beliefs are apt to be weaker factors in mobilising 
action and emotion than goal commitments. Thus, for example, one may think 
it is good to have wealth but not worth making a major sacrifice to obtain it.
The term goal commitment implies that a person will strive hard to attain the 
goal despite discouragement and adversity.
Lazarus (2000) maintains that if there is no goal commitment, there is 
nothing of adaptational importance at stake in an encounter to arouse emotions. 
The individual goes about dealing with routine matters until there is an 
indication that something of greater adaptational importance is taking place, 
which will interrupt the routine because it has more potential for harm, threat or 
challenge (Mandler, 1984).
Fundamental to the questions an individual asks himself in primary 
appraisals, are whether anything is at stake, e.g. “Are any of my goals, 
important personal relationships, or core beliefs and values represented here?” 
and “If I do have a stake, what might the expected outcome be?” If the answer 
is “no stake”, in other words the transaction is not relevant to one’s well-being, 
there is nothing further to consider (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984)
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Secondary appraisals are concerned with the allocation of the available 
coping resources and are seen as drawing on an individual’s experience and 
knowledge (Cox, 1987; Ferguson, et ol, 1999; Lazarus & Smith, 1988). Thus, 
this process focuses on what can be done about a troubled person-environment 
relationship, that is, the coping options and the social and intra-psychic 
constraints against acting them out. Such an evaluation, and the personal 
meanings a person constructs from the relationship, is the essential cognitive 
underpinnings of coping actions (Lazarus, 2000).
In any stressful transaction, an individual must evaluate coping actions, 
decide which ones to choose, and decide how to set them in motion (Lazarus & 
Launier, 1978). This is the function of secondary appraising. The questions 
addressed vary with the circumstances, but, according to Lazarus, they concern 
diverse issues such as the following: “Do I need to act?”, “What can be done?”, 
“Is it feasible?”, “Which option is best?”, “Am I capable of carrying it out?”, 
“What are the costs and benefits of each option?”, “Is it better not to act?”, 
“What might the consequences of acting or not acting be?”, and “When should I 
act?” Decisions about coping actions are not usually etched in stone; they 
should be changed in accordance with the flow of events, if there is the 
possibility to do so.
The word “Secondary” appraisals does not denote less importance than 
primary, but it suggests only that primary appraisals are judgements about what 
is happening, whether worthy of attention and, perhaps, mobilisation (Lazarus 
& Folkman, 1984). Primary appraising never operates independently of 
secondary appraising, which is needed to attain an understanding of an 
individual’s total plight. In effect, there is always an active interplay of both. 
The distinctly different contents of each type of appraisal justify treating them 
separately, but each should be regarded as integral meaning components of a 
more complex process (Lazarus, 2000; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).
Four basic dimensions are believed to underlie primary appraisals: (1) 
threat, (2) challenge, (3) loss and (4) benefit. According to Folkman and 
Lazarus (1985) the threat dimension refers to the potential for harm, whereas
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the loss dimension refers to harm which affects (already affected) friendships, 
health or self-esteem. The challenge dimension is seen as relating to the 
potential for growth, mastery and gain, and is, therefore very similar to the 
notion of Selye’s (1974) eustress, where people who feel challenged pit 
themselves enthusiastically, even joyously, about the struggle that will ensue.
In the analysis offered by Folkman and Lazarus (1985) a fourth dimension 
termed ‘benefit’ is also presented. This dimension reflects the ideas of mastery 
and gain, and as such appears very similar to the challenge dimension. As such, 
Ferguson, Matthews, and Cox (1999) developed an instrument termed the 
Appraisal of Life Events (ALE) scale which showed that appraisals are better 
suited as a three dimensional model, o f ‘threat’, ‘challenge’, and Toss’.
Ferguson, Matthews, and Cox (1999) found that a threatening 
environment is not just potentially threatening, but tends also to be physically 
harmful (e.g. hostile) and apt to generate anxiety (e.g. worrying). An 
environment appraised as related to loss is one with the potential for suffering 
(e.g. pain, intolerable) and sadness (e.g. depressing, pitiful). The challenge 
factor represents the degree to which the environment is perceived as one that 
allows for personal growth and development (e.g. informative, stimulating, 
enjoyable), and thus incorporates benefit.
It has already been reported that primary and secondary appraisals 
should be regarded as integral meaning components of a more complex process 
(Lazarus, 2000; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). However, Ferguson, et al (1999) 
argue that these two appraisal processes are not mutually exclusive, but rather 
interact to produce an overall percept, and thus, can, and should, be measured 
separately. Thus, they argue that, within this transactional model of stress, the 
primary appraisals form the ‘final common path’ (see Monroe & Kelley, 1995). 
Support for this version of the transactional model is provided by a series of 
structural models presented by Cooper and Baglioni (1988). This, therefore, 
further highlights the appropriateness of a reliable and valid measure of simply 
primary appraisals, rather than measuring both sets of appraisals together (ALE 
scale: Ferguson, Matthews, & Cox, 1999). It also means that, according to 
Ferguson, et al (1999), the other components of the stress model (e.g. coping)
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should be associated in a theoretically meaningful way with such a measure 
(Cox & Ferguson, 1991). For example, although, according to the model, 
coping behaviours are primarily associated with secondary appraisals (Lazarus 
& Folkman, 1984), the dynamic interrelationship between appraisal processes 
and coping means that primary appraisals should be associated with coping 
behaviour (Edwards & Cooper, 1988). Therefore, there is a level of congruency 
between primary appraisals and coping behaviour (Ferguson, Matthew, & Cox, 
1999; cf. Vitaliano, DeWolfe, Maiuro, Russo & Katon, 1990). Thus, negative 
appraisals (e.g. threat and loss) have been found to be significantly associated 
more with avoidant/emotion-focused coping, and positive appraisals (e.g. 
challenge), more with problem-focused coping (Ferguson, Matthews, & Cox, 
1999). Ferguson, etal also argue that, although Lazarus and Folkman (1984) 
tend to emphasise secondary rather than primary appraisal as an influence on 
coping, findings show that primary appraisals may also bias choice of coping 
strategy.
It is worth noting that this outlook is also congruent with Jungian theory. 
Jung has proposed that when an individual is strong in commitment to their 
beliefs, i.e. on a strong path toward individuation, then such an individual, when 
facing problems or crises in their life, will use their beliefs to help, or guide, 
them. Thus, the individual would use their beliefs as a tool to give meaning to 
what is happening, which in turn, would give them strength to deal with the 
problem in a positive light, perhaps, seeing the problem as a challenge and a 
way of development and growth, rather than the problem representing a threat, 
or loss. It is prudent, then, as part of this chapter, to examine the dynamics of 
stress appraisals whilst using the Commitment to Belief scale, to consider 
whether commitment to belief is related to primary appraisals. Thus, an 
individual with strong commitment to belief should, when confronted with a 
stressful situation see it as challenging.
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Lazarus (1966), and Lazarus and Folkman (1984), asserted that the primary 
mediator of person environment transaction was appraisals (primary and 
secondary). Primary appraisal is a judgment about what the person perceives a 
situation holds in store for them. Specifically, a person assesses the possible 
effects of demands and resources on well-being. If the demands of a situation 
outweigh available resources, then the individual may determine that the 
situation represents the potential for threat or loss, or that the situation has 
potential for some type of gain or benefit (challenge).
The perception of threat triggers secondary appraisals, which is the 
process of determining what coping options or behaviours are available to deal 
with a threat. There are many situational factors that influence appraisals of 
threat, including; their number and complexity; person’s values, commitments, 
and goals; availability of resources; novelty of the situation; self-esteem; social 
support; coping skills; situational constraints; degree of uncertainty and 
ambiguity; proximity (time and space), intensity, and duration of threat; and the 
controllability of the threat. What occurs during appraisal processes determines 
emotions and coping behaviours (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).
A third type of appraisal is also identified as that of reappraisal 
Reappraisal is the process of continually evaluating, changing, or re-labelling 
earlier primary, or secondary appraisals, as the situation evolves. What was 
initially perceived as threatening may become viewed as a challenge, or as 
benign, or irrelevant. Often, reappraisal results in the cognitive elimination of 
perceived threat.
Other important concepts in Lazarus’s transactional framework for 
stress include coping and stress emotions. Unlike response-based stress (stress 
as a response to noxious stimuli or environmental stressors; Selye, 1956) or 
stimulus-based orientation to stress (life events, or life changes, are seen as the 
stressors to which a person responds, e.g. Holmes & Rahe, 1967), the 
transactional model explicitly includes coping efforts. Coping is defined as
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“constantly changing cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage specific 
external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the 
resources of the person” (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p.141). This definition 
clearly deems coping as a process-oriented phenomenon, not a trait or an 
outcome, and makes it clear that such effort is different from automatic adaptive 
behaviour that has been learned (Rice, 2000). Furthermore, coping involves 
‘managing’ the stressful situation; therefore, it does not necessarily mean 
‘mastery’. Managing may include efforts to minimise, avoid, tolerate, change, 
or accept a stressful situation as a person attempts to master, or handle, their 
environment.
In 1966, Lazarus identified two forms of coping; direct action and 
palliative. In 1984, Lazarus and Folkman changed the names of these two 
forms to problem-focused and emotion-focused, respectively. Problem-focused 
coping strategies are similar to problem-solving tactics. These strategies 
encompass efforts to define the problem, generate alternative solutions, weigh 
the costs and benefits of various actions, take actions to change what is 
changeable, and, if necessary, leam new skills. Problem-focused efforts can be 
directed outward to alter some aspect of the environment, or inward to alter 
some aspect of self. Rice (2000) argues that many of the efforts directed to self 
fall into the category of reappraisals, for example, changing the meaning or the 
situation or event, reducing ego involvement, or recognising the existence of 
personal resources or strengths.
Emotion-focused coping strategies are directed toward decreasing 
emotional distress. These tactics include such efforts as distancing, avoiding, 
selective attention, blaming, minimising, wishful thinking, venting emotions, 
seeking social support, exercising, and meditating. Similar to the cognitive 
strategies identified in problem-focused coping efforts, changing how an 
encounter is construed without changing the objective situation is equivalent to 
reappraisal (Rice, 2000). The following are common examples: “I decided that 
something a lot worse could have happened”, or “I just decided there are more 
important things in life”. Unlike problem-focused strategies, emotion-focused 
strategies do not change the meaning of a situation directly. For example, doing
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vigorous exercise or meditating may help an individual reappraise the meaning 
of a situation, but the activity does not directly change meaning. Emotion- 
focused coping is the more common form of coping used when events are not 
changeable (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).
Lazarus (1966), and Lazarus and Folkman (1984), summarise a large 
body of empirical evidence supporting the distinction between emotion 
(palliative) and problem-focused (direct-action) coping. In addition, the 
evidence indicates that everyone uses both types of strategies to deal with 
stressful encounters or troublesome external or internal demands.
Folkman (1997), based on her work in studying AIDS-related care 
giving, proposed an extension of the model regarding the theoretical 
understanding of coping. Her study involved measurement of multiple 
variables of psychological state (depressive symptomology, positive states, and 
positive and negative affect), coping, and religious or spiritual beliefs and 
activities. Each caregiver participant was interviewed twice. Although 
participants reported a high level of negative psychological states, as expected, 
they also reported a high level of positive affect. Interestingly, the interview 
data, when examined along with quantitative analyses, revealed that the coping 
strategies associated with positive psychological states had a common theme: 
“searching for and finding positive meaning. Positive reappraisal, problem- 
focused coping, spiritual beliefs and practices, and infusing ordinary events 
with positive meaning all involve the activation of beliefs, values, or goals that 
help define the positive significance of events” (p. 1215). Folkman cites many 
studies that support her conclusion that finding positive meaning in a stressful 
situation is linked to the experience of well-being.
Another important construct in Lazarus’s (1966; 1991) transactional 
model is emotion, specifically emotions that are considered to be stress 
emotions. These include, but are not limited to, anxiety, fear, anger, guilt, and 
sadness (Lazarus, 1991,1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Lazarus (1991) does 
not treat depression as an emotion but rather as a composite of several stress 
emotions, including anger, sadness, and guilt.
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Lazarus and Folkman (1984) present cogent arguments for the 
explanatory power of the cognitive theory of emotion. Although thoughts 
precede emotions, i.e. emotions are shaped by thought processes, emotions can, 
in turn, affect thoughts. The primary appraisal of threat, and the specific 
meaning of the situation to the person, trigger a particular stress emotion 
consistent with the meaning.
Lazarus (1966), and Lazarus and Folkman (1984), link stress-related 
variables to health-related outcomes. All of their constructs in the transactional 
model, when taken together, affect adaptational outcomes. Lazarus and 
Folkman propose three types of adaptational outcomes: (a) functioning in work 
and social living, (b) morale or life satisfaction, and (c) somatic health. They 
view the concept of health broadly to encompass physical (somatic conditions, 
including illness and physical functioning), psychological (cognitive functional 
ability and morale -  including positive and negative effects regarding how 
people feel about themselves and their life, including life satisfaction), and 
social (social functioning).
Given the findings of Lazarus (1966; 1991), Folkman (1997), and 
Lazarus and Folkman (1984), and Jung’s description of the person who has a 
strong commitment to belief, some predictions can be made regarding the 
relationship between commitment to belief and psychological well-being. This 
is particularly evident when regarding those individuals who have found 
meaning to what is happening to them, and use this to create/assist direct action 
(problem-focused coping) to understand and work with the problem, and that 
these individuals tend to be healthier, both in terms of physical and mental 
health, than those who tend to use emotion-focused coping.
Thus, it could be argued that individuals who have a strong commitment 
to belief are more related to problem-focused coping (adaptive) rather than 
emotion-focused (maladaptive) coping, as they are, perhaps, more able to 
understand/appraise the world through meaning, and thus able to tackle, instead 
of avoid, the problem. This, then also needs further investigation.
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3. Optimism
Following the literature review on coping above, optimism is also considered 
(within cognitive perspectives) as another aspect of coping (Scheier, Weintraub 
& Carver, 1986). Also, optimism theory is particularly prudent to the 
considerations of belief, given that, in chapter five, optimism was found to be 
positively significantly correlated to all aspects of the Commitment to Belief 
scale (internal, stable, global, and overall commitment to belief), albeit from a 
Jungian perspective. Therefore, it is considered appropriate, given the light of 
this chapter, to further explore optimism as a theory, and as an alternative, or 
dynamic of commitment to belief.
Optimism, as a theory, was considered at length in chapter five. Thus, 
to sum the optimism literature; findings by Scheier, Weintraub and Carver 
(1986) suggest that dispositional optimism is a mediator of how well people 
respond to stress. They argue that coping, whether problem-focused or 
emotion-focused, is considered to eventually alleviate the stress. However, 
attempts to cope with difficult circumstances are not always successful. If 
people find that they cannot remove or even reduce the threat, they may give up 
their efforts to attain the goals that are impeded by the stressor (Carver, & 
Scheier, 1985). Such a giving-up response or disengagement, though not a 
central element of Lazarus’s model, does not seem inconsistent with it. Thus, 
there is the possibility that optimists and pessimists differ in the strategies they 
use to cope with stress. Many authors have found that problem-focused coping 
is more likely in situations that seem amenable to positive change (Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1980; McCrae, 1984). Thus, optimism theory suggests that problem- 
focused coping is more likely among persons who expect to see positive 
change, i.e. optimism is seen in terms of generalised expectancies for good 
outcomes (Scheier & Carver, 1985). Indeed, optimism (Carver & Scheier,
1981; 1982; Scheier & Carver, 1985) has demonstrated significant relationships 
with health and overall well-being; as Chang, Maydeu-Oliveras, and D’Zurilla 
(1997) note, optimism and life satisfaction are highly related. Similarly, Smith, 
Pope, Rhodewalt, and Poulton (1989) believe that optimists’ holding of positive
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expectations for the future leads them to be better able to solve problems, and 
also experience better health. Carver & Scheier (1985; 1994) argue that 
individuals who display positive or optimistic expectation are more likely to 
persist in goal-oriented efforts than those with negative or pessimistic views if, 
and when, disruption of goal-oriented activities occur.
In previous chapters, it has been presented that Jung believes that an 
individual needs meaning to persevere with life and an integration of the Self to 
reach individuation, which in turn, gives a person full meaning to their life and 
a reason for being. In other words, a person needs to find belief and commit 
themselves with their whole being (Jung, 1958) in order to face, or cope, with 
life’s struggles openly and with courage, in order to understand themselves, and 
their own life’s meaning in order to achieve their answers to life through 
individuation. It is this suggestion by Jung that has led to the speculation that 
commitment to belief is the mechanism that allows a person to better deal with 
life events, in other words is the dynamic/mediator behind the way a person 
‘copes’, i.e. of how well a person responds to stress.
It seems apparent then, that the findings in chapter five, demonstrating 
optimism as related to commitment to belief, is in contradiction to these 
speculations, and that optimism could actually be more of an accurate predictor, 
than considering coping and stress (particularly in regards to problem-focused 
strategies) as better related to commitment to belief. It is also not clear whether 
commitment to belief is simply measuring optimism, or it is indeed a separate 
and unique concept, which, as mentioned when defining Jung’s overall theories, 
has an effect on, and is affected by, optimism. For example, it may be that a 
person who has deep commitment to belief gains optimism, or that a person 
with an optimistic attitude to life spurs them to develop a deep commitment to 
belief.
Thus, for the purposes of exploring social cognitive dynamics of coping 
alongside, or in place of Jungian concepts (i.e. in order to gain modem 
theoretical guidance, or simply to realize that Jung’s guidance is of better use), 
and their relationship to the Commitment to Belief Scale, and because optimism
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has already been found, in chapter five, to be positively correlated to 
commitment to belief, it would be prudent to further examine optimism and its 
relationship to commitment to belief in much greater depth.
Rationale and Aims of the Study
In summary, three aspects of appraisal and coping can be outlined. Firstly, 
stress appraisals are involved with primary appraisals to a stressor. Ferguson, 
Matthews and Cox (1999) show three main types of these appraisals; threat; 
challenge; and loss. They argue that whereas, threat and loss are detrimental to 
health, challenge appraisals involve benefiting the individual in psychological 
well-being as they perceive the situation as informative, stimulating and 
enjoyable, which then allows for personal growth and development. Secondly, 
coping (secondary appraisals) involves 2 main forms; emotion-focused coping, 
and problem-focused coping. Lazarus (1966; 1991), Folkman (1997), and 
Lazarus and Folkman (1984), have found that individuals who have found 
meaning to what is happening to them, and use this to create/assist direct action 
(problem-focused coping) to understand and work with the problem, and that 
these individuals tend to be healthier, both in terms of physical and mental 
health, than those who tend to use emotion-focused coping. Thirdly, optimism 
theory acts as a mediator of how well people deal with stress. It is argued that 
optimists tend to use problem-focused coping, are more likely to see positive 
change, and are more likely to solve problems, which, overall, leads to better 
mental health as opposed to pessimists. Previous findings with the 
Commitment to Belief scale have suggested a significant positive correlation 
with optimism.
Thus, the aim of this chapter is to begin to explore the relationships 
between commitment to belief, and stress appraisals, coping, and optimism, in 
order to identify which possible strategies/aspects may provide a further 
understanding to the relationship between commitment to belief and 
psychological well-being. In light of Jungian theory, that has been used as a 
basis to develop the Commitment to Belief scale, and previous findings using
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the Commitment to Belief scale, there are a number of hypotheses that can be 
made;
1. An individual with strong commitment to belief should, when 
confronted with a stressful event, see it as challenging. Therefore, 
engaging in Challenge appraisals, and not appraisals of Threat and Loss, 
when using primary appraisals.
2. An individual with strong commitment to belief should, when 
confronted with a stressful event, be related to problem-focused coping 
(adaptive behaviour) rather than emotion-focused coping (maladaptive 
behaviour), as they are more able to understand (appraise) the world 
through meaning, thus able to tackle, instead of avoid, the problem.
3. An individual with strong commitment to belief should be more 
optimistic.
Method
176 undergraduate students at Sheffield Hallam University (65 males, 111 
females) aged between 18 and 58 years (Mean = 28.9, SD = 10.4). These 
respondents were the same sample that is reported in chapters 3 and 6 of this 
thesis.
Questionnaires
All respondents completed a questionnaire, which included a number of scales;
(i) The Commitment to Belief scale: see chapter two for full details
(ii) The Appraisal of Life Events (ALE) scale (Ferguson, Matthews, & 
Cox, 1999). The scale is a 16 item self-report adjective checklist 
designed to elicit participants’ appraisals of a situation’s potential
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emotional impact. These 16 adjectives sum to form three 
dimensions of primary appraisal: threat, challenge and loss (see 
Ferguson, Matthews, & Cox, 1999). Each adjective is scored along 
a six-point Likert-type scale (where 0= ‘Not at all9, to 5= ‘Very 
much so’). The ALE scale can be used retrospectively with 
participants describing how they perceived a life event at the time 
that the event occurred. The ALE scale can also be used 
concurrently to describe a single event. A threatening environment 
is not just potentially threatening, but tends also to be physically 
harmful and liable to anxiety. The challenge factor represents the 
degree to which the environment is perceived as one that allows for 
personal growth and development. An environment appraised as 
related to loss is one with the potential for suffering loss and 
sadness. Coefficient alphas for the three sub-scales range from .74 
for loss to .91 for threat. Test-retest reliabilities for a single event 
over 1 month are above .77 (Ferguson, 2000). Concurrent validity 
for the scale has been supported, as the ALE scale has been shown to 
be correlated with Neuroticism, Extroversion, coping behaviour, and 
health (Ferguson, et a l  1999; Ferguson, 2000).
(iii) The COPE (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989) was administered 
to measure coping styles. This is a 53-item scale measuring a 
number of coping strategies to deal with stressors as described by 
Carver, et al (1989) via a series of 13 4-item discreet scales and 1 
single item scale designed to assess respondent’s problem-focus and 
emotion-focus coping strategies. The scale’s validity has been 
demonstrated by expected correlations and a number of outcomes 
with health (Lyne & Roger, 2000). The scales include:
(a) Active Coping: Active steps are taken to remove or circumvent 
the stressor (e.g. ‘I take additional action to try and get rid of the 
problem’ [item 1]).
(b) Planning: Thinking about how to cope with the stressor, 
thinking up action strategies, thinking about what steps to take
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and how to best handle the problem (e.g. ‘I try to come up with a 
strategy about what to do’ [item 5]).
(c) Suppression: This means putting other projects aside, trying to 
avoid becoming distracted by other events, sometimes letting 
other things slide in order to deal with the stressor (e.g. ‘I put 
aside other activities in order to concentrate on this’ [item 9]).
(d) Restraint Coping: Waiting until an appropriate opportunity 
presents itself in order to act (e.g. T force myself to wait for the 
right time to do something’ [item 13]).
(e) Seeking Social Support for Instrumental Reasons: A style of 
problem focused coping: seeking advice, assistance or 
information (e.g. I ask people who have had similar experiences 
what they did’ [item 17]).
(f) Seeking Social Support for Emotional Reasons: A style of 
emotion focused coping; getting moral support, sympathy, or 
understanding (e.g. T talk to someone about how I feel’ [item 
21]).
(g) Positive Reinterpretation and Growth: Coping aimed at 
managing distress emotions rather than dealing with the stressor 
(e.g. T look for something good in what is happening’ [item 
25]).
(h) Acceptance: The individual accepts the reality of the stressor 
(e.g. ‘I learn to live with it’ [item 29]).
(i) Turning to Religion: Religion may serve as an emotional 
support (e.g. T seek God’s help’ [item 33]).
(j) Focus on and Venting of Emotion: A tendency to focus on the 
distress felt by the individual and ventilate those feelings (e.g. T 
get upset and let my emotions out’ [item 37]).
(k) Denial: Attempts are made by the individual to deny the reality 
of the stressor (e.g. ‘I refuse to believe that it has happened’
[item 41]).
(1) Behavioural Disengagement: A reduction of effort to deal with 
the stressor (e.g. ‘T give up the attempt to get what I want’ [item 
45]).
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(m)Mental Disengagement: A variation on Behavioural
Disengagement; argued to occur when the conditions that allow 
Behavioural Disengagement to occur are not present (e.g. ‘I turn 
to work or other substitute activities to take my mind off things’ 
[item 49]).
(n) Alcohol and Drug Disengagement (1 item): A tendency to use 
drink or drugs as a coping strategy (‘I drink or take drugs, in 
order to think about it less’ [item 53]).
Responses are scored on a four point format from 1 = ‘I usually don’t do this at 
all’, through 4 = ‘I usually do this a lot’. Higher scores on each of these sub­
scales indicate a greater use of that particular coping style.
(iv) The Life Orientation Test -  Revised: LOT-R f Scheier. Carver, & 
Bridges, 1994). The original LOT (Scheier & Carver, 1985) was a 
10-item scale with two filler items, four positively worded items, 
and four reverse-coded items. The LOT-R has been revised to 
remove colloquialisms, and to address any issues of neuroticism 
accounting for unique variance with mental health variables in place 
of optimism (Smith, Pope, Rhodewalt & Poulton, 1989). It is a 10- 
item measure with four filler items, three positively worded items, 
and three reverse-coded items. Respondents indicate their degree of 
agreement with statements such as, “In uncertain times, I usually 
expect the best”, using a five-point response scale ranging from
1- ‘Strongly disagree” to 5=“Strongly agree”. Negatively worded 
items are usually reversed, and a single score is obtained.
(v) The General Health Questionnaire: GHO (Goldberg & Williams, 
1991). This scale contains four sub-scales that measure aspects of 
general health. Each of these sub-scales comprise 7-item measures 
of; depressive symptoms (e.g. ‘Felt that life is entirely hopeless’ 
[item 23]); anxiety symptoms (e.g. ‘Been getting scared or panicky 
for no good reason’ [item 12]); social dysfunction (e.g. ‘Been taking 
longer over the things you do’ [item 16]; and somatic symptoms
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(e.g. ‘Been feeling run down and out of sorts’ [item 3]). Scores are 
recorded on a four point response format, from 0= ‘Better than 
usual’, 2 = ‘Same as usual’, 3 = ‘Worse than usual’, through 4 = 
‘Much worse than usual’. The scale demonstrates satisfactory 
reliability and validity across a number of samples (Goldberg & 
Williams, 1991).
Results
Internal reliability statistics are a popular way of assessing how well scales are 
functioning psychometrically, by assessing the correlations between the items 
comprising the scale (Kline, 1986). Due to the limited information on the 
psychometric properties of some of the scales among the present sample, 
internal reliability statistics were used. Table 8.1 shows Cronbach alpha 
statistics (Cronbach, 1951) that were computed for all the scales comprising 
more than two items. Table 8.1 also shows the mean and standard deviation 
scores for all the scales by sex.
It is generally accepted that a reliability statistic of above .7 is satisfactory for 
item analysis (Kline, 1986). The present findings suggest that all the scales 
have Cronbach alpha scores of above .7 and suggest that all the scores are 
performing satisfactory among the present sample.
Table 8.1 also shows the mean and standard deviation scores for all the 
scales by sex. Of the 26 variables in the study, significant differences for sex 
occur for 9 of these variables. Females are found to score significantly higher 
than males on threat appraisals, somatic symptoms, anxiety, depression, seeking 
social support for emotional reasons, focus on and venting of emotions, and 
behavioural disengagement. Males are found to score significantly higher than 
females on optimism and suppression of competing activities. These 
differences are consistent with the present literature (Carver, et al. 1989; 
Goldberg & Williams, 1991: Scheier, et al. 1994). However, given that 
significant differences between the sexes for the scales did not occur for 
internal, stable, and global beliefs, and overall commitment to belief (and no sex
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differences for 17 of the 26 variables), the following analysis was performed 
with men and women combined.
Table 8.1: Internal reliability statistics, and Mean Scores by sex for all the 
scales among the present sample population norms.
Scale a Mean (SD) 
Males(N=65)
Mean (SD) 
Females(N=lll)
t
Internal Belief 0.94 20.89 (13.4) 21.94 (11.6) -0.55
Stable Belief 0.88 27.15(11.0) 25.17(09.4) 1.26
Global Belief 0.88 26.83 (11.3) 24.71 (09.4) 1.34
Overall Commitment to Belief 0.95 74.88 (32.4) 71.82(27.9) 0.66
Threat appraisal 0.76 14.44 (06.9) 16.91 (06.1) -2.45*
Challenge appraisal 0.88 13.46 (08.5) 11.96 (07.3) 1.22
Loss appraisal 0.73 09.08 (05.3) 09.18 (04.6) -0.13
Optimism 0.77 35.25 (06.8) 32.98 (05.9) 2.32*
Somatic Symptoms 0.88 05.49 (03.6) 07.64 (04.7) -3.17**
Anxiety 0.92 06.95 (04.1) 09.30 (05.6) -2.91**
Social Dysfunction 0.82 04.18(03.6) 04.60 (03.9) -0.68
Depression 0.90 05.65 (03.4) 07.41 (03.9) -3.03**
Active Coping 0.77 11.65 (03.0) 10.96 (02.7) 1.59
Planning 0.86 11.41 (03.2) 10.48 (03.2) 1.84
Supp. of Competing Activities 0.80 10.38(03.2) 09.16(02.7) 2.74**
Restraint Coping 0.81 09.55 (03.0) 09.88 (02.8) -0.74
Seek Soc. Sup for Inst. Reasons 0.90 09.84 (03.7) 10.55 (03.4) -1.27
Seek Soc. Sup for Emot.Reasons 0.92 09.63 (04.0) 11.04 (03.7) -2.33*
Pos.Reinterpretation and Growth 0.85 11.15(02.9) 10.63 (03.2) 1.09
Acceptance 0.81 10.23 (03.0) 10.47 (03.0) -0.51
Turning to Religion 0.91 06.49 (03.6) 07.71 (04.3) -1.93
Focus & Venting of Emotions 0.89 08.65 (03.5) 10.27 (03.3) -3.09**
Denial 0.89 06.26 (02.8) 06.87 (03.3) -1.26
Behavioural Disengagement 0.81 05.95 (02.2) 06.79 (02.5) -2.26*
Mental Disengagement 0.76 08.57 (02.8) 09.19(02.8) -1.43
Alcohol & Drug Disengagement N/A 02.22 (01.0) 02.00 (01.0) 1.37
p<0.05*; p<0.01**
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To examine the relationship between all the variables, Pearson Product 
moment correlations were computed between all the measures, and internal, 
stable, and global beliefs, and overall commitment to belief (see Table 8.2 for 
full correlation matrix). In essence, this shows that a number of variables are 
significantly related to one another. However, when considering the 
Commitment to Belief scale; internal beliefs were found to be positively 
significantly correlated to optimism, positive reinterpretation and growth, and 
challenge appraisals; and negatively significantly correlated to anxiety, 
depression, social dysfunction, suppression, denial, and mental disengagement, 
and loss appraisals. Stable beliefs were found to be positively significantly 
correlated to optimism, positive reinterpretation and growth, and challenge 
appraisals; and negatively significantly correlated to somatic symptoms, 
anxiety, depression, social dysfunction, and denial. Global beliefs were found 
to be positively significantly correlated to optimism, active coping, planning, 
positive reinterpretation and growth, and challenge appraisals; and negatively 
significantly correlated to somatic symptoms, anxiety, depression, social 
dysfunction, turning to religion, and denial. Overall commitment to beliefs 
were positively significantly correlated to optimism, active coping, positive 
reinterpretation and growth, and challenge appraisals; and negatively 
significantly correlated to somatic symptoms, anxiety, depression, social 
dysfunction, denial, and loss appraisals.
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However, when considering the correlation matrix, it is apparent that many 
constructs are all related to each other, namely, overall commitment to belief, 
optimism, challenge appraisals, and the coping styles of positive reinterpretation 
and growth and denial. Therefore, as an attempt to simplify the relationship 
between all these variables, regression analysis was performed in order to 
discover which aspects of coping, alongside commitment to belief, were 
accounting for unique variance with the psychological well-being measures. For 
this purpose, only overall commitment to belief will be taken forward, as it is this 
construct that gives the whole picture.
Table 8.3 shows the results of the four standard multiple regressions that 
were performed with each of the psychological well-being measures used as 
dependent variables and overall commitment to belief, optimism, coping 
strategies of positive reinterpretation and growth and denial, and appraisals of 
challenge and loss used as independent variables. Included in this table are the 
unstandardised regression coefficients (B), the standardized regression 
coefficients (5), the semi-partial correlations (sr2), R, R2  and adjusted R2. For 
the total sample, the regression statistic (R) was significantly different from zero 
for somatic symptoms (F(5,166)=5.73, p<.001), anxiety (F(4,165)=14.55, 
p<.001), depression (F(5,164)=13.11, p<.001), and social dysfunction 
(F(6,159)=l 1.01, p<.001). For somatic symptoms, optimism and challenge 
appraisals account for unique variance in the prediction of this psychological 
well-being measure. For anxiety, optimism accounts for unique variance in the 
prediction of this well-being measure. For depression, optimism and denial 
account for unique variance in this well-being measure. For social dysfunction, 
overall commitment to belief, optimism, and challenge appraisals account for 
unique variance in the prediction of this well-being measure.
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Table 8.3: Regression analysis for somatic symptoms, anxiety, depression and 
social dysfunction using overall commitment to belief, optimism, positive
reinterpretation and growth, denial, and challenge.
N=176
B B sr2
Somatic Symptoms
Factor 1 -  Overall Com. 0.01 -0.09
Factor 2 -  Optimism -0.16 -0.23 0.05**
Factor 3 -  PRGrowth 0.04 -0.03
Factor 4 -  Denial 0.09 0.06
Factor 5 - Challenge -0.09 -0.16
Adj r2 
r
0.03**
=0.30
=0.29
=0.55**
Anxiety
Factor 1 -  Overall com. -0.02 -0.10
Factor 2 -  Optimism -0.31 -0.38 0.14**
Factor 3 -  PRGrowth -0.09 -0.05
Factor 4 - Denial 0.22 0.13
r2 
Adj r2 
r
=0.26.
=0.24
=0.51**
Depression
Factor 1 -  Overall com. 0.01 -0.01
Factor 2 -  Optimism -0.21 -0.35 0 .12**
Factor 3 -  PRGrowth -0.09 -0.08
Factor 4 -  Denial 0.28 0.23 0.05**
Factor 5 - Challenge -0.05 -0.09
r2 
Adj r2 
r
=0.29
=0.26
=0.53**
Social Dysfunction
Factor 1 -  Overall com. -0.03 -0.19 0.04**
Factor 2 -  Optimism -0.17 -0.28 0.08**
Factor 3 -  PRGrowth -0.12 -0.09
Factor 4 -  Denial 0.08 0.01
Factor 5 -  Challenge -0.08 -0.16 0.03**
Factor 6 - Loss 0.05 *V 
 ^
V.
r- 
^ 
o©
=0.29
=0.27
=0.54**
p<.05*, p<.01**
To take this analysis a step further, the findings from the multiple regression 
analysis suggest four models of how these variables are operating.
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Structural equation modeling and path analysis are techniques which allow 
the testing of how well a particular hypothesized model fits the data; it is used to 
confirm a model not to explore one; or to enable a choice between two competing 
models to be made. Therefore, it is usual practice, within research, that structural 
equation modeling is recommended only after findings from the data have been 
replicated (Hoyle, 1995; Hoyle & Panter, 1995).
However, given the previous findings of optimism being significantly 
correlated to commitment to belief, in chapter five, given the fact that four models 
are presented, and tested through regression analysis, and given the data is 
confounded only within the realms of this thesis, this chapter begs the opportunity 
to take forward the proposed models for analysis, if not only to provide full 
information for future comparisons. Therefore, path analysis was performed (as 
variables are observed variables and not latent), with the recommendation that all 
findings must be treated with caution until further replication can be made.
1. The first multiple regression suggests that the relationship between 
commitment to belief and somatic symptoms is accounted for by the 
measures of optimism and challenge. Therefore, the following model can be 
drawn up, and tested using path analysis.
Model 1. Mediated path model suggesting commitment to beliefs 
relationship with somatic symptoms is mediated by optimism and challenge 
appraisals.
Optimism
Commitment Somatic
to Belief Symptoms
* * Challenge8 5
8 *
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2. The second multiple regression suggests that the relationship between 
commitment to belief and anxiety is accounted for by the measure of 
optimism. Therefore, the following model can be drawn up, and tested using 
path analysis.
Model 2. Mediated path model suggesting commitment to beliefs 
relationship with anxiety is mediated by optimism.
Commitment to Optimism Anxiety
Belief w w
8 *  8 *  8 *
3. The third multiple regression suggests that the relationship between 
commitment to belief and depression is accounted for by the measures of 
optimism and denial. Therefore, the following model can be drawn up, and 
tested using path analysis.
Model 3. Mediated path model suggesting commitment to beliefs 
relationship with depression is mediated by optimism and denial.
5 *
Optimism
Commitment to Depression
Belief
Denial (-)
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4. The fourth multiple regression suggests that the relationship between
commitment to belief and social dysfunction is accounted for by the measures 
of overall commitment to belief, optimism and challenge. Therefore, the 
following model can be drawn up, and tested using path analysis
Model 4. Mediated path model suggesting commitment to beliefs 
relationship with social dysfunction is mediated by optimism and challenge 
appraisals.
Commitment to
Belief
Optimism
Challenge
Social
Dysfunction
8 *
The models were analysed using PRELIS and LISREL 8. The following 
LISREL analysis was assessed on the co-variance matrices. PRELIS analysis was 
used to assess the univariate and multivariate normality of the measured variables. 
The model parameters were estimated using LISREL 8 . Co-variances were all 
found to be less than 1 and none of the negative error variances were found to be 
approaching zero suggesting the parameters were free within the subsequent 
analysis.
Table 8.4 shows the goodness of fit statistics reported for each of the 
models. Using a cutoff criteria of .95 for the ML based statistics (TLI, IFI, CFI), 
.08 for SRMR and .06 for RMSEA (Hu & Bentler, 1999), the goodness of fit
211
Chapter 8: Commitment to Belief and Coping
statistics suggest that all models with the exception of model 3 suggest a relatively 
good fit of the data.
Table 8.4: Goodness of Fit Indexes for the four models.
X2 SRMR RMSEA GFI AGFI PGFI NFI TLI
(NNFI)
CFI IFI
(BL89)
Model 1 4.28 .04 .08 .99 .94 .20 .94 .90 .97 .97
Model2 3.02 .04 .11 .99 .93 .16 .96 .92 .97 .97
Model3 12.88 .08 .17 .97 .83 .19 .88 .69 .90 .90
Model4 1.76 .03 .07 1.00 .95 .10 .98 .95 .99 .99
Discussion
The present study considered the origins of commitment to belief as better 
fitting within coping styles and stress appraisals, which lead to better effects on 
well-being. A number of hypotheses were made: (1) An individual with strong 
commitment to belief should, when confronted with a stressful event, use 
Challenge appraisals, and not appraisals of Threat and Loss, when using primary 
appraisals; (2) an individual with strong commitment to belief should, when 
confronted with a stressful event, engage in problem-focused coping (adaptive 
behaviour) rather than emotion-focused coping (maladaptive behaviour); and (3) 
an individual with strong commitment to belief should be more optimistic. As 
well as these specific hypotheses, a number of models were tested in order to 
consider how commitment to belief is operating with these social cognitive 
dynamics.
Correlational findings showed that overall commitment to belief was 
positively related to challenge appraisals, and negatively related to loss appraisals 
(hypothesis 1), positively related to active coping, positive reinterpretation and 
growth, and negatively related to denial (hypothesis 2), and positively related to 
optimism (hypothesis 3). Also, commitment to belief was negatively related to 
somatic symptoms, anxiety, depression, and social dysfunction. These findings
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suggested that commitment to belief is involved when appraising a stressful 
situation, which, in turn, is related to better well-being, however, it does not 
explain which mechanisms may underlie the relationship between commitment to 
belief and psychological well-being.
The multiple regression and path analysis findings provide some possible 
information on this. Following these analyses a number of models have been 
outlined that could explain the dynamics of commitment to belief. Therefore, in 
model 1, a commitment to belief gives an individual better optimism, and spurs 
individuals to use challenge appraisals, which in turn, reduces somatic symptoms. 
In model 2, commitment to belief gives an individual better optimism, which then 
reduces anxiety. In model 3, commitment to belief gives an individual better 
optimism, and reduces denial, which in turn, reduces depression (however, the 
path analysis does not suggest this is a good fit). Finally, in model 4, commitment 
to belief directly reduces social dysfunction, but also gives an individual better 
optimism, and spurs individuals to use challenge appraisals, which in turn, 
reduces social dysfunction. However, again, it must be noted that, although these 
findings are indeed promising, such post hoc modeling is not usually 
recommended. Therefore, further research must be undertaken to replicate these 
models.
Therefore, findings from this study begin to suggest some overall findings, 
with the individual who demonstrates a strong commitment to belief showing a 
‘positive-engaging’ typology. That is, that an individual who has strong 
commitment to belief engages in challenge appraisals, positively reinterprets 
stressful situations to gain growth, doesn’t tend to use denial, and is more 
optimistic. It is argued that it is the engagement in these behaviors that help the 
individual with a strong commitment to belief to better psychological well-being. 
It is also worth noting that optimism is present in each model hypothesised to 
explain the relationship between commitment to belief and psychological well­
being.
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This ‘positive-engaging’ description is very reminiscent of Jungian 
descriptions of this character. That such a character is likely, when on a strong 
path toward individuation, to look for meaning and a reason for being which helps 
them to face life’s struggles openly and with courage, dealing with problems in a 
positive light by seeing the problem as a way to develop and, thus, grow nearer to 
individuation. However, whether these are part of wider traits (stress appraisal 
and coping), or can be integrated fully within Jungian theory needs to be further 
explored.
One further point, in chapter seven, social dysfunction was the only 
significant relationship found when considering an ABC model. Similarly, social 
dysfunction is the only dimension of well-being that commitment to belief 
accounted for unique variance in, within this chapter. This finding is perhaps of 
some interest, and may be important in explaining how an individual with a higher 
commitment to belief actually operates in the social world. The items of the 
social dysfunction scale suggest that an individual low in social dysfunction is 
able to continue with everyday activities and, as such, this finding is reminiscent 
of the Jungian description of a person aiming for individuation who is able to 
engage fully and positively with the world rather than a person who withdraws.
The present findings suggest mechanisms such as positive behaviours of 
optimism, challenge appraisals, positive reinterpretation and growth are not only 
related to a strong commitment to belief, but may also help explain the 
relationship between commitment to belief and psychological well-being. Thus, it 
could be that commitment to belief is in fact working ‘within’ cognitive dynamics 
to enhance individuals psychological well-being, i.e. that it works with optimism 
to help individuals positively appraise events and then to decide on more adaptive 
coping styles. Further, the relationship between commitment to belief and these 
positive behaviours suggest that this relationship may be best conceptualized, 
overall, within, rather than outside a Jungian psychological framework.
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CHAPTER NINE
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Summary
Chapter nine will assess how well the aims presented in this thesis have been 
addressed. Firstly, a summary of the findings found within this thesis are 
presented, along with an examination of the issues raised in the opening chapter 
where it was thought further research may be useful in the understanding of the 
positive effects of belief on mental health. Secondly, a discussion of the 
implications of the findings from this thesis for the theories around belief, and 
how the findings can impact on/contribute to this psychological literature is 
presented. Thirdly, there is an attempt to integrate the important findings from the 
current series of studies into the wider context of the importance of belief, and 
future possible uses of commitment to belief. Unresolved issues are also 
addressed. Finally, an attempt is made to integrate the important findings from 
this thesis, along with the proposition that this thesis can be used as the foundation 
to enable applied considerations of commitment to belief in future research. In 
sum, this thesis builds constructively upon previous research, providing good 
theoretical guidance, and suggests avenues for future research.
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This thesis has sought to systematically examine the relationship between 
commitment to belief and positive effects on mental health. This final chapter 
will assess how well this aim has been addressed. Initially, there will be a 
summary of the findings found within this thesis, and an examination of the issues 
raised in the opening chapter where it was thought further research may be useful 
in the understanding of the positive effects of belief on mental health. Following 
this, there will be some discussion of the implications of the findings from this 
thesis for the theories around belief, and how the findings can impact 
on/contribute to this psychological literature. Thirdly, there will be an attempt to 
integrate the important findings from the current series of studies into the wider 
context of the importance of belief, and future possible uses of commitment to 
belief. Unresolved issues will also be addressed here. Finally, an attempt will be 
made to integrate the important findings from this thesis, along with the 
proposition that this thesis can be used as the foundation to enable applied 
considerations of commitment to belief in future research.
Overview of findings
The review of the literature in chapter one of this thesis suggested that the 
research into belief tends towards considering them as specific, independent 
beliefs; not as how and why belief, as a construct, functions as it does, but how 
specific beliefs (such as religion, luck etc) are structured, formed or changed, and 
what psychological purpose these specific beliefs serve, leading to a lack of 
theoretical guidance when conceptualising beliefs as a whole. The literature 
suggests that beliefs can be related to an individual’s mental health, though often, 
within sets of the literature, a distinction can be made as to whether the belief has 
a positive effect or a negative effect on mental health. For instance, religious 
themes of belief (e.g. Allport & Ross, 1967; Freud 1907; 1927/1961; Genia & 
Shaw, 1991; Jung, 1958; Maltby, 1999; Pargament, 1990; 1997) have identified 
three main religious orientations that have varying effects on psychological well­
being; (i) an intrinsic orientation, where a person lives their religious beliefs, the
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influence of which is evident in every aspect of their life; an extrinsic orientation, 
which is split into (ii) extrinsic-personal, where individuals look to religion for 
comfort, relief, and protection, and use religious practices for peace and 
happiness, and (iii) extrinsic-social, where individuals look to church for making 
friends, creating social status, and being part of an in-group. Overall, an intrinsic 
orientation has been found to have a better effect on well-being, reducing, anxiety 
and depression, and increasing self-esteem (Allport, 1996; Allport & Ross, 1967; 
Baker & Gorsuch, 1982; Batson, 1976; Batson & Gray, 1981; Batson & Ventis, 
1982; Bergin, 1983; Fleck, 1981; Genia, 1991; 1996; Genia & Shaw, 1991; Kahoe 
& Meadow, 1981; Kirkpatrick, 1989; Koenig, 1995; Leong & Zachar, 1990; 
Maltby, 1999; 2000; Maltby, Lewis & Day, 1999; Nelson, 1989; 1990; Park, 
Cohen & Herb, 1990; Sturgeon, 1979; Watson, Morris & Hood, 1989); as 
opposed to extrinsic orientations towards religion where results suggest belief can 
be detrimental to mental health (e.g. Gorsuch & Venable, 1983; Gorsuch & 
McPherson, 1989; King & Hunt, 1969; Leong & Zachar, 1990; Maltby, 1999). 
Thus, there is a clear distinction between certain religious beliefs affecting mental 
health in a positive way, and certain, other, religious beliefs affecting mental 
health in a negative, or detrimental, way. Similarly, authors have begun to re­
evaluate the notion that luck is maladaptive, and instead, their findings show that 
it is adaptive (has a positive effect) when considering the positive illusions around 
good luck; leading to feelings of confidence, control and optimism, increasing 
self-esteem, and reducing levels of depression and anxiety (Darke & Freedman, 
1997a; Day, Maltby & Macaskill, 1999; Day & Maltby, in press; Taylor &
Brown, 1988); as opposed to bad luck. It was argued, then, in chapter one, that 
further research was needed into the underlying principles of belief itself and how 
this influences a positive or negative effect, rather than concentrating on specific 
phenomena of belief. This thesis has concentrated on investigating the 
reasons/importance of positive effects; it is suggested that a full research 
programme would be needed separately for the reasons for negative effects.
Alongside this, within present research on religiosity and luck, there is 
little overarching theoretical guidance that suggests the reasons for these positive
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outcomes. Usually researchers, on reflecting on such findings, are often seen to 
conclude that individuals demonstrating these set beliefs are able to ‘cope better’ 
than those other individuals that do not show these aspects of belief (e.g. 
Pargament, 1990; 1997). Such theorising, regarding the influence of religious 
coping, for instance, in the relationship between religious orientation and 
psychological well-being, is useful. However, this consideration cannot, at 
present, be expanded into a wider theoretical context, i.e. religious coping cannot 
be used to explain the positive and negative distinction in, for example, the belief 
of luck etc, and rather, like religious orientation, theory is led by findings from 
analysis of scales rather than any driving rationale. Similarly, with belief in 
‘good’ luck, authors conclude good luck may provide an important means of 
coping with the very real influences that chance sometimes has on everyday life 
(Darke and Freedman, 1997; Day, et al (1999). However, despite some findings 
that optimism may play an important role in the relationship between belief in 
good luck and mental well-being (Day & Maltby, in press), again there is little 
overarching theoretical guidance for this relationship. It was then argued, in 
chapter one, that a need to consider these positive effects on mental health in more 
than ‘coping’ terms should be forthcoming.
One aspect to the present literature findings, on occasions when 
distinctions can be made between different types of belief, is that, sometimes, 
certain dimensions may reflect a commitment. This is none so apparent as in the 
research reporting the role of religious belief, where the individual has somehow 
internalised their belief, i.e. that a person has become committed to that belief, 
and thus it has become an underlying principle. Similar ideas around the 
importance and commitment/strength of beliefs are echoed in the belief in good 
luck literature, where this concept of a committed set of ideas being lived, can 
also be found. Within this literature, belief in good luck is seen as an attempt to 
understand the world, particularly in response to events in our lives that are 
largely beyond any direct attempts to control (Darke & Freedman, 1999). It was 
argued in chapter one, that such findings need to be conceptualised within a wider 
theoretical framework, that may not only be used to explain a set of behaviours
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related to a commitment to belief, but may be useful in understanding why 
different types of belief, such as religion and luck, demonstrate a positive effect 
on psychological well-being, as well as, or in place of, a negative effect.
It was finally argued, in chapter one, that theoretical guidance for research 
on belief was lacking. Therefore, it was suggested that Jungian theory on belief 
could be used to inform modem psychology on the processes of underlying belief; 
Particularly, whilst focussing on two areas of; (i) conceptualising a commitment 
to belief, and (ii) using commitment to belief to explain positive mental health 
effects.
Therefore, in the discussion of the relevant research (see chapter one) it 
was argued that there appeared to be several issues that needed to be addressed in 
future research, and it was thus the aim of this thesis to address these key issues. 
Therefore, the main aim of the preceding studies was to examine a functional role 
of overall commitment to belief which argues (i) that a commitment to belief is 
important; (ii) that overall belief will be related to mental health and well-being; 
and (iii) that it is the strength of belief in itself that is important and not the type of 
belief. Such considerations included the development of an overall commitment 
to belief measure, and hypotheses derived from both Jungian theory and the 
present literature concerning belief. It was also a major aim of the studies to 
account for any alternative explanations of results found in support of overall 
commitment to belief.
1. The development of an overall commitment to belief measure
Chapter one speculated the importance of belief to the well-being of the 
individual. In summary, the reviewed literature suggested that three basic 
dimensions underlie the importance of belief; (i) that a commitment to belief is 
important (i.e. that it is internalised, stable across time, and used within all 
situations within one’s life); (ii) that the belief will be related to mental health, or 
well-being; and (iii) that the strength of the belief in itself is important and not
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necessarily the type of belief. However, belief, so far, had been considered within 
specific contexts such as religion, spirituality, conservatism, irrationality, rather 
than generic measures. Thus, chapter two set out to present a psychometric test in 
which to measure commitment to belief. Chapter three considers this new 
measure in terms of reliability and validity.
Within chapter two, a measure of Commitment to Belief was developed 
and compared to measures of psychological well-being, personality and 
attribution style. It was argued that the Commitment to Belief Scale should (i) 
measure all underlying core belief (beliefs that are central to the person), and must 
not be reliant upon one type of belief; (ii) be able to measure the size of 
commitment within that belief (i.e. its strength of belief, whether it is evident 
within all aspects of one’s life); and (iii) be considered alongside measures of 
health and well-being. Adaptations of personal construct theory and attribution 
style as a basis for reaching these aims seem successful, with findings 
demonstrating reliability and validity in measuring individuals’ commitment to a 
set of beliefs. Exploratory factor analysis suggested both a one factor (an overall 
commitment to belief) and three-factor model of commitment to belief (internal, 
global, and stable aspects), in which both models are related to better 
psychological well-being (higher self-esteem, lower depression, lower anxiety, 
lower levels of somatic symptoms and social dysfunction), and largely fall outside 
personality space (Eysenck), and attribution style.
Within chapter three, six studies aimed to provide further consideration of 
the reliability and validity of the Commitment to Belief scale (CTB). Overall, the 
studies showed that the constructs generated by the scale were valid and useful, 
the scale was shown to have a stable factor structure, a high test -  re-test 
reliability, and further construct validity by a lack of relationship with irrational 
and just world beliefs. However, confirmatory factor analysis was unable to 
suggest whether a one or three-factor model was a more appropriate description of 
the Commitment to Belief scale. Nevertheless, both models apply to the theory 
presented, and thus, it was suggested that future work should continue to report
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correlations for both the 1-factor and 3-factor solutions in order to present a full 
consideration. Clearly further examination of the factor structure of the 
Commitment to Belief scale is required.
In summary the implications for the findings of these studies were 
envisaged to be positive (even at the early stages of the development of this new 
scale). There were two reasons: the first is that a more accurate holistic belief 
instrument is now available, rather than relying on previous instruments of 
individual beliefs; and, second, given the confidence in this new measure, studies 
of the effects of commitment to belief, and the implications of this commitment 
on theoretical underpinnings could now be established to belief and psychological 
well-being, and the relationship of commitment to belief to psychological theory. 
Unresolved issues concerning the Commitment to Belief scale, and suggestions 
for its future use are discussed later within this chapter.
2. Commitment to belief and hypotheses derived from Jungian theory concerning 
belief
Chapter two and three showed development of a measure of commitment to belief 
that showed reliability and validity. However, at this point, there was little 
support for a theoretical context for this measure. As the measure was developed 
from aspects of Jungian theory, a programme of research was necessary to test 
ideas around a commitment to belief against ideas derived from Jungian theory. 
Given, then, that this thesis had, so far, established the reality of the concept of 
commitment to belief within individuals, it seemed proper to consider the 
mechanisms behind it. Three primary ideas emerged. The first was the possible 
relationship between commitment to belief and the notion of individuation, 
considered in chapter four. The second focused on personality types, the third on 
optimism; both were considered in chapter five.
Within chapter four, studies aimed to examine the relationship between 
commitment to belief and measures of individuation and self-actualisation derived
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from Jungian theory to provide evidence for a theoretical context for recent 
findings with the Commitment to Belief scale. Study 1 found evidence to suggest 
that aspects of commitment to belief are related to words associated with some 
aspects of individuation, but not necessarily symbols associated with 
individuation (Tarot). These findings were intriguing, raising problematic issues, 
as well as interest. It has been argued that conflicting findings with the Tarot 
cards may be due to two reasons; (1) there is no relationship between 
individuation and commitment to belief, thus, commitment to belief is working 
totally independent of this Jungian process; or (2) results could be typical to the 
problems raised by Kline (1987) and Sjoback (1992), who suggest that measuring 
the unconscious is, as yet, impossible. Findings could also be due to the modem 
day popularity of the Tarot cards, distorting their original meaning. However, 
although findings here gave somewhat limited support, it has been proposed (e.g. 
Kline, 1987) that projection tests could be the way forward, thus further research 
should be considered using the Tarot cards, perhaps using some more stringent 
measure. However, the findings for a relationship between commitment to belief 
and individuation with the use of word association are fascinating, and seem 
promising for further investigation. The findings certainly do not show an 
unconscious individuation process, but they do suggest that people who show 
higher levels of commitment to belief are attracted to words and phrases such as 
Strength, Energy, Happiness, Triumph, Reward for Past Effort, Settlement of 
Matters, Renewal, Growing Awareness, and Self-appraisal. It was also found, 
here, that people who score highly on the Commitment to Belief scale like, or 
show affiliation for, the kinds of concepts and ideas demonstrated by these words. 
Thus, placing these individuals inside the ideas of Jungian theory, liking concepts 
of completion and wholeness. However, as previously mentioned, the findings 
are far from conclusive, and the present consideration suggests little 
understanding of whether these people are driving for individuation.
Nevertheless, the findings are intriguing and worthy of further study, particularly 
by considering a factor structure to the word/phrases with a larger sample.
223
Chapter 9: Discussion
In study 2, commitment to belief was found to be related to self- 
actualisation as measured by the Measure of Actualization of Potential, with more 
detailed relationships being revealed by the Commitment to Belief scale’s 
association with some of the scale’s subscales, namely openness to life, openness 
to experience and overall scores for actualisation potential. Although self- 
actualisation is not the same concept as Jung’s individuation, it is considered 
within the literature as a similar concept and worthy of investigation. The reason 
why other aspects of self-actualisation do not correlate with commitment to belief 
may reflect theoretical differences between individuation and self-actualisation, 
however, the subscales of the self-actualisation scale that are related, provide 
further support for commitment to belief showing some level of openness and 
actualization. Further research might wish to extrapolate some of the theoretical 
distinctions between these concepts and investigate further the relationship 
between measures of self-fulfilment and commitment to belief. These findings, 
then, from both studies, suggest that those individuals who show a high level of 
commitment to belief associate themselves with concepts that can be described in 
the process of individuation and self-actualisation.
In summary, the findings suggest that those who score high in 
commitment to belief are attracted to words/phrases/statements relating to aspects 
of development, growth, wholeness, completeness, reflection, and self- 
actualisation as described by Jung in the process of individuation, and other 
theorists concerned with the development of the self. These present findings also 
suggest these relationships might be better measured by the use of clusters of 
words rather than symbolic images. These present findings do not place these 
people totally inside Jungian concepts, however, as the present consideration does 
little to establish whether these processes are unconscious. However, the present 
findings suggest that those who show a high level of commitment to belief do 
associate themselves with concepts described in the process of individuation and 
self-actualisation.
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Within chapter five, studies aimed to examine the relationship between 
commitment to belief and measures of Jungian personality types and optimism 
based on hypotheses derived from Jungian theory to further provide evidence for a 
theoretical context for findings with the Commitment to Belief scale. Study 1 
found that aspects of commitment to belief are related to extraversion (suggesting 
that an individual who is committed in their beliefs may also be demonstrating 
confidence and carefree behaviours), and sensing personality dimensions 
(suggesting that they carry their beliefs as a way of perceiving the world into all 
life’s experiences). However, the finding of extraversion contradicts the findings 
in chapter two where no correlation was found between Eysenck’s extraversion 
dimension and commitment to belief, thus, future research is needed to replicate 
these findings. It is also worth noting, here, that the sample size for this study was 
small, thus suggesting further need to replicate the findings in a much larger 
sample. In study 2, commitment to belief was related to optimism, and was 
consistent with a-priori predictions, i.e. that a person, in order to strive for 
meaning and persevere, regardless of what life throws at them, appears to have 
adopted a strong positive outlook (optimistic) on life, seeing challenges etc as 
ways of developing and growing, which in turn leads to a healthier, deeper self.
In sum, the findings of significant relationships between commitment to belief and 
Jungian personality types can be explained within Jungian psychology. However, 
such speculations need to be further examined within more specific predictions 
relating to particularly traits before any firm conclusions can be drawn. The 
positive relationship between commitment to belief and optimism suggests that 
optimism may provide a context for understanding the mechanisms that might be 
involved in the relationship between commitment to belief and psychological 
well-being, this relationship, then, was re-visited and expanded upon in chapter 
eight.
Overall, due to theoretical guidance for the commitment to belief 
hypothesis finding its origins within Jungian ideas, chapters four and five 
attempted to investigate whether the concept of commitment to belief should lie 
within, or outside, of Jungian theory. Findings gave mixed conclusions,
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suggesting some significant relationships between individuation and commitment 
to belief, but some inconclusive relationships were also apparent. Altogether, 
relationships suggest promise for future research, with improved methodologies, 
to embed this construct within Jungian theory, but as yet this relationship is 
unclear.
3. Commitment to belief and hypotheses derived from present literature 
concerning belief; spirituality and religiosity
The commitment to belief hypothesis had been developed from Jung’s 
observations around individuals’ belief being deeply committed (internalised, 
stable across time, and used within all situations within one’s life). However, 
Jung’s ideas were deeply enveloped within religion and spirituality, whereas this 
thesis has argued that it is the strength of belief (commitment) that is important 
and not necessarily the type of belief (e.g. spirituality or religiosity). However, 
given that commitment to belief has already been found to be congruous with a 
number of Jungian concepts, and given the importance of religiosity and 
spirituality in Jungian theory, it was deemed necessary to consider whether 
commitment to belief is, in fact, related to religion and spirituality.
Within chapter six, Pearson product moment correlations revealed no 
significant relationships existed between all aspects of commitment to belief and 
measures of religion and spirituality. These findings suggest that commitment to 
belief is separate from religiosity and spirituality, and demonstrates further 
support for the construct validity of commitment to belief.
In sum, the findings in chapter six support the argument for the concept of 
commitment to belief. It was demonstrated that commitment to belief is not 
simply another way of measuring the specific beliefs of religion and spirituality, 
and suggests a departure from Jungian theory. Findings also suggest confidence 
in using the measure with other belief sets without the worry that the scale may 
reflect deeper aspects of religiosity and spirituality.
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4. Alternative explanations of results found in support of overall commitment to 
belief using cognitive variables
In chapter one, this thesis presented a concept of commitment to belief as a 
possible explanation for positive effects of belief on mental health (i.e. why 
intrinsic religiosity may better benefit an individual as opposed to extrinsic 
religiosity; why belief in good luck may be more beneficial than a belief in bad 
luck etc). It also attempted to provide theoretical guidance for this concept by 
considering similar concepts proposed by Jung. Here, findings in chapters four to 
six show some partial, but intriguing support for commitment to belief being 
entwined within Jungian theory. However, it was considered prudent, given the 
conflicting findings, to take these investigations further, not only by further 
exploring Jungian concepts, but by considering commitment to belief within 
modem psychological paradigms, in an attempt to establish its origin or dynamic. 
Particularly within the finding that commitment to belief is related to better 
psychological well-being. Therefore, it was necessary to expand these findings to 
explore whether commitment to belief is directly responsible for effects on mental 
health and well-being, or whether it works within other psychological 
mechanisms to create this effect.
Within modem psychology, there are a number of concepts that could be 
considered to explain the mechanisms of commitment to belief, and its 
relationship to psychological well-being, that work outside, or alongside, Jungian 
theory. Four dimensions of cognitive theory were investigated; (1) in chapter 
seven it was attempted to conceptualise what is happening with commitment to 
belief by borrowing aspects of a well-established model (Ellis’s model of ABC; 
Ellis, 1973; 1994); in chapter eight alternative explanations for commitment to 
belief were considered through the cognitive variables of (2) stress appraisals, (3) 
coping, and (4) optimism.
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Within chapter seven, a theoretical context for the relationship between 
commitment to belief and psychological well-being was considered using a 
simplification of Ellis’ ABC model. To test this model, those respondents who 
indicated that they used their beliefs to deal with a stressful life event were scored 
on how committed they were to that belief set using the Commitment to Belief 
scale. However, findings suggested little support for Ellis’s theory aiding the 
conceptualization of the relationship between commitment to belief and better 
psychological well-being; however, there was some support that commitment to 
belief may aid an individual to engage in everyday life, after a stressful event. 
Methodology issues, however, were raised as problematic, suggesting ways 
forward by; shortening the period of time between the stressful event and 
completion of the questionnaire; by considering other methods of measuring 
stressful events, such as daily hassles and uplifts (Lazarus, 1984); and by looking 
at other theories of stress (some of which are considered in chapter eight). 
However, although plenty of suggestions are made as to how to improve on this 
methodology, it is considered by the author that suggestions made in this chapter 
are flawed, for instance, conceptualising the mechanisms of commitment to belief 
may not be possible through an Ellis explanation, indeed, it could be argued that 
testing this way oversimplifies Ellis’s process model, which is really immensely 
complex. Although this study was only considering Ellis’s model as a way to 
operationalise commitment to belief, and not to test Ellis’ model per se, this may 
have added to the problems. It is also considered, with the benefit of hindsight, 
that findings from chapter eight are far more informative for explaining the 
mechanisms of commitment to belief.
Within chapter eight, a theoretical context for the relationship between 
commitment to belief and psychological well-being was considered using models 
around stress appraisal and coping. Findings from these studies suggested 
mechanisms such as positive behaviours of optimism, challenge appraisals, 
positive reinterpretation and growth are not only related to a strong commitment 
to belief, but may also help explain the relationship between commitment to belief 
and psychological well-being. Thus, it could be that commitment to belief is in
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fact working ‘within’ cognitive dynamics to enhance individuals psychological 
well-being, i.e. that it works with optimism to help individuals positively appraise 
events and then to decide on more adaptive coping styles (further discussion on 
optimism will be addressed later within this chapter). Further, the relationship 
between commitment to belief and these positive behaviours provided further 
support that the relationship may be best conceptualised, overall, within Jungian 
psychology, rather than outside Jungian psychology.
Thus, to simplify these findings into everyday language, a person who shows a 
deep commitment to their beliefs can be conceived within a typology, 
demonstrating certain traits and behaviours. This individual;
• Has an openness to life, open to experience, and has potential for self- 
actualisation
• Is attracted to words and phrases of strength, energy, happiness, triumph, 
reward for past events, settlement of matters, renewal, growing awareness, 
and self-appraisal
• Is high in self-esteem; low in depression, anxiety, social dysfunction, and 
somatic symptoms
• May be extraverted (presently findings are inconsistent), demonstrating a 
confident and carefree nature; uses their beliefs as a way of perceiving the 
world into all life’s experiences
• Is optimistic, seeing challenges as a way of developing and growing, thus 
uses challenge appraisals, and positive reinterpretation and growth
• Uses beliefs to aid them through stressful life events
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Thus, a model illustrating the outcomes for the individual can be drawn;
Self-
actualisation
High self­
esteem
Development 
and growthChallengePositive mental health
Optimism Wholeness
Commitment to 
BeliefExtraversion and sensing
Openness to 
Life
Figure 9.1: A model showing the mechanisms affected by a commitment to belief
There is one note of caution with this model. This model is based on the 
significant correlations found between Commitment to Belief and a number of 
variables across a number of studies. However, it must be noted that some 
variables have been excluded from this model (for example, Tarot Card 
Judgement in Chapter 4; correlated .28 with global subscale of commitment to 
belief scale; p>.05, n=42) even though they demonstrate an equivalent size of 
correlation, with Commitment to Belief, to variables that have been included in 
this model (for example, Openness to Experience, Chapter 4, correlated .28 with 
Overall Commitment to Belief, p<.01, n=176). This is because there has been a 
strict adherence to significance testing throughout this work. These differences 
are a perennial problem with significance testing because significant relationships 
between variables are influenced by sample size. However, it must be 
remembered that conclusions brought forward from each study (i.e. those 
variables significantly related to commitment to belief) are based around 
confidence levels based on that specific sample. Therefore some variables have 
been excluded in this way, despite equivalent correlations sizes, because they
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have been discovered among smaller samples and there is not enough evidence to 
bring these variables, with confidence, into this model.
Notwithstanding such discussion, it can be seen, that so far, the 
Commitment to Belief scale is extremely promising, informing research as to the 
type of person, who is committed to their beliefs, i.e. their behaviours and 
personality, as well as how this commitment to belief affect mental health. The 
findings and the subsequent model provides a rationale for the positive effects of 
belief.
The Commitment to Belief scale, then, can be used to demonstrate a 
reflection on the wider literature mentioned at the outset. Namely, the scale has 
an immediate impact on the current literature mentioned in chapter one, i.e. 
religion and luck. For instance, researchers can now, not only investigate 
behaviours and orientations of religiosity or luck, but can investigate how 
committed they are to these behaviours, as well as the constructs the individual 
possesses around this belief. For example, authors researching religiosity have 
found significance with the frequency of prayer; here, it is those persons, who 
show a commitment to prayer (i.e. once a day or more) that show better mental- 
health. Thus, the Commitment to Belief scale can be used alongside measures of 
prayer to inform authors as to the reasons why this is so. Instead of knowing that 
prayer is significant, authors, then, can now understand the rationale as to why it 
is important; by investigating the constructs behind individual’s commitment to 
prayer, and how the practice of prayer allows the individual to cope better with 
life, give meaning to their life, a way of reflection, for example. It can allow 
authors to identify between those who are committed to prayer and those who 
simply use it as part of their religion, in order to identify the dynamics of positive 
effects on health.
Similarly, the literature around good luck suggests that belief in good luck 
is seen as an attempt to understand the world, particularly in response to events in
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our lives that are largely beyond any direct attempts to control (Darke & 
Freedman, 1999). The uncertainty associated with the possibility that such events 
may occur can be quite disconcerting, especially when the consequences are 
substantial. Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982) suggest that irrational beliefs 
about luck may allow individuals to remain optimistic even when it is objectively 
impossible to exercise direct control over one’s circumstances. As such, it is 
argued that it is this belief that gives meaning to life and events, and adherence to 
this belief set helps the person interpret, understand and deal with the world.
These explanations by authors, however, have been purely speculative, possessing 
no rationale, however, the Commitment to Belief scale can now be used to 
identify whether these speculations are correct, thus, providing theoretical 
guidance, or indeed, whether different constructs better explain these positive 
effects.
This immediate impact then, demonstrates the importance for the present 
rationale of this thesis, and also provides support for the methodology chosen. It 
was argued in chapter one, that qualitative research could be useful to investigate 
the concept of commitment to belief, however, it was felt to be an inappropriate 
methodology for two main reasons; (i) it has been established, within this thesis, 
that the research on beliefs is extensive, and in order to present a valuable 
contribution to the literature, the research here needed to be able to be 
extrapolated to all these populations. It was felt that qualitative research (because 
of the limited amount of participants used in this methodology) would not enable 
this contribution, (ii) Because of the nature of research, i.e. considering an 
underlying construct of belief, in which to explain the positive effects on well­
being within areas such as religion and luck, it was deemed necessary to fall in 
line with the generally accepted methodology within these areas, in other words 
quantitative. Therefore, a quantitative programme of research was followed. 
These arguments, then, seem to have been well founded, and an immediate impact 
is apparent.
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Contributions to the psychology literature
The research reported in this thesis, then, has thrown up some very interesting 
findings that may have implications for theories of the way in which belief effects 
positive outcomes in mental health. Thus, the preceding studies make a number 
of contributions to the psychology literature.
1. The Commitment to Belief scale
It has been argued that belief, so far, has been considered, and measured, within 
specific contexts such as religion, spirituality, conservatism, and irrationality, and 
have not considered how and why belief, as a whole, functions as it does. Thus, 
no generic measures of belief, so far, exist.
Therefore, one important contribution to the literature has been the 
development of a new generic scale that has shown to hold good reliability and 
validity. Constructs generated by the scale have been shown to be valid, as well 
as the way the commitment is measured. Also, the scale was shown to have a 
stable factor structure, high test-retest reliability, no significant association with 
conservatism, and concurrent validity with respect to a lack of significant 
correlation with irrational and just world beliefs. This scale enables researchers to 
measure core belief (beliefs that are central to the person), and the size of the 
commitment to that belief (i.e. its strength of belief, whether it is evident within 
all aspects of one’s life), which shows significant relationships between 
commitment to belief and psychological well-being.
As well as the Commitment to Belief scale being able to measure aspects 
of belief, its usefulness is established by enabling researchers to measure different 
beliefs, and is not reliant upon one type of belief. Therefore, future uses of the 
scale can be expanded to measure dimensions of a specific belief, or dimensions 
to various beliefs. This can be expanded further than just the literature on religion
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and luck, and suggestions of how this can be so are considered later within this 
chapter.
2. Theoretical Underpinnings to belief
Within the present research on beliefs, there are many explanations as to how 
specific beliefs such as religion, spirituality, and luck, are serving the individual, 
but lack explanation as to how this function operates, therefore, these perspectives 
lack theoretical guidance. Within the literature, themes such as motivation, 
positive mental health effects, beliefs being used for a purpose, different attitudes 
to belief, are alluded to, but never examined across beliefs (Darke & Freedman, 
1997a; Day & Maltby, in press; Ellis, 1995; Pargament, 1997; Thoresen, 1999).
An important contribution to the literature, therefore, is the presentation of 
a theoretical underpinning of belief, as placed within Jungian theory. Indeed, 
using the theory of Jung, the Commitment to Belief scale has shown that three 
basic dimensions underlie the importance of belief; (i) that a commitment to belief 
is important (i.e. that it is internalised, and used within all situations within one’s 
life, and is present across time); (ii) that the belief will be related to mental health, 
or well being; and (iii) that the strength of the belief in itself is important and not 
necessarily the type of belief. Findings investigating Jung’s concept of 
individuation suggest that, although results cannot be considered within the 
processes of the unconscious, individuals who show a high level of commitment 
to belief associate themselves with individuation concepts such as development, 
growth, wholeness, completeness, reflection, and self-actualisation. There is 
some evidence to suggest Jung’s personality dimensions (extraversion, and 
sensing), as part of individuation, are important. Also, when considering 
commitment to belief to cognitive variables, findings suggest a ‘positive- 
engaging’ description, which is very reminiscent of Jungian descriptions of this 
character. That such a character is likely, when on a strong path toward 
individuation, to look for meaning and a reason for being which helps them to 
face life’s struggles openly and with courage, dealing with problems in a positive
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light by seeing the problem as a way to develop and, thus, grow nearer to 
individuation. However, whether these are part of wider traits, or can be 
integrated fully within Jungian theory needs to be further explored. Nevertheless, 
findings demonstrate that theoretical guidance, using Jungian concepts, have been 
essential to gain a theory of commitment to belief. In other words, Jung has 
facilitated the building block needed to enable applied research to take place.
Another contribution to the literature, relating to theoretical underpinnings, 
is that findings may help researchers understand that certain attitudes and beliefs 
have more positive outcomes. At present, although the literature suggests that 
religiosity and belief in luck can be sometimes associated with better 
psychological well-being, particularly when concentrating on certain aspects of 
these belief (i.e. intrinsic orientation towards religion, belief in good luck), there is 
little overarching theoretical guidance that suggests the reasons for these positive 
outcomes. Usually researchers conclude that individuals demonstrating these set 
beliefs are able to ‘cope better’ other than those individuals that do not show these 
aspects of belief. At best, Pargament has considered this idea within religious 
coping, also authors conclude Good Luck may provide an important means of 
coping with the very real influences that chances sometimes have on everyday life 
(Darke & Freedman, 1997; Day, et al. 1999). Although researchers have tried to 
expand this idea of coping into more detail, very often this is descriptive more 
than theoretically led. This thesis has established that a commitment to belief 
gives a rationale/reason to the positive effects of belief on mental health.
Further, not only has it been presented that commitment to belief helps the 
understanding of why some aspects of beliefs have more positive effects, but it 
has also been able to establish variables that help explain this relationship. Thus, 
an individual who has strong commitment to belief engages in challenge 
appraisals, positively reinterprets stressful situations to gain growth, doesn’t tend 
to use denial, and is more optimistic. It is argued that it is the engagement in 
these behaviors that help the individual with a strong commitment to belief to 
better psychological well-being. Therefore, commitment to belief has not only
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been placed within Jungian concepts but it has also been established within 
modem cognitive paradigms. Thus, Jungian concepts are important, and allow an 
underpinning of the theory, but commitment to belief tends to be operationalised 
within the coping literature, particularly its close relationship with optimism. It 
seems, then, that optimism as a way of coping, is much more important than it is 
presently considered to be within the literature. Again this contribution can allow 
further investigations of optimism to take place. Whatever future research shows, 
optimism, within the theory of commitment to belief, should not be 
underestimated.
Finally, another major contribution of this thesis is that it has demonstrated 
that there is relevance and applicability of Jungian psychology within modem, 
empirical, mainstream psychology.
Future Research and Implications
In this section of this final chapter the need for critical reflection is highlighted. 
There is a need for an attempt to integrate the important findings from the current 
series of studies into the wider context of the importance of belief, future possible 
uses of commitment to belief, and the research’s long-term impacts, in order to 
establish the uniqueness and position of this thesis. Unresolved issues will also be 
addressed here.
Advice for future uses
The preceding studies, and comments made earlier within this chapter, give rise to 
a number of future uses, as well as suggested advice for this use.
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1. Use of the Commitment to Belief scale
The aim of the Commitment to Belief scale was to elicit as many beliefs as 
possible from the respondents. The generating of seven beliefs was decided upon, 
this number was arbitrary, however, from pilot studies (N=5) using the 
questionnaire, it was suggested that these were as many beliefs as respondents 
could generate within an appropriate timeframe (approximately 45-60 minutes). 
Though, for the purposes of this thesis, consideration was to generate as many 
belief constructs as possible, there is the implication that the Commitment to 
Belief scale may be too long for future use. Therefore, future research may 
consider shortening the scale, i.e. to generate three belief constructs instead of 
seven. Although there is the chance that some of the ‘richness’ of the data may be 
lost, it could be argued that the loadings across the factors of internal, stable, 
global, and overall commitment to belief dimensions, throughout, suggests that 
the first three beliefs generated are as important as the next four beliefs generated. 
Also, in chapter 2, the alpha coefficient statistic for the internal commitment 
within sequence 7 was low. This has been argued that, outside of the sample, it 
may suggest that by sequence 7, all core beliefs have been extracted and the 
seventh sequence is unnecessary, or, indeed, it may suggest that the respondents 
have, by this time, become despondent, or bored, of the task. Thus, shortening the 
scale would alleviate this problem. Therefore, future investigations into an 
abridged version of the scale are recommended.
2. Applications for widening, understanding beliefs within other theories/contexts 
of belief
The commitment to belief hypothesis was originally derived from observations 
made about the theories of luck and religion. Thus, the Commitment to Belief 
scale now presents us with the opportunity to complete this circle. Indeed, 
researchers have suggested that it is beliefs that help individuals to better 
understand the world that has positive effects on mental health. For instance, 
authors argue that this beneficial effect is seen within individuals who ‘live’ their
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religious beliefs, seen via personal prayer, and intrinsic orientations toward 
religion, and enables individuals to gain control over their lives through 
understanding, seen via belief in good luck. Thus, future applications should 
involve investigations amongst specific religious, or ‘good luck’, samples, 
alongside other measures (e.g. religious coping scale), in order to consider 
whether commitment to belief accounts for unique variance.
As well as investigating specific constructs within specific samples, there 
is also the opportunity to go deeper, for instance, not only does the Commitment 
to Belief scale allow investigations of belief within religion, but it allows the 
chance to discover what constructs within prayer are helping the individual. Thus, 
wider applications of this measure would enable greater understanding of 
established theory.
3. Use of the Commitment to Belief scale outside established theories of belief
It has been presented that commitment to belief may be of value to expand 
existing literature on beliefs, however, other, wider, opportunities are available 
within other theories of psychology. In chapter 3, findings demonstrated that the 
Commitment to Belief scale was, indeed, reflecting the general attitude sets of the 
individual. Thus, for example, a religious individual generated religious 
constructs, an individual believing in luck generated constructs that are lucky in 
nature, etc. Therefore, there is an opportunity to compare constructs generated for 
the Commitment to Belief scale against scores on a number of wider attitude sets.
Opportunities suggest themselves through a variety of applications, such 
as occupational attitudes, and general attitudes affecting general health.
First, occupational attitudes could be measured in order to establish an 
individual’s commitment to their job. For instance, constructs generated could 
investigate an individual’s commitment to: the aims of their company, i.e. their 
mission statement; to their general work ethic; to their priorities in life, i.e. does
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their work come first, or much further down their list; of their values, etc.
Benefits for companies, then, are twofold (i) for recruitment purposes, and (ii) for 
appraisals and promotion prospects. Benefits are also available to understand why 
some individuals suffer more work-oriented stress than others.
Second, because the Commitment to Belief scale has been argued to 
reflect general attitude sets of the individual, there is an opportunity to compare 
constructs generated for the Commitment to Belief scale against specific attitudes 
that have implications on general health. For instance, Jung argues that if we 
cannot find a strong enough belief, in which meaning is established, then this may 
be extremely damaging to our mental health. Commitment to belief, then, could 
be used to further investigate this, perhaps by establishing whether these 
individuals have weak belief systems, or not.
Also, commitment to belief could be used, outside its normal concept, to 
understand why certain individuals continue to behave in specific ways, 
regardless of the effects on health, by considering their belief constructs. Such 
considerations could be used, for instance, to investigate smoking, over-eating etc. 
It is argued by smokers, for instance, that there is more to this act than simple 
addiction, the Commitment to belief scale could be used to identify constructs 
around this behaviour, which could enable better understanding as to why 
smokers continue to smoke. Also, it is accepted that these ‘unhealthy’ 
behaviours/attitudes can present secondary gains for the individual, for instance, 
with over-eating, the individual may continue the behaviour because they get 
attention (whether good or bad) from their family, or the habit may prevent them 
from doing tasks etc that they do not want to do, thus, over-eating can be used as 
an excuse. Secondary gains are endless, however, the use of the Commitment to 
Belief scale may help to identify these confounding variables much earlier within 
therapy. Although these applications are simple speculations, there is, 
nevertheless, the scope within the Commitment to Belief scale for future, and 
wider, use, and presents a long-term impact in psychology.
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A note about long-term impacts
It has been suggested above, how the Commitment to Belief scale could have a 
long-term impact, both in regards to psychometric measurements of belief to 
provide further understanding of how belief may aid better mental health, and in 
regards to the wider context of therapeutic psychology. However, it must be 
made clear that this thesis has only begun this process, by laying down the 
foundations to understanding this new process of commitment, and by 
establishing a scale, and producing preliminary findings in how these beliefs 
impact on positive mental health. These foundations, then, need to be teased and 
expanded upon within substantial future research programmes in order to 
successfully, and fully, apply its considerations. Once this is achieved, further 
considerations then need to be taken concerning negative effects on health.
Unresolved Issues
Alongside the recommendations mentioned above, however, the preceding 
studies, although demonstrating interesting and beneficial findings, have also 
given rise to a number of unresolved issues. These issues will be presented here, 
along with some suggestions as to how these may be eradicated (many of these 
issues have already been presented elsewhere within this chapter).
1. Is commitment to belief situated within, or outside. Jungian theory?
The theoretical underpinnings of commitment to belief originated from Jungian 
concepts. However, it is unclear whether commitment to belief is, indeed,
Jungian in nature, or is now an indivisible concept. In other words, there are 
similarities between the two theories, particularly surrounding a striving for 
meaning, and a strength or commitment of belief. However, so far, this thesis has 
been unable to establish whether these are unconscious processes. Nevertheless, 
chapters four and five do suggest ways forward, in order to further investigate this 
question. For instance, Kline (1987) argues that projection tests could be the way
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forward in ‘tapping’ the unconscious, and indeed, the tarot cards may need further 
investigation with more stringent measures. Also, findings using variations of the 
word association technique were certainly intriguing, again, suggesting further 
study. However, it may also be considered that Jungian theory has served its 
purpose, i.e. it has provided the initial theory to drive the construct of commitment 
to belief, and that the theory is now established in its own right. Nevertheless, 
whether commitment is a conscious or unconscious process is definitely worthy of 
further consideration.
2. Is commitment to belief related to personality?
Within chapter two, with a sample of 154 students, there was no relationship 
found between Eysenckian concepts of personality and commitment to belief, 
however, chapter five, with a smaller sample of 43 students, showed a relationship 
between Jung’s concept of extraversion and commitment to belief. Therefore, 
further exploration of personality is warranted through two avenues: (i) by 
replicating the findings in study five, but with a much larger sample, and (ii) by 
using other measures of personality, perhaps the more recent Eysenck Personality 
Profiler (Eysenck, Wilson & Jackson, 2000) that measures 7 different aspects of 
extraversion (activity, sociability, assertiveness, expressiveness, ambition, 
dogmatic, aggression) or the 5-factor model (e.g. Costa & McCrae, 1986), where 
neuroticism and extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness are 
measured. These aspects certainly seem to be better suited to findings now 
apparent in the commitment to belief hypothesis.
3. Can Ellis’s model of ABC help conceptualise the mechanisms of commitment 
to belief?
Chapter seven began to explore the relationships between commitment to belief, 
and Ellis’s model of ABC, in order to identify whether this model could provide a 
further understanding to the relationship between commitment to belief and 
psychological well-being. In other words, a stressful life event (an activating
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experience: A) would be related to commitment to belief (belief: B), which would 
then be related to better psychological well-being (consequence: C). Findings 
showed that most of the sample used commitment to belief to help them with their 
stressful life events; however, this was only found to alleviate social dysfunction. 
Also, a multiple regression showed that it is commitment to belief in its original 
format that actually accounted for unique variance with social dysfunction. This 
suggests that the item of scored beliefs used to deal with life events may not be a 
real construct, and that simply using the commitment to belief scale in its original 
format would have identified this finding. Thus, this casts doubt on the usefulness 
of the theory put forward in this chapter, or perhaps the method used to consider 
the theory. Therefore, it is strongly recommended, that future research needs to 
address this by replicating the current findings.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that 80% of the total sample did 
report that they used their beliefs to help them deal with stressful situations. Thus, 
the issue may be one of methodology, i.e. it is assumed that effects on 
psychological well-being are of long-term benefit as it is assumed that people use 
these beliefs again and again. However, when measuring beliefs effects on a 
specific event (i.e. stressful), it may need to be carried out much nearer to the 
event itself in order to establish the beliefs direct effect. Therefore, a much 
smaller time frame than 3 months should be considered in future research to 
tighten up the methodology used. Other future methodology may also consider 
using other models, besides Ellis, to help explain commitment to beliefs role in 
aiding individuals to deal with stressful situations.
4. Is commitment to belief better placed within optimism?
Chapters five and eight demonstrated a relationship between commitment to belief 
and optimism. This is indeed a finding that demands further study. Indeed, 
chapter eight outlined a number of models to explain the dynamics of 
commitment to belief. Therefore, in model 1, a commitment to belief gives an 
individual better optimism, and spurs individuals to use challenge appraisals,
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which in turn, reduces somatic symptoms. In model 2, commitment to belief 
gives an individual better optimism, which then reduces anxiety. In model 3, 
commitment to belief gives an individual better optimism, and reduces denial, 
which in turn, reduces depression (however, the path analysis does not suggest 
this is a good fit). Finally, in model 4, commitment to belief directly reduces 
social dysfunction, but also gives an individual better optimism, and spurs 
individuals to use challenge appraisals, which in turn, reduces social dysfunction.
Therefore, optimism is clearly important within the theory of commitment 
to belief. However, one issue arises here, it is not clear whether commitment to 
belief is simply measuring optimism, or it is indeed a separate and unique 
concept, which, as mentioned when defining Jung’s overall theories, has an effect, 
and is affected by, optimism. For example, that a person who has deep 
commitment to belief gains optimism because of this, or that a person with an 
optimistic attitude to life spurs them to develop deep commitment to belief.
Another issue is the way optimism is conceptualised. Indeed, the Jungian 
description of optimism, i.e. a positive individual, with purpose in life, who 
strives for meaning, and takes on the chin whatever life throws at them in order to 
develop and grow, is useful, and fits nicely within the commitment to belief 
literature. However, other authors conceive optimism in other ways, sometimes 
as part of the coping literature, and sometimes as an underlying trait. Therefore, it 
is difficult to establish whether optimism supports Jungian theory, or indeed, does 
not. To elaborate, it looks Jungian, it smells Jungian, it tastes Jungian, but 
whether or not it is Jungian is another matter, and demands further research.
One final issue to address, here, belongs to the consideration of the models 
developed in chapter eight. Although these findings are indeed promising, such 
post hoc modelling is not usually recommended. Therefore, further research must 
be undertaken to replicate these models, before further research on optimism can 
take place.
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5. Is commitment to belief applicable within a wider population?
A final issue is the consideration of commitment to belief within wider 
populations. So far, research has considered commitment to belief within the 
confined realms of student samples. Commitment to belief merits further 
consideration; (i) within wider general population samples, and (ii) within a wider 
age group, with particular emphasis on older generations in order to investigate, 
further, mechanisms of individuation. It may also be worth considering 
commitment to belief within life-span psychology, and measure beliefs over long 
periods of time.
A note about the research carried out in this thesis
Finally, it is worth noting that, with the benefit of hindsight, there are some 
studies within this thesis that could have been addressed, or approached, 
differently. These are considered, however, to have been part of the learning 
process of this thesis, and the development of the researcher. These studies have 
already been addressed in this chapter, and suggestions made as to how they could 
be improved upon. However, it is worth reiterating them here. Firstly, in chapter 
two a measure of Eysenck’s personality dimensions was chosen, in order to 
investigate whether a relationship existed between personality and commitment to 
belief. However, later chapters informed the researcher that extraversion (via 
Jungian personality dimensions) did, in fact, correlate with belief; thus 
development of the thesis suggests that the big-five personality dimensions may 
be better suited. Secondly, chapter four attempted to investigate unconscious 
aspects of Jungian psychology, and although the theory behind the methodology 
used was sound, many other problems were apparent. However, the findings 
around the words used were promising, even suggesting that they were scales in 
their own right; a tightening up, and further exploration of this methodology is 
needed, and recommended. However, as always, attempting to measure the 
unconscious is full of pit-holes, and caution should always be taken. Finally, the 
problems with chapter seven (conceptualising belief through Ellis’s model of
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ABC) have been well documented already in this chapter, however, the researcher 
would strongly recommend re-visiting these findings, with much stronger 
methodology.
Final summary and comments
In all, the thesis has presented and developed a reliable and valid measure of 
commitment to belief; it has suggested theoretical guidance for this theory 
through Jungian concepts of belief; it has been demonstrated that commitment to 
belief is not simply another way of measuring specific beliefs such as religion and 
spirituality; and it has presented alternative explanations of results through the use 
of cognitive variables. Contributions to the literature have been outlined through 
the usefulness of the Commitment to Belief scale; the ability to expand present 
literature using theoretical underpinnings of Jung, and the importance of positive 
outcomes on mental health, as well as establishing the variables that help explain 
this relationship. Thus, an individual who has strong commitment to belief 
engages in challenge appraisals, positively reinterprets stressful situations to gain 
growth, doesn’t tend to use denial, and is more optimistic. Advice for future uses 
have been presented by considering an abridged version of the Commitment to 
Belief scale; considering applications for widening and understanding beliefs 
within other contexts and theories of belief; and uses of commitment to belief 
outside established theories of belief, with suggestions of occupational attitudes, 
and general attitudes affecting general health. Finally, unresolved issues have 
been addressed.
It is suggested, then, that the research in this thesis is extremely promising 
for informing research on the nature of belief, and has enabled the foundations for 
a much wider and applied research programme. In other words, this thesis 
presents the beginnings of research on commitment to belief, and not the end 
result.
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A final comment, here, regards the theoretical guidance presented for 
commitment to belief through the guise of Jungian thought. Although findings 
create a figure that is very Jungian in nature, it cannot be said, here, that it is in 
fact Jungian, but rather reflects a Jungian idea, and incorporates modem coping 
styles to produce a much fuller picture.
In sum, this thesis builds constmctively upon previous research, providing 
good theoretical guidance, and suggests avenues for future research.
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Commitment to (Be fiefs Study
This workbook is intended to investigate the structure of beliefs, in conjunction with many different 
psychological variables; such as whether we see the world as a fair and just place; whether we have 
control over our lives, etc.
The workbook has been designed to enable complete privacy on such a personal topic, and allows 
participants to work through the book without interference. However, you are encouraged to ask for 
help at any time, as you may find some of the material difficult to understand.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your co-operation in completing this 
workbook and taking part in this study.
Before starting could you answer the following questions.
SEX: Male Female
AGE: ________
Confidentiality
The first section of the questionnaire asks you to reveal/explore your feelings and beliefs. We 
recognise that this material (page 2 - steps 1 and 2) is extremely personal, therefore you are 
asked to write these down on separate sheets so as you can take them away with you on 
completion of the workbook. It is only vour responses to step 3 that will be recorded in the 
workbook.
Thankyou for your help. When you have finished the workbook please return it to the researcher.
Please do not hesitate to ask for help or advice at any stage of completing this workbook
Step 1
For this step, you will be working with the statements attached on the BLUE separate sheet. Please 
answer each question in numerical order, writing them on the answer sheet provided (coloured 
PINK). Do not think too hard about these questions, write down the first thing that comes into your 
head (this separate pink sheet is personal to you and can be taken away with you at the end, if you 
wish).
Step 2
For this step you will need your answers from step 1 (PINK sheet) and the YELLOW coloured 
sheet.
Using the answers you have from step 1 above (written on the PINK sheet), please turn to 
the number sequences (each showing 3 numbers) on the separate YELLOW sheet. These numbers 
correspond to different sequences of your answers that you wrote down on the PINK sheet.
• Using only the first sequence of numbers, look at each of your 3 answers that correspond to the 
number sequence (so for example, if your first sequence is 3, 5, 7, you will be looking at your 
answers to questions 3, 5, and 7 only).
• Now think about these 3 answers. For you, 1 answer will be different from the other 2 in 
someway. Turn to page 4 and write this difference down in the ‘Construct:’ part of the 
Number sequence 1 (don’t get too worried about this -  just put down the first thing that springs 
to mind -  if you cannot think of one word to describe the difference, then use a sentence that 
describes it).
• Then, using the construct you have written down, write down next to it what, to you, is its 
opposite meaning (again, if you cannot think of one word to describe the difference, then use a 
sentence that describes it).
• Then mark the construct that is most desirable to you. If you have problems with this use the 
example overleaf.
© L.Day, Sheffield Hallam University (1999-2002)
Example
If the sequence of numbers were 1, 2,3. My answers may have been
1. Open mindedness
2. Being in control
3. Perfection.
For me 2 and 3 are ‘Rigid’, and number 1 is ‘Flexible’. So, I would decide that different 
construct is ‘Flexible’ and decide its opposite is ‘Rigid’.
I would then write in the workbook
Example Sequence
Construct E le ^ U b le '________  It’s Opposite RC&Cd/_____
Desirable construct _  F lex ib le /  '■ _______ ______
Step 3
Next, using only the ‘desirable construct’ from step 2 (that you have already written down on page 
4), complete the scales for ‘number sequence 1’ only.
Now can you please indicate how important this ‘desirable construct’ is to you in three different 
ways:
• First, you have to indicate how important the ‘desirable construct’ is by rating how 
‘personal’ it is to you.
• Second, you have to indicate how important the ‘desirable construct’ is, by rating it in 
terms of whether it is something that will persist across time/be present in the future.
• Third, you have to indicate how important the ‘desirable construct’ is, by rating it in 
terms of whether the construct is something that affects many aspects of your life.
For each of these ratings, circle one of the following numbers; l=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 
3=Slightly disagree, 4=Not certain, 5=Slightly agree, 6=Agree, 7=Strongly agree. (An example is 
given below).
j Example o f response format
1 The construct is very personal to me j 1 2 3 4 |5,; 6 7 1<
| In the future, the construct is something I will continue to believe in J 1 2 3 4 .5 6 7 1I| This construct is applicable to many aspects of my life | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 )s
Now, complete steps 2 and 3 for each of the remaining 6 number sequences given. Completing 
each scale, which corresponds to each sequence.
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Number Sequences
Number Sequence 1
Construct_____________________  It’s Opposite___________________
Desirable construct__________
l=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Slightly disagree, 4=Not certain, 5=Slightly agree, 6=Agree, 7=Strongly agree.
i The construct is very personal to me I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Ij In the future, the construct is something I will continue to believe in J 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
| This construct is applicable to many aspects of my life J 1 2 3 4 5 6 71
Number Sequence 2
Construct_____________________  It’s Opposite___________________
Desirable construct  _______________________________
l=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Slightly disagree, 4=Not certain, 5=Slightly agree, 6=Agree, 7=Strongly agree.
| The construct is very personal to me 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7fj
1 In the future, the construct is something I will continue to believe in 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ;
| This construct is applicable to many aspects of my life 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7I
Number Sequence 3
Construct_____________________  It’s Opposite
Desirable construct ____________  ____
l=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Slightly disagree, 4=Not certain, 5=SlightIy agree, 6=Agree, 7=Strongly agree.
j  The construct is very personal to me | 2 3 4 5 6 7 f
| In the future, the construct is something I will continue to believe in | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
| This construct is applicable to many aspects of my life 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 !
3
Number Sequence 4
l=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Slightly disagree, 4=Not certain, 5=Slightly agree, 6=Agree, 7=Strongly agree.
j The construct is very personal to me I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 f
I In the future, the construct is something I will continue to believe in | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 j
1 This construct is applicable to many aspects of my life I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 !
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Number Sequence 5
l=Strong!y disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Slightly disagree, 4=Not certain, 5=SIightly agree, 6=Agree, 7=Strongly agree.
The construct is very personal to me 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7[
In the future, the construct is something I will continue to believe in j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I
This construct is applicable to many aspects of my life 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ;
Number Sequence 6
l=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Slightly disagree, 4=Not certain, 5=Slightly agree, 6=Agree, 7=Strongly agree.
| The construct is very personal to me I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
[ In the future, the construct is something I will continue to believe in | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ]
I This construct is applicable to many aspects of my life 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 * ' i
Number Sequence 7
l=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Slightly disagree, 4=Not certain, 5=Slightly agree, 6=Agree, 7=Strongly agree.
j The construct is very personal to me I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [
[ In the future, the construct is something I will continue to believe ini 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 i
[ This construct is applicable to many aspects of my life J 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 j
© L.Day, Sheffield Hallam University (1999-2002)
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Ratings for Constructs
For each questionnaire, consider each of the constructs generated by that participant.
On the table below, please mark
1. The questionnaire number (this will help to identify this person for later 
analysis)
2. Consider whether the participant has generated any constructs that, in your 
opinion, can be considered as either religious in nature, an irrational belief, 
conservative in nature, or a belief in luck, and place a V or X for each one you 
identify.
3. Write down (in the final column) how many of these constructs (within a 
particular category) you believe are generated.
Thank you for your participation
Questionnaire
Number
Constructs (see 
attached sheet for 
descriptions)
Put a V or a X for 
constructs used 
for this person
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BELIEF IN GOOD  
LUCK AND GENERAL HEALTH1
LIZA DAY, JO H N  MALTBY, A ND  A NN  MACASKILL
School o f  Health and Community Studies 
Sheffield Hallam University, England
Summary.— 62 undergraduate university students were administered the 12-item 
Belief in Good Luck Scale of Darke and Freedman and the General Health Question­
naire of Goldberg and Williams. Scores on belief in good luck showed a significant 
correlation o f -.29  with anxiety and -.35  with depression but correlations were not 
significant for somatic symptoms (.15) and social dysfunction (.15).
Within the literature, there are traditionally two psychological explanations o f luck. The 
first is luck as an external, unstable factor within social events or achievement outcomes (Rot­
ter, 1955, 1966; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & Rosenbaum, 1972). Here, luck is per­
ceived as uncontrollable and having little influence on future expectations as well as a rational 
belief. Thus, luck is thought to have no influence on the psychological well being and health o f  
the individual. The second explanation is luck as a personal attribute, as an internal and stable 
factor (Darke & Freedman, 1997b). In this explanation luck is often seen as an irrational be­
lief, typically considered maladaptive (Ellis, 1971, 1973) and is thought to have a detrimental 
effect on individual’s psychological well-being and health (Rotter, 1966; Seligman, 1975).
Some researchers, however, have begun to reevaluate the latter assumption that beliefs sur­
rounding luck are necessarily maladaptive and instead have speculated that they may be adap­
tive as these positive illusions can lead to feelings of confidence, control, and optimism (Taylor 
& Broun, 1988; Darke & Freedman, 1997a). As part of this reevaluation Darke and Freedman 
(1997a) developed a 12-item Belief in Good Luck Scale to measure such beliefs and assess their 
implications for perceptions o f control. They reported that items on the scale showed a good 
internal reliability (a = .8 5 ) and significantly correlated with locus of control scores but not with 
scores on self-esteem, desire for control, and achievement motivation. These findings provided 
both convergent and discriminant validity for the scale. Despite the development o f the scale, 
there has been no examination o f whether belief in good luck is adaptive in psychological well 
being and health so an examination between the relationship in belief in good luck, psychologi­
cal well being, and health is required.
Undergraduate students (14 men, 38 women, and 10 undisclosed) of ages 18 to 44 years 
(M = 21.4, SD = 5.24) were administered the 12-item Belief in Good Luck scale (Darke & 
Freedman, 1997a) and the General Flealth Questionnaire (Goldberg & Williams, 1991). Items 
such as ‘I consider myself to be a lucky person’ were scored on a 6-point scale anchored by 
‘strongly disagree’ and ‘strongly agree’. The General Health Questionnaire contains four sub­
scales that measure aspects o f general health, Severe Depression, Anxiety, Somatic Symptoms, 
and Social Dysfunction.
A significant negative Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient obtained for higher 
scores on the Belief in Good Luck scale and lower scores on the Severe Depression (r = -.35 ,
'Please address correspondence to Liza Day, Centre for Health and Social Care Research, 
School o f Health and Community Studies, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, England, S10 
2BP or e-mail (L.Day@shu.ac.uk).
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p < .0 1) and Anxiety (r = -.29 , p < .0 5 ) measures o f the General Health Questionnaire. N o sig­
nificant relationship was found between scores on Belief in Good Luck and Somatic Symptoms 
(r = - .04 , ns) and Social Dysfunction (r = .15, ns).
This suggests that belief in good luck is associated with less depression and anxiety. Fur­
ther, belief in good luck may indicate better psychological well being and is not maladaptive as 
is traditionally accepted for irrational beliefs. Together with the research by Darke and Freed­
man (1997a), we suggest that believing in good luck may be an adaptive behaviour. For in­
stance, belief in good luck may provide an important means o f coping with the unforeseen 
events that happen by allowing individuals to remain optimistic when it is impossible to exer­
cise direct control over the circumstances. It must be remembered, however, that the General 
Health Questionnaire is a self-report measure and, although the findings show that subjects 
who believe in good luck are more optimistic, there is also a possibility that they may tend to 
exaggerate how little depressed and anxious they are. Researchers may examine the relationship 
between these concepts. Notwithstanding these speculations, the findings suggest reconsidering 
whether beliefs in luck are necessarily maladaptive.
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Abstract
The relationship between belief in good luck, depression, and anxiety was 
examined within the context of a number of cognitive and personality variables 
used to explain depression and anxiety. Undergraduate students (46 men, 98 
women) were administered measures of belief in good luck, depression, anxiety, 
optimism, neuroticism, attribution style, self-esteem and irrational beliefs. Belief 
in good luck was found to be significantly related to optimism and irrational 
beliefs. A number of models were testedfor good-fit examining whether 
irrational beliefs or optimism mediated the relationship between belief in good 
luck and depression and anxiety, a number of theoretical models were tested. 
Findings suggest that the finding of a negative relationship between belief in good 
luck and both depression and anxiety is best considered by the theory that belief 
in good luck engenders optimistic traits and a low level of irrational beliefs.
Within the literature, there are traditionally two psychological explanations of 
belief in luck. The first explanation views luck as an external, unstable factor 
within social events (Rotter, 1955; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & 
Rosenbaum, 1972). Here, belief in luck is perceived as uncontrollable, having 
little influence on future expectations (Darke & Freedman, 1997a). Within this 
perspective, belief in luck is thought to have no influence on the psychological 
well-being of the individual. A second explanation of luck, views belief in luck 
as a personal attribute, and as an internal and stable factor (Darke & Freedman,
1997a). In this perspective, luck is an irrational belief, considered to be 
maladaptive (Ellis, 1971; Ellis, 1973) and is thought to have a detrimental effect 
on the individual’s psychological well-being (Rotter, 1966; Seligman, 1975).
However, some research has begun to re-evaluate the second explanation 
of belief in luck as necessarily maladaptive, and has speculated that a belief in 
good luck may be adaptive, and that positive illusions surrounding luck can lead 
to feelings of confidence, control and optimism (Darke & Freedman, 1997a; 
1997b; Taylor & Brown, 1988). As part of this re-evaluation, Darke & Freedman 
(1997b) developed a 12-item Belief in Good Luck scale to measure good luck 
beliefs and determine their implication for perception of control. The reliability, 
concurrent and discrimnant validity of this scale is supported by the scale’s 
satisfactory internal reliability (a=.85) and significant correlation with locus of 
control, but not self-esteem, desire for control and achievement motivation.
To extend the view that belief in good luck is adaptive, Day and Maltby 
(1999) examined the relationship between belief in good luck and depression and 
anxiety. Consistent with recent theoretical speculations (Darke & Freedman, 
1997a; 1997b), Day and Maltby found belief in good luck to share a significant 
negative association with depression (r=-.35, p<.01) and anxiety (r=-29, p<.05). 
An examination of Day and Maltby’s findings, within cognitive and personality 
explanations of depression and anxiety, would be prudent. If the relationship 
between belief in good luck and depression and anxiety could be explained within
existing theories of depression and anxiety, then this would suggest that belief in 
good luck itself may not explain unique variance. Placing belief in good luck 
within other theories of depression also would point to important mechanisms that 
are crucial to the relationship between belief in good luck and psychological well­
being.
There are a number of theories of depression and anxiety that might be 
useful. First is the role of optimism. Scheier and Carver (1985) suggest that 
optimism has a beneficial effect on psychological well-being. This view is 
supported by optimism measures being negatively correlated with depressive 
symptoms (Carver & Gaines, 1987; Fibel & Hale, 1978; Scheier & Carver, 1985) 
and anxiety (Haiju & Bolen, 1998; Robinson-Whelen, Kim, MacCallum, & 
Kiecolt-Glaser, 1997). Second is the presence of neuroticism in depression and 
anxiety. Eysenck and Eysenck (1975) describe the neurotic as anxious, moody 
and frequently depressed. Not only does anxiety appear as a feature in 
descriptions of neuroticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975; Matthews, Saklofske, 
Costa, Deary, & Zeidner, 1998), but neuroticism is associated with a less pleasant 
mood state, a dispositional factor for depression, and correlated with depressive 
symptoms (Bagby, Parker, & Joffe, 1993; Costa & McCrae, 1980; Larsen, 1992; 
Maltby, Lewis, & Hill, 1998; Saklofske, Kelly, & Janzen, 1995). Third is the 
relationship between attribution style and depression and anxiety. Research 
suggests that individuals who make internal, stable and global attributions for 
negative events, and who give external, unstable and specific explanations for 
positive events, score higher on measures of depression (Peterson & Villanova, 
1988; Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979; Sweeney, Anderson,
& Bailey, 1986) and anxiety (Feiring, Taska, & Lewis, 1999; Franck, Blount, & 
Brown, 1997). Fourth, there is evidence that self-esteem shares a negative 
correlation with depression measures (Brewin & Fumham, 1986; Flett,
Blankstein, Occhiuto, & Koledin, 1994; Tennen & Herzberger, 1987; Tennen, 
Herzberger, & Nelson, 1987) and anxiety (Ehntholt, Salkovskis, & Rimes, 1999; 
Lee & Robbins, 1998; Ralph & Mineka, 1998). Finally, belief in good luck is 
thought to represent irrational belief and that irrational beliefs share a positive 
association with depression (Marcotte, 1996; McDermut, Haaga, & Bilek, 1997; 
Solomon, Haaga, Brody, Friedman, & Kirk, 1998) and anxiety (Chang &
DZurilla, 1996; Moller & deBeer, 1998; Watson, Sherbak, & Morris, 1998).
Wt present, there is no information that examines whether the relationship 
between belief in good luck and depression and anxiety can be seen within the 
context, or outside the consideration, of other theories of depression and anxiety. 
The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between belief in 
good luck, depression and anxiety within the context of measures of optimism, 
neuroticism, attribution style, self-esteem and irrational beliefs.
Method
Sample.
Respondents were 144 (46 men, 98 women) undergraduate full-time 
students at Sheffield Hallam University aged between 18 and 51 years of age
(Mean=23.22, SD=2.5). All students were full-time. The scales were administered 
through classes and were completed by students individually.
Questionnaires.
All respondents completed:
1. The Belief in Good Luck Scale (Darke & Freedman, 1997b) that comprises 12 
items (e.g. ‘I consider myself to be a lucky person’) and responses are scored on 
a 6-point scale anchored by ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘strongly agree’. Higher 
scores on this scale indicate a higher level of belief in good luck.
2. the Depression and Anxiety subscales of the General Health Questionnaire 28 
(Goldberg & Williams, 1991) that comprise 7-item measures of depressive and 
anxiety symptoms. Responses are scored on a 4-point scale ranging from (0) 
Better than usual, (1) Same as Usual, (2) Worse than Usual, (3) Much Worse 
than usual. Higher scores on each of these subscales indicate a higher level of 
depression and anxiety.
3. The Revised Life Orientation Test (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) which is a 
6-item measure (with 4 additional items used as fillers) that assesses 
dispositional optimism. Responses are scored on a 5-point scale anchored by 
‘strongly disagree’ and ‘strongly agree’; with higher scores on this scale indicate 
a higher level of optimism.
4. The Neuroticism scale from the Abbreviated form of the Revised Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire (Francis, Brown, & Philipchalk, 1992) which 
comprises 6-items that measure aspects of anxious, worrying and moody 
personality traits. Responses to items are scored on a ‘Yes’ -  ‘No’ scale, with 
higher scores on this scale indicating a higher level of neuroticism.
5. The extended version of the Attribution Style Questionnaire (Peterson & 
Villanova, 1988) which subsumes three subscales to measure internal versus 
external, stable versus unstable, and global versus specific attributions, with 
higher scores on each of the subscales indicating internal, stable and global 
attributions respectively.
6. The 12-item general self-esteem sub-scale of the Self-Description Questionnaire 
III (Marsh, 1990) that is modified from the original Rosenberg self-esteem scale 
(Rosenberg, 1965). Responses are scored on a 5-point scale anchored by 
‘strongly disagree’ and ‘strongly agree’, with higher scores on the scale 
indicating a higher level of self-esteem.
7. The 11-item Irrational Beliefs Survey (Watson, Vassar, Plemel, Herder, & 
Manifold, 1990) that is a scale derived from a previous well-used measure of 
irrational beliefs (MacDonald 8c Games, 1972), but uses simplified language to 
measure irrational beliefs. Responses to items on the Irrational Beliefs Survey 
are scored on a five-point response format (l=Strongly disagree, through to 
5=Strongly Agree), with higher scores on this scale indicating a higher level of
irrational beliefs. Though reports on this measure of irrational beliefs are 
limited, available evidence suggests the scale represents one factor among non- 
clinical samples (Mahoney, 1997; Maltby & Day, 2001).
Results
Table one shows the mean scores, by sex, and alpha co-efficients for all the scales 
(Cronbach, 1951). No significant differences were found between men and 
women for scores for each of the variables. The alpha co-efficients for the scales 
are above .7 suggesting satisfactory internal reliability (Kline, 1986).
- Insert Table One about here-
Table Two shows the Pearson product moment correlation coefficients 
computed between all the measures. The table shows that the depression measure, 
from the General Health Questionnaire, shares a significant positive correlation 
with anxiety, irrational beliefs, neuroticism, and a significant negative correlation 
with belief in good luck, internal, stable, and global attributons, self-esteem, and 
optimism. Further, the table also shows that the anxiety measure from the 
General Health Questionnaire shares a significant positive correlation with 
depression, irrational beliefs, neuroticism, and a significant negative correlation 
with belief in good luck, internal, stable, and global attributions, self-esteem, and 
optimism. In addition, a number of significant correlations occurred between all 
the variables thought to be associated with depression and anxiety.
- Insert Table Two about here -
The significant correlations between belief in good luck, optimism and 
irrational beliefs, suggest optimism and irrational beliefs may be variables that are 
central to relationship between belief in good luck and psychological well-being. 
To test this idea a number of models were hypothesised. Figure 1 shows the 
hypothesised models.
- Insert Figure 1 about here -
For each of these models; depression and anxiety are treated as separate 
dependent variables. The first two models suggests that optimism (model 1) and 
irrational beliefs (model) separately mediates the relationship between belief in 
good luck and both the measures of psychological well-being. The third model 
suggests irrational beliefs and optimism together mediates the relationship 
between belief in good luck and both measures of psychological well-being. The 
fourth model suggests irrational beliefs and optimism together mediates the 
relationship between belief in good luck, but do not account for all the variance, 
and both measures of psychological well-being.
The models were analysed using PRELIS and LISREL 8 (Joreskog & 
Sorbom, 1999). The following LISREL analysis was assessed on the co-variance 
matrices. PRELIS analysis was used to assess the univariate and multivariate
normality of the measured variables. Kurtosis statistics to assess univariate and 
multivariate normality were all non-significant. The model parameters were 
estimated using LISREL 8. Co-variances were all found to be less than 1 and 
none of the negative error variances were found to be approaching zero, 
suggesting the parameters were free within the subsequent analysis.
Table 4 shows the goodness of fit statistics reported for each of the 
models. Using a cutoff criteria of .95 for the ML based statistics (TLI, IFI, CFI), 
.08 for SRMR and .06 for RMSEA (Hu & Bentler, 1999), the goodness of fit 
statistics suggest that model three provides a relatively satisfactory fit of the data 
for both depression and anxiety as indicators of psychological well-being.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between 
belief in good luck and psychological well being in the context of a number of 
cognitive and personality variables.
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients suggest that, among the 
present sample, higher depressive and anxiety symptoms are significantly 
positively correlated with each other, neuroticism and irrational beliefs are 
significantly negatively correlated with internal, stable and global attributions (a 
depressive attributional style), self-esteem and optimism. These findings are 
consistent with previous research (for example, Carver & Gaines, 1987; Darke & 
Freedman, 1997a; Darke & Freedman, 1997b; Day & Maltby, 1999; Feiring et al., 
1999; Flett et al., 1994; Haiju & Bolen, 1998; Lee & Robbins, 1998; Maltby et 
al., 1998; McDermut et al., 1997; Peterson & Villanova, 1988). In terms of the 
relationship between belief in good luck and other variables, belief in good luck 
shares a significant positive relationship with optimism, and a significant negative 
relationship with depression, anxiety and irrational beliefs.
The testing of hypothesised models for goodness-of-fit suggests that 
optimism and irrational beliefs are important components in the relationship 
between belief in good luck and depression and anxiety. In regard to optimism, 
this finding is consistent in supporting the view that belief in good luck produces 
a positive illusion that leads to feelings of confidence, control and optimism 
(Darke & Freedman, 1997a; 1997b; Taylor & Brown, 1988). The present 
findings suggest that the belief in good luck engenders feelings of optimism, 
which in turn, leads to better psychological well-being (Carver & Gaines, 1987; 
Fibel & Hale, 1978; Scheier & Carver, 1985).
In regard to irrational beliefs, explanation of the present findings is a little 
more difficult as there is a significant negative relationship between belief in good 
luck (an irrational belief) and irrational beliefs. However the present finding 
suggests that belief in good luck represents a low level of irrational beliefs. One 
explanation centres on the fact that irrational beliefs measures (MacDonald & 
Games, 1972; Watson et al., 1990) have been developed within Ellis’ theoretical 
and applied framework that view irrational beliefs as mal-adaptive. Therefore the
Irrational Beliefs Survey may not measure all aspects of irrational beliefs and 
there is a distinction between irrational beliefs that lead to negative outcomes in 
terms of psychological well-being, and irrational beliefs that lead to positive 
outcomes in psychological well-being (Darke & Freedman, 1997a; 1997b). In 
terms of theoretical relevance the present findings suggest that belief in good luck 
shares a significant negative relationship with irrational beliefs, and those 
individuals who believe in good luck reject the types of beliefs usually associated 
with irrational beliefs which in turn leads to better psychological well-being.
Together, these findings lend support to authors who have begun to 
challenge the traditional view that all irrational beliefs are maladaptive (Darke & 
Freedman, 1997a; 1997b; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Such a view needs further 
investigation, and future research would need to specifically examine other ‘sets’ 
of irrational beliefs that may have these positive outcomes. However, the nature 
of the sample may limit the extent to which these findings can be generalized. 
Future research is needed to examine whether the correlates of belief in good luck 
among students can be replicated among individuals sampled from a wider 
population group. This may be important as there may be particular variables 
associated with the present sample (younger persons having a more positive 
outlook on life, university students being more positive about their careers) that 
may provide an important context to the present findings.
In summary, the present findings suggest that belief in good luck is 
associated with better psychological well-being as a result of optimism and the 
rejection of mal-adaptive irrational beliefs. Therefore the present findings do 
support the sentiments of Darke and Freedman (1997a; 1997b) who suggest that 
finer distinctions need to be made when considering whether a particular set of 
irrational beliefs can be considered as wholly mal-adaptive.
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Tables
Table One: Mean Scores (Standard Deviations) by sex, and alpha coefficients for 
total sample, for all the scales.
Scale a Men (N=46) Women (N=98) t
1. Belief in Good Luck .90 52.59(16.4) 51.04(14.8) .57
2. Depression .77 01.37(01.9) 00.90 (01.6) 1.57
3. Anxiety .81 01.72(01.8) 01.89 (02.0) -.50
4. Internal Attributions .75 54.53 (13.0) 52.23 (11.0) .97
5. Stable Attributions .78 54.28 (10.7) 54.96 (09.4) -.35
6. Global Attributions .79 55.56 (10.7) 26.20 (09.3) -.33
7. Irrational Beliefs .83 28.76 (08.7) 29.32 (07.0) -.41
8. Self-Esteem .90 28.15 (08.2) 30.31 (07.0) -1.82
9. Neuroticism .83 04.13 (05.1) 03.47 (02.3) 1.07
10 Optimism .89 19.53 (05.6) 20.05 (04.4) - .59
* p<.05; ** p<.01 (two-tailed)
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Figure 1: Models tested for good fit
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A bstract
The aim of the present study was to apply suggestions made by Kinderman and Bentall (1996) to the 
accurate measurement o f attributional style. Three hundred undergraduate students (140 males, 160 
females) completed the original, and an amended version o f the Attribution Style Questionnaire, two 
measures of depression, and a number o f 1-item measures of Attribution Style. The findings suggest that 
the amended version of the Attribution Style Questionnaire shows improved reliability and correlational 
statistics with depression and with 1-item measure of constructs, over the original version of the 
Attribution Style Questionnaire. Together, these findings suggest that separating out all aspects of 
attribution style could contribute to clearer measurement of attribution style. ©  2000 Elsevier Science 
Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Attribution style; Depression; Questionnaire; Internal; Stable; Global
1. Introduction
Attribution style is a cognitive personality variable that can be defined as the way 
individuals interpret good  and bad events (Abram son, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Peterson et 
al., 1982). In essence, interpretations o f  good and bad events reflect the use o f  internal (cause 
o f  events due to the individual) vs external (cause o f  events due to other people or
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44-114-2252543; fax: +44-114-2252430.
0191-8869/00/S - see front matter ©  2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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circumstances) attributions, stable (cause o f  events persistent over time) vs unstable (cause o f  
events not persistent over time) attributions, and global (cause o f  events persistent over time 
evidence in a variety o f  situations) vs specific (cause o f  events specific to one situation) 
attributions (Peterson et al., 1982).
The use o f  attribution style has been used in a number o f  research contexts, however, its 
m ost influence has been in using a reformulated learned helplessness m odel to  explain  
attribution style depression (Abram son et al., 1978). Generally, it is accepted that the use o f  
internal, stable and global attributions to  explain events (pessim istic attributional style) is 
related to higher scores on depression, and the use o f  external, unstable and stable attributions 
(positive attributional style) is associated with lower depression (Brewin, 1985; Peterson & 
Villanova, 1988; Sweeney, Anderson & Bailey, 1986; M altby, Lewis & Hill, 1998).
One research issue that has recently developed is discussion surrounding the m easurem ent o f  
attribution style, with researchers often favouring its psychological im portance over its 
psychom etric properties (Rehm , 1988). M easurement o f  attribution style centres around 
individuals generating causes for a number o f  good  (e.g. ‘Y ou get a raise’ [item 12]) and bad 
(e.g. ‘A  friend com es to you  with a problem and you don’t try to help’ [item 4]) events, and 
then rating the cause along a 7-point response form at corresponding to internal, stable and 
global attributions. H owever, Peterson et al. (1982) reports low reliability statistics for the 
subscales o f  the questionnaire. H owever, from the original introduction o f  the Attribution  
Style Questionnaire am ong 130 undergraduate students (Peterson et al., 1982), the scale has 
been expanded (Peterson & Villanova, 1988) and there has been further discussion around  
further shortened versions (W hitley, 1991a,b; Peterson, 1991). Further, two recent papers m ake 
suggestions regarding how  the measurement o f  attribution style m ight be im proved  
(Kinderman & Bentall, 1996; X enikou, Fum ham  & McCarrey, 1997).
Kinderm an and Bentall (1996) have argued that there are lim itations with the use o f  the 
Attributional Style Questionnaire. Further, Kinderm an and Bentall argue that low  internal 
reliability o f  six subscales (internality, stability and globalness for good  and bad events) have 
led researchers to sum scores o f  internality, globalness and stability for positive and negative 
events. To specifically address issues with the m easurement o f  internal-external attributions, 
Kinderman and Bentall introduced the internal, personal and situational attributions 
questionnaire am ong 88 undergraduates. In this version o f  an A ttributional Style 
Questionnaire, the internal, external and circumstances aspects o f  attribution style are 
separated out to represent separate items. W ithin this, respondents are asked to select internal, 
external or circumstantial causes to events. Though this type o f  ipsative scoring m ethod  
presents difficulties in obtaining reliability measures, validity was found for this new measure 
o f  attributional style with measures o f  depression and the original measure o f  attribution style.
These sentim ents are echoed by X enikou et al. (1997). Though the original A ttribution Style 
Questionnaire (Peterson et al., 1982) sought to separate out good  and bad events, m any  
researchers produce com posite overall scores for good  and bad events (X enikou et al., 1997). 
H owever, this is not the recommended practice with the use o f  A ttributional Style 
Questionnaires (Peterson, 1991). This view  is confirmed am ong U K  sam ples by X enikou et al.
(1997) who found that factor analysis o f  attribution styles am ong 189 insurance staff suggests 
that attributions for good and bad events across internal-external, stable-unstable and global- 
specific do represent separate orthogonal dimensions.
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A t present the suggestions by Kinderman and Bentall (1996) and X enikou et al. (1997) 
suggest that Attribution Style m ight be better measured by dividing up attribution style into  
separate constructs and while m aking a distinction between good and bad events. H owever, 
this research can be extended in two ways. First, both research papers do not use exam ple  
scenarios from  the Attribution Style Questionnaire, but scenarios tailored towards the specific 
contexts o f  present research (occupational and social situations). Therefore, at present, there is 
no inform ation to whether researchers can use these suggested changes with the original 
attribution style questionnaire. Second, Kinderman and Bentalls’ (1996) use o f  separating out 
the internal-external dim ension was not extended to the stable-unstable and global-specific  
dim ensions. Therefore, the aim o f  the present study was to consider the suggestions m ade by 
Kinderm an and Bentall (1996) regarding the measurement o f  Attribution Style using the 
original version o f  the Attribution Style Questionnaire.
2. Method
2.1. Sample
Three hundred undergraduate students (140 males, 160 females) from  Sheffield H allam  
U niversity aged between 18 and 53 years (M ean =  25.22, SD  =  8.3) took  part in the study.
2.2. Measures
Respondents were administered the follow ing measures.
1. T he Attributional Style Q uestionnaire (Peterson et al., 1982).
2. T he Attribution Style Questionnaire, incorporating suggestions m ade by (K inderm an & 
Bentall, 1996). In this version, the com pletion instructions preceding the questionnaire were 
retained, but the opposing dim ensions were separated out; (1) Totally due to me, (2) Totally  
due to others, (3) Totally  due to other circumstances, (4) A lways present, (5) N ever present, 
(6) Just this situation and (7) A ll situations. Further a 7-point response form at was retained  
with available responses ranging from (1) Strongly agree, (2) Agree, (3) Slightly agree, (4) 
N o t certain, (5) Slightly disagree, (6) Disagree and (7) Strongly disagree.
The order o f  the presentation o f  the original and am ended version o f  the A ttribution Style 
Questionnaire was alternate for each questionnaire booklet administered so as to counteract 
any order effect. Scoring for each aspect o f  attribution style (internal, external, circum stantial, 
stable, unstable, global and specific) was divided between good and bad events.
Respondents were also administered the Beck D epression Inventory (Beck & Steer, 1993) 
and depression sym ptom s subscale from the General Health Q uestionnaire (G oldberg & 
W illiams, 1991). A s an additional concurrent validity check, a number o f  1-item measures were 
written to represent the separate dim ensions. These were:
•  the causes o f  good  things that happen to me are totally due to me;
•  the causes o f  good  things that happen to me are totally due to others;
•  the causes o f  good things that happen to me are due to  other circumstances;
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• the causes of good things that happen to me are never present in my life;
• the causes of good things that happen to me are always present in my life;
• the causes of good things that happen to me, happen in just a few situations;
• the causes of good things that happen to me, happen in all situations;
• the causes of bad things that happen to me are totally due to me;
• the causes of bad things that happen to me are totally due to others;
• the causes of bad things that happen to me are due to other circumstances;
• the causes of bad things that happen to me are never present in my life;
• the causes of bad things that happen to me are always present in my life;
• the causes of bad things that happen to me happen in just a few situations;
• the causes of bad things that happen to me happen in all situations.
3. Results
Scores for each possible measure o f  attribution style were com pared by order o f  
adm inistration. A n  independent groups /-test suggested no significant differences occurred 
between the order o f  the adm inistration o f  the original and am ended questionnaire (/ was no  
larger than 1.7 for any tests performed; P > 0.05).
Table 1 show s a breakdown o f  the internal reliability for each version o f  the attribution  
style, with satisfactory reliability suggested at above 0.7 (Kline, 1986). For the original version  
o f  the Attribution Style Questionnaire, all, except one (specific-global for bad events), o f  the 
subscales o f  attribution style fall below the 0.7 criteria. For the Kinderm an and Bentalls’ 
version o f  attribution style (using a 7-point response format) all internal reliability statistics 
dem onstrate adequate reliability.
Table 2 show s the correlations between the different formats o f  the Attribution Style 
Q uestionnaire, and scores on both indices o f  depression and corresponding 1-item measure o f  
attribution style by sex.
Table 1
This table shows a breakdown of the internal reliability for each version of the attribution style for the total sample
Original measure of attribution style Kinderman and Bentall (Response scale response)
6 good items 6 bad items 6 good items 6 bad items
Internal 0.79 0.74
External3 0.54 0.51 0.91 0.84
Circumstances3 0.88 0.83
Stable 0.58 0.66 0.93 0.91
Unstable 0.91 0.87
Global 0.54 0.80 0.87 0.90
Specific 0.91 0.93
a Represents the same end of the dimension for the original questionnaire.
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In terms o f  the relationship between the original version o f  the Attribution Style 
Q uestionnaire and the Beck Depression Inventory, internal, stable and global attributions for 
bad events are significantly positively associated with depressive sym ptom s, for both m en and  
wom en. For the original version o f  the Attribution Style Questionnaire and the depression  
measure contained within the General Health Questionnaire, am ong men, internal attributions 
for bad events are significantly positively associated with depression. A m ong w om en, internal 
attributions to  good  events are significantly positively associated with depression. In terms o f  
the Original Attribution Style, and the corresponding 1-item measures o f  attribution style (for 
each measure it can be argued there are two corresponding 1-item measures), am ong m en, 
internal and global attribution style to good and bad events, and a stable attribution style to 
good events shares a significant association with at least one o f  the two corresponding 1-item  
measure o f  attribution style. A m ong women, internal and stable attribution style to good  and 
bad events, and a global attribution style to good  events shares a significant association with at
least one o f  the two corresponding 1-item measures o f  attribution style.
For the Kinderman and Bentalls’ version o f  the questionnaire, am ong m en and w om en, an 
internal, stable and global attribution style to bad events share a significant positive 
relationship with both measures o f  depression for bad events, whilst an external, unstable and 
specific attribution style to good  events share a significant negative relationship with both  
measures o f  depression. Further, am ong men and wom en, all measures o f  attributions style 
share a significant positive association with its corresponding 1-item measure.
Further, Pearson product-m om ent correlation coefficients were com puted for each o f  the
subscales that had been separated out in the amended version o f  the Attribution Style 
Questionnaire. The Internal subscale shared a negative correlation with both External (good  
events, r =  —0.42, P <  0.01; bad events, r =  —0.47, P <  0.01) and Circumstances (good events, 
r=— 0.41, P < 0.01; bad events, r = — 0.43, P <  0.01) subscales. The External and  
Circumstances subscales shared a significant positive correlation (good  events, r = 0.52, P <
0.01; bad events, r = 0.51, P <  0.01). Further, a significant negative correlation occurred 
between both the Stable and Unstable subscales (good events, r = — 0.44 P <  0.01; bad events, 
r =  —0.49, P <  0.01), and the Global and Specific subscales (good events, r = — 0.50, P < 0.01; 
bad events, r = —0.52, P <  0.01).
4. Discussion
The aim o f  the present study was to consider the suggestions m ade by K inderm an and  
Bentall (1996) regarding changes to the measurement o f  Attribution Style using the original 
version o f  the Attribution Style Questionnaire.
The internal reliability statistics for the am ended measure o f  Attribution style are 
satisfactory and favourable to those reported for the subscales o f  the original version o f  the 
Attribution Style Questionnaire. Those reported for the Attribution Style Q uestionnaire are 
similar to those reported by the original authors (Peterson et al., 1982).
Further evidence o f  the validity o f  making am endm ents to the response form at o f  the 
A ttribution Style Questionnaire can be discussed in reference to  the relationship between scores 
on both the original and amended versions o f  the Attribution Style Q uestionnaire and
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corresponding scores on the measures of depression. For the amended version of the 
Attribution Style Questionnaire, for both men and women, an internal, stable and global 
attribution style to bad events share a significant positive relationship with depression, while an 
external, unstable and specific attribution style to good events share a significant positive 
relationship with depression. Among men and women, within the original version of the 
Attribution Style Questionnaire, the internal, stable and global attributions for bad events are 
only significantly positively correlated with depression as measured by the Beck Depression 
Inventory. This finding is consistent with previous research (Peterson & Villanova, 1988; 
Sweeney et al., 1986; Maltby et al., 1998). Therefore, at present, the amended version of the 
Attribution Style Questionnaire seems to provide a better predictor of depression scores, across 
two measures of depression. However, these findings need to be considered with caution, as the 
correlations reported in the present study, between the original Attribution Style Questionnaire 
and the depression measures, are lower than reported elsewhere (Sweeney et al., 1986).
Other validity for using the suggestions of Kinderman and Bentall (1996) can be found in 
the reported correlation between both the original and amended versions of the Attribution 
Style Questionnaire and corresponding 1-item measures of these constructs. The subscales 
contained within the amended version of the Attribution Style Questionnaire share consistent 
significant positive correlations with each of the corresponding 1-item measure of that 
construct. This finding is favourable to those correlations reported between the original version 
of the Attribution Style Questionnaire and the 1-item measures.
The relationship between the subscales of all aspects of the amended versions of the 
Attribution Style Questionnaire provides some interest. Consistent with theory (Peterson, 
Schwartz & Seligman, 1981), and the suggestions of Kinderman & Bentall (1996), are the 
findings that; the Internal Attribution Style subscale shares a significant negative relationship 
with External and Circumstances Attribution subscales, that the Stable Attribution Style 
subscale shares a significant negative relationship with Unstable Attribution subscales, and that 
the Global Attribution Style subscale shares a significant negative relationship with the Specific 
Attribution subscale. However, the correlations between each of the corresponding attribution 
sub-scales (internal, external and circumstances; global and specific; stable and unstable) are 
low, suggesting the subscales share no more than 27% of the variance. This may suggest that 
respondents are making finer distinctions between different attribution styles. However, such a 
problem is reminiscent of a debate that surrounded the definition and psychometric 
investigation of intrinsic (personal) and extrinsic (public) religiosity. Originally, Allport and 
Ross (1967) viewed these religious orientations as bi-polar, however extensive research revealed 
how these constructs needed to be separated out to give new useful underpinnings to the 
psychology of religion. These speculations may be over-stated, however, the low correlations 
between the Attribution Style subscales suggest the need to further examine this problem.
However, caution is required in interpreting the amended version of the Attribution Style 
Questionnaire over its original version, for a number of reasons. The first reason is the lack of 
generalizability and the use of a number of criteria variables used to establish the validity of 
the measures in the present study. The second reason is that there are limitations of the 
original version of the Attribution Style Questionnaire. Other authors have attempted to rectify 
problems with the original Attribution Style Questionnaire and have suggested improvements, 
such as the Expanded Attribution Style Questionnaire (Peterson & Villanova, 1988) and the
1054 L. D ay, J. M a ltb y  I P ersonality an d  Individual D ifferences 29 (2 0 0 0 ) 1047-1055
Attribution Style Questionnaire for general use (Dykema, Bergbower, Doctora & Peterson, 
1996).
Notwithstanding, the present study demonstrates that amendments to the original version of 
the Attributional Style Questionnaire suggest its improved reliability and validity as a measure 
of attributional style. These present findings do not negate the use of the original version of the 
Attribution Style Questionnaire, nor can the findings be used to overturn a history of research 
using the concept of attribution, particularly as this original version of the Attribution Style 
Questionnaire demonstrates some reliability and validity among the present sample. It would 
be of empirical interest to see how these amendments transfer to more frequently used 
measures of attribution style such as the Expanded Attribution Style Questionnaire (Peterson 
& Villanova, 1988) and the Attribution Style Questionnaire for general use (Dykema, et al., 
1996). Nevertheless, the present findings suggest that the amended version of the Attribution 
Style Questionnaire demonstrates satisfactory reliability, and demonstrates concurrent validity 
by its significant relationship with measures of depression and 1-item measures of attribution 
style. Consequently, the findings provide, using Kinderman and Bentalls’ (1996) suggestions 
regarding the measurement of attribution style among UK adults, a measure of attribution 
style that has adequate psychometric properties and has psychological relevance to the theory 
of depression.
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intrinsic orientation toward religion are described as wholly committed to their religious beliefs, 
and the influence of religion is evident in every aspect of their life (Allport, 1966). On the other 
hand, those who demonstrate an extrinsic orientation toward religion have been described as 
using religion to provide participation in a powerful in-group (Genia & Shaw, 1991), protection, 
consolation, and social status (Allport & Ross, 1967), religious participation (Fleck, 1981), and an 
ego defence (Kahoe & Meadow, 1981). However, due to a number of studies investigating the 
extrinsic orientation toward religion (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989; Gorsuch & Venable, 1983; King 
& Hunt, 1969; Leong & Zachar, 1990; Maltby, 1999), there is the strong suggestion that the extrinsic 
orientation towards religion comprises two dimensions, extrinsic-personal (protection, consolation) 
and extrinsic-social (religious participation, social status). Finally, a quest orientation toward reli­
gion typifies an individual for whom religious involvement is ‘an open-ended, responsive dialogue 
with existential questions raised by the contradictions and tragedies of life’ (Batson, Scheonrade, 
& Ventis, 1993). The quest orientation is thought to comprise three religious factors (Batson et 
al., 1993). The first is the ability to address existential questions without reducing their complex­
ity. The second is the tendency for the individual to perceive self-criticism and religious doubt as 
positive. The third is a tentativeness or openness to change in religious belief.
In regards to psychological well-being, there are three constructs of psychological well-being 
which dominate the literature on religious orientation and psychological well-being; depression, 
trait anxiety, and self-esteem (Batson et al., 1993; Batson & Ventis, 1982; Loewenthal, 1995; 
Wulff, 1997). Generally, studies are consistent in finding a significant negative correlation 
between an intrinsic orientation towards religion and depressive symptoms, trait anxiety and self­
esteem, and a significant positive correlation between extrinsic orientation towards religion, and 
depressive symptoms, trait anxiety and self-esteem (Baker & Gorsuch, 1982; Bergin, 1983; Genia, 
1996; Genia & Shaw, 1991; Koenig, 1995; Maltby & Day, 2000; Maltby, Lewis, & Day, 1999; 
Nelson, 1989, 1990; Park, Cohen, & Herb, 1990; Sturgeon & Hamley, 1979; Watson, Morris, & 
Hood, 1989).
A quest orientation towards religion is less often used in studies examining the relationship 
between religious orientation and psychological well-being (Wulff, 1997). In part, this is due to its 
relatively recent formulation as a dimension of religious orientation. However, when considering 
the three psychological well-being constructs (depression, anxiety and self-esteem) that are 
dominant in the intrinsic/extririsic religiosity literature, Genia (1996) reports a significant positive 
correlation between a Quest orientation towards religion and depression, and a significant negative 
relationship with higher self-esteem. However, other authors report no significant relationship 
between a quest orientation towards religion and depressive symptoms, trait anxiety and self-esteem 
(Maltby et al., 1999; Ryan, Rigby, & King, 1993).
However, this research has also been re-examined, with some authors suggesting that the 
theoretical guidance provided by making distinctions between certain sets of religious attitude, 
behaviors and beliefs is limited (Pargament, 1997). There have been attempts to conceptualise these 
relationships within a model of religious coping (Paragament, 1997). This theoretical perspective 
views religion as a coping process (Pargament, 1990; 1996; 1997; Pargament, Olsen, Reilly, Fal- 
gout, Ensing, & Vanhaitsma, 1992; Pargament & Park, 1995; Pargament, Smith, Koenig, & Perez, 
1998). Pargament (1990, 1997) and Pargament, Smith et al. (1998) suggest that a religious coping 
model might better explain the relationship between religiosity and psychological well-being. He 
argues that such a theoretical model addresses the complex and continuous process by which
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religion interlocks with an individual’s life and allows them to deal with stresses in life. Pargament
(1997) uses and extends coping theory, by arguing that religion may enter the coping process in a 
number of ways, with critical events, appraisals of situations, coping activities and outcomes, to 
which religion may be integral or external to these occurrences. There is some evidence for this view 
with religious coping thought to be a stronger predictor than religious orientation measures for 
scores on psychological well-being; with religious coping mediating the relationship between religious 
orientation and psychological well-being (Pargament, 1997; Pargament, Smith et al., 1998a).
There have been two ways that recent research has tried to examine these ideas within the 
context of psychological well-being. The first way is that Pargament and his colleagues have 
developed a number of measures of religious coping, ranging from those that concentrate on 
problem areas of religious coping (Pargament, Zinnbauer, et al., 1998), to identification of a 
number of dimensions of specific coping processes (Pargament, 1996; Pargament et al., 1992). 
However, Pargament, Smith et al. (1998) developed the RC0PE (and a shorter version, the brief 
RCOPE) which demonstrates a two-factor model of religious coping in response to stressful life 
events; positive and negative religious coping. The advantage of the RCOPE is that it covers a 
number of positive and negative religious coping styles including religious forgiveness, colla­
borative religious coping, spiritual connection, and religious purification. Pargament, Smith et al.
(1998) report that positive religious coping is associated with fewer symptoms of psychological 
distress, while negative religious coping was associated with higher levels of depression and 
reporting of psychological symptoms.
The second way is by examining other coping and psychological mechanisms that surround the 
relationship between religiosity and psychological well-being. A second way that the relationships 
between religious orientation and psychological well-being has been examined, within a coping 
model, is by exploring the relationships between religious orientation and psychological well­
being within existing theoretical explanations of coping (Maltby & Day, 2000). As such, these 
ideas reflect those of Pargament, but attempt to provide a theoretical basis to the relationship 
between religiosity and psychological well-being within a number of cognitive, personality and 
social psychology explanations of psychological well-being, such as optimism, attribution style, 
neuroticism, and coping style. Maltby and Day found some evidence to suggest that both the 
intrinsic and extrinsic distinctions account for unique variance outside cognitive and social 
psychology accounts of depressive symptoms.
However, these two models of examining factors in religious orientation and general health can 
be used together when considering the role of cognitive appraisals that are thought to be corre­
lated with psychological . .well-being. Ferguson, Matthews, and Cox (1999) introduced the 
Appraisal of Life Events (ALE) Scale, which measures three dimensions of primary appraisal: 
threat, challenge and loss .This measure was developed with the growing importance attached in 
health research to stress appraisal (Monroe & Kelly, 1995). Ferguson et al. (1999) developed the 
scale within the Cognitive Phenomenological model of stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), in 
which primary (the evaluation of the stressor) and secondary (the allocation of coping resources) 
stress appraisals are emphasised. As such, the appraisal of life events reveals individuals’ assess­
ment of the potential emotional impact of stressful events and these assessments reflect three 
dimensions; seeing stressful events as a challenge (allowing for individual growth and devel­
opment), threat (threatening and anxiety-provoking) and loss [aspects of loss and sadness; 
(Ferguson, 2000)].
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Using the General Health Questionnaire as an indicator of psychological well being (depression, 
anxiety, somatic symptoms, and social dysfunction), Ferguson et al. (1999) report that these three 
aspects of appraisal are significantly related to psychological well-being. Ferguson et al. (1999) found 
the use of Challenge Appraisals to be associated with better psychological well-being, and the use of 
both the Threat and Loss appraisals to be associated with poorer psychological well-being.
These relationships between appraisal of life and psychological well-being provide an opportu­
nity to describe the relationship between religious coping, religious orientation and psychological 
well-being within wider psychological theory. Pargament, Smith et al. (1998) maintains that it is 
better to view religiosity as interlocking with psychological well-being as a continual process. 
Therefore, an examination of the relationship between religious orientation, religious coping and 
cognitive primary appraisals will reveal how these aspects of religiosity are linked to cognitive 
processes that influence psychological well-being. If significant relationships were found between 
appraisals of stress, and both, or either, religious orientation and religious coping, this would 
provide researchers with a further understanding of the mechanisms that underpin the relation­
ship between religiosity and psychological well-being. The aim of the present study was to examine 
the relationship between religious orientation, religious coping and cognitive primary appraisals to 
assess possible factors in the relationship between religiosity and psychological well-being.
1. Study one
1.1. Method
1.1.1. Sample
Four hundred and sixty-six (239 men and 227 women) adults from the north of England, aged 
between 21 and 47 years (Mean = 34:02; S.D. = 5.04) took part in the study. Respondents were 
sampled from a number of workplaces, church congregations and local community groups. 
Among the sample, 277 respondents were white, 64 were Black Caribbean, 22 were Black Afri­
can, 99 were Black British and four reported to be Black other. Further, 222 of the sample were 
married, 163 were single, 32 separated and 49 were divorced; 304 were employed, 103 were 
unemployed but seeking work, 35 were unemployed, and 24 reported to be a house-husband or 
wife; and, in terms of highest! educational qualifications received, nine respondents had a 
postgraduate qualification, T il had a degree, 56 had attended college for at least 1 year, 95 
had an ‘A’ level or equivalent, 130 had ‘O’ level or equivalent and 65 had left school with no 
qualification.
1.1.2. Measures
A number of religiosity, spirituality, religious coping, personality, psychological well-being and 
coping measures were administered among the present sample.
1.1.2.1. The 'Age-Universal’ I-E Scale—12 (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983; Maltby, 1999). This scale 
is a derived, revised, and amended measure of the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 
1967). Since the inception of the Religious Orientation Scale, a number of suggestions have been 
made to improve psychometric confidence in the measurement of the intrinsic and extrinsic religious
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1 orientations. Suggestions have included item changes, changes in response format, and scoring
2 methods (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989; Gorsuch & Venable, 1983; King & Hunt, 1969; Leong &
3 Zachar, 1990; Maltby & Lewis, 1996). In the main, consideration of such changes suggests that the
4 intrinsic orientation towards religion is a constant feature of religious orientation, while an extrinsic
s orientation towards religion represents two separate factors; extrinsic-social and extrinsic-personal,
e The present scale administered is a 12-item version of the ‘Age-Universal’ Religious Orientation
7 Scale (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983) which adopts items suggested by Gorsuch and McPherson (1989),
e and changes to the response format (Maltby & Lewis, 1996). Maltby (1999) reports among 3300
9 USA, English and Irish adults, psychometric confidence in combining these suggestions to
10 measure intrinsic orientation towards religion (six-items), an extrinsic-personal orientation
11 towards religion (three-items) and extrinsic-social orientation towards religion (three-items).
12
13 1.1.2.2. A 12-item version of the Quest scale (Batson & Scheonrade, 1991a, 1991b). The scale
14 comprises three measures of a quest orientation toward religion, religious complexity, religious
15 doubt, and religious tentativeness or openness to change. Reported internal reliability statistics are 
is above 0.7 (Batson & Scheonrade, 1991a, 1991b) and the present version administered incorpo- 
17 rated some amendments to the response-format of The scale, and two re-written items to facilitate 
is the measurement of the quest orientation towards religion among samples comprising religious
19 and non-religious persons (Maltby & Day, 1998).
20 *
21 1.1.2.3. The brief RCOPE (Pargament, Smith et al., 1998). This religious coping measure is a 14-
22 item indicator of a 2-factor model of positive and negative religious coping. Positive coping items
23 include [‘I looked for a stronger connection with God’ (item 1), ‘Focused on religion to stop
24 worrying about my problems’ (item 7)], and negative religious coping items (‘Wondered whether
25 God had abandoned me’ (item 8), ‘Questioned the power of God’ (item 14)].
26
27 1.1.2.4. The Appraisal of Life Events Scale (Ferguson et al., 1999). The Appraisal of Life Events
28 (ALE) scale is a 16 item self-report adjective checklist designed to elicit participants’ appraisals of
29 a situation’s potential emotional impact (Ferguson, 2000). There are three dimensions of primary
30 appraisal: (1) Threat, (2) Challenge and (3) Loss (Ferguson, 2000). The scale comprises 16
31 adjectives to form the three dimensions: threat, challenge and loss (see Ferguson, Matthews, &
32 Cox, 1999). Each adjective is scored along a six point Likert-type scale (where 0 = Not at all to
33 5 = Very much so).
34
35 1.2. Results
36
37 Table 1 shows mean scores for all the variables by sex. Among the present sample, women
38 scored significantly higher than men for the majority of the religious measures, with the excep-
39 tions of negative religious coping (in which men score significantly higher than women) and
40 extrinsic-personal orientation towards religion (where no significant difference occurs for sex).
41 The finding, that women scored higher than men on many of the religiosity measures used in the
42 present study, are consistent with the general view that women are more religious than men (Beit-
43 Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997; Francis & Wilcox, 1994; Wulff, 1997). Among the other measures, men
44 were found to score significantly higher than women on the measures of threat and loss appraisals.
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Table 1
Mean scores and standard deviations o f all the scales by sex '
Scales Men (W= 239) Women (N = 221) t
1. Intrinsic 5.61 (2.7) 7.91 (2.9) -8 .83**
2. Extrinsic-Personal 4.17(1.4) 4.34 (1.2) = -1 .4 0
3. Extrinsic-Social 3.10(1.3) 3.63 (1.3) -4 .35**
4. Quest-Complexity 3.42 (1.6) 4.97 (2.1) . 1 OO VO # *
5. Quest-Doubt 4.51 (1.7) 5.00 (1.9) -2 .92**
6 . Quest-Tentativeness 3.25 (1.7) 3.84 (1.9) _ 3  5 7 **
7. Positive Religious Coping 9.10 (3.8) 12.3 (3.4) —9.47**
8 . Negative Religious Coping 9.06 (3.4) 8.10 (2.5) 3.43**
9. Challenge 5.45 (2.7) 5.11 (2.9) 1.30
10. Threat 15.8 (4.0) ; 12.6 (5.4) 7.31**
11. Loss 11.9 (2.5) 9.80 (3.3) 7.68**
14 *P<0.05; **P<0.01.15 -
16
17 Table 2 shows a correlation matrix between all the variables. 1 The correlations reveal a number
is of significant correlations between the religious orientation, religious coping, and stress appraisal
19 measures.
20 Due to the number of significant correlations, Table 3 shows the results of six standard multiple
21 regressions performed with each of the appraisals of stress measures (challenge, threat, and loss)
22 used as dependent variables, and the variables found to be significantly related to each appraisal
23 style, by sex.2 Included in this table is the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), the stan-
24 dardised regression coefficients (B), the semipartial correlations (sr2), r, r2 and adjusted r2.
25 Among males, the regression statistic (r) was significantly different from zero for challenge
26 appraisals CF(4 ,2 3 4) = 10.04, P < 0.001), threat appraisals {F^,\22,2) = 14.13, P<0.001), and loss
27 appraisals (F(4>2 3 4)= 13.07, P c 0.001). In ascending order, positive religious coping, intrinsic and
28 quest-complexity orientations toward religion account for unique variance in challenge apprai-
29 sals; extrinsic-social, quest-complexity, intrinsic orientations toward religion and negative reli-
30 gious coping account for unique variance in threat appraisals, and quest-tentativeness, extrinsic-
31 social, and quest-complexity orientations toward religion account for unique variance in loss
32 appraisals.
33 Among females, the regression statistic (r) was significantly different from zero for challenge
34 appraisals (P(3,2 2 3)= 12.45, P<0.001), threat appraisals (P(7 ,i2i9) = 24.91, P<0.001), and loss
35 appraisals (P(8 ,2 i8)= 11-10, P<0.001). Using an ascending order for each appraisal, positive reli-
36 gious coping accounts for unique variance in challenge appraisals, an intrinsic, extrinsic-social,
37 quest-tentativeness dnd quest-complexity orientations toward religion account for unique vari-
38 ance in threat appraisals, and a quest-tentativeness and quest-complexity orientations toward
39 religion account for unique variance in loss appraisals.
40
41 1 To facilitate comparisons with previous research total scores for both the extrinsic and quest orientations towards
42 religion are also included in this matrix.
43 2 Loss, Threat and Challenge appraisals theoretically and empirically have been shown to be distinct factors (Fer-
44 guson et al., 1999) and therefore these were not used as independent variables in the analysis.
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Table 3
Standard multiple regressions performed with each o f the appraisal o f  stress measures (Challenge, Threat, and Loss) 
used as dependent variables, and the variables found to be significantly related to each appraisal style, by sex
Males (A''=239) Females (N =  227)
Scales B Beta Sr2 Scales B Beta Sr2
Challenge
Positive Religious Coping 0.22 0.32 0.10** Positive Religious Coping 0.25 0.29 0.08**
Quest-Complexity —0.21 -0 .1 2 0.01* Extrinsic-Social -0 .2 6  -0 .11
Negative Religious Coping —0.09 -0 .01
Intrinsic Religious Orientation —0.15 -0 .1 5 0.02*
r2 =  0.15 72 =  0.10
Adj 72 =  0.13 Adj t2 =  0.09
r= 0.38 7 =  0.32
Threat
Quest-Complexity —0.61 -0 .2 4 0.06** Intrinsic, 1 O l/l OO 1 o 0.10**
Extrinsic-Social 0.92 0.31 0.10** Quest-Complexity -0 .4 2  -0 .1 6 0.03*
Positive Religious Coping —0.11 -0 .11 Quest-Teritativeness -0 .5 4  -0 .1 9 0.04**
Negative Religious Coping 0.19 0.17 0.03* Positive Religious Coping -0 .1 6  -0 .1 0
Intrinsic Religious Orientation —0.30 -0 .2 0 0.04** Extrinsic Social 0.84 0.20 0.04**
Quest-Doubt -0 .2 7  -0 .0 9
r2 =  0.23 t2 =  0.41
Adjr2 =  0.22 Adj t2 =  0.39
r =  0.48 7 =  0.64
Loss
Extrinsic-Social 0.46 0.24 0.06** Quest-Tentativeness 0.44 0.26 0.07**
Quest-Complexity —0.33 -0 .2 0 0.04** Quest-Complexity -0 .2 8  -0 .1 8 0.03*
Quest-Tentativeness 0.29 0.19 0.04** Intrinsic -0 .2 1  -0 .1 9 0.03*
Negative Religious Coping 0.07 0.06
Quest-Doubt 0.04 0.03
Positive Religious Coping -0 .01  0.02
r2 = 0.14 t2 =  0.23
Adjr2 = 0.13 Adj t2 =  0.21
r =  0.38 7=0.48
1.3. Discussion
The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between religious orientation, 
religious coping and appraisals of stress. A number of patterns emerge when considering each of 
the cognitive appraisals of stress.
First, among both men and women, positive religious coping accounts for the largest amount of 
unique variance in the use of challenge appraisals. This finding suggests that individuals, who use 
positive religious coping, adopt a positive view to stress, interpreting stressful events as allowing 
for personal development and growth.
Secondly, the quest-complexity and extrinsic-social orientations towards religion are found to 
account for unique variance in the use of the threat and loss appraisals among both men and
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1 women, with the extrinsic-social orientation positively correlated, and quest-complexity correlated
2 negatively with both of these appraisal constructs. The finding that an extrinsic orientation
3 towards religion is related to viewing stressful events as anxiety provoking (threat) and reflecting
4 aspects of loss and sadness (loss) is consistent with the view that extrinsic-social religious orien-
5 tation is associated with poorer psychological well-being. Further, it would also seem that indi-
6 viduals who are unable to address existential questions without reducing their complexity tend to
7 view stressful events as either a threat or loss. As such, these findings support the view that more
8 reflective aspects of religious orientation (quest) are related to cognitive appraisals. Some further
9 support for this view is found in that the quest-tentativeness religious orientation is negatively
10 related to the use of threat (among men only) and loss appraisals (among men and women). This
11 finding suggests that individuals who are not open to changes in religious belief tend to use these
12 mal-adaptive cognitive appraisals.
13 Thirdly, an intrinsic orientation towards religion is negatively related to the use of threat
14 appraisals. This finding is generally consistent with the view that intrinsic religiosity is often
15 associated with better psychological well-being.
16 Further to these patterns, among men, both the quest-complexity and intrinsic religious orien-
17 tations account for unique variance in scores on the challenge appraisal measure, and negative 
is religious coping accounts for unique variance in the use of threat appraisals. As such, these
19 f i n d in g s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  m a le s  d i s p la y in g  th e s e  a s p e c ts  o f  r e l ig io s i ty  t e n d  t o  a p p r o a c h  s t r e s s f u l  e v e n ts
20 using these types of appraisals.
21 However, the four main patterns that emerge from the findings begin to describe and extend the
22 view of the psychological mechanisms that surround the relationship between religious orienta-
23 tio n , relig iou s c o p in g  and  p sy ch o lo g ica l w ell-b eing . In  term s o f  relig iou s o r ien ta tio n , researchers
24 can begin to view an extrinsic-social orientation towards religion (in terms of making threat and
25 loss appraisals), a quest-complexity orientation towards religion (in terms of not making threat
26 and loss appraisals), intrinsic orientation (in terms of not making threat appraisals), and a quest-
27 tentativeness orientation towards religion (in terms of not making loss appraisals) as the
28 mechanisms that are important to psychological well-being. Further, in terms of religious coping,
29 individuals using positive religious coping tend to interpret stressful events as challenging. As
30 such, these conclusions begin to describe the psychological processes that may underpin the
31 relationships between religiosity and psychological well-being, and suggest that the cognitive
32 appraisals that individuals make may be important mediators in these relationships. From this,
33 three theoretical models can be suggested using those findings that are replicated across male and
34 female samples (see Fig. 1).
35 In the first model (Fig. la), it is argued that challenge appraisals are important in the relation-
36 ship between religious coping and psychological well-being. The theory underlying this model
37 suggests that challenge stress appraisals are an important aspect to the relationship between
38 positive religious coping and psychological well-being. This model suggests that those individuals
39 for whom religiosity reflects positive religious coping are able to appraise stressful events as
40 allowing personal growth and development and these appraisals have a positive influence on
41 psychological well-being.
42 In the second model (Fig. lb), it is argued that threat appraisals are important in the relation-
43 ship between the extrinsic-social, intrinsic, and quest-complexity orientations toward religion and
44 psychological well-being. That is, that those individuals high in extrinsic-social orientation
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(a) Relieious Coping-Challenge-Psvchological Well-being
Positive Religious 
Coping
Challenge
Appraisals
Psychological
Well-being
fb') Religious Orientation-Threat Appraisals-Psvchological Well-being
9 Extrinsic-Social
10 Religious Orientation
11 Intrinsic Threat Psychological
12 Religious Orientation Appraisals " " ^ Well-being
13
14 Quest-Complexity
15 Religious Orientation
Quest-Complexity 
Religious Orientation
(c) Religious Orientation-Loss Appraisals -Psychological Well-being
21 Loss ------------------ —► Psychological
22 y  " Appraisals Well-being
Quest-Tentativeness 
Religious Orientation
Fig. 1. Three models o f  religious orientation, religious coping, appraisals o f  stress, and psychological well-being.
37
38
39
40
41
42
towards religion, and demonstrating low levels of intrinsic and quest-complexity orientations 
toward religion, tend to view stressful events as threatening and this leads to poorer psychological 
well-being. i,
In the third model (Fig. lc), it is argued that loss appraisals are important in the relationship 
between the quest-complexity and quest-tentativeness orientations toward religion and psycho­
logical well-being. Among these variables it could be suggested that those individuals scoring 
higher in a quest-tentativeness orientation towards religion and scoring lower in a quest-com­
plexity orientation towards religion tend to view stressful events as threatening, and this leads to 
poorer psychological well-being.
These models can be investigated, by linking religious orientation, religious coping and stress 
appraisals to psychological well-being, and by comparing whether cognitive appraisals of stress 
are important factors in the relationship between religiosity and psychological well-being. The 
aim of study two was to examine these possible models that link the relationship between reli­
gious orientation, religious coping and psychological well-being using measures of primary 
appraisals of stress.
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2. Study two
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Sample
Three hundred and sixty (187 men and 173 women) adults from the north of England, aged 
between 21 and 47 years (Mean = 33.87; S.D.=4.97) took part in the study. Respondents were 
sampled from a number of workplaces, church congregations and local community groups. 
Among the sample, 235 respondents were white, 45 were Black Caribbean, six were Black Afri­
can, 70 were Black British and four reported to be Black other. Further, 170 of the sample were 
married, 127 were single, 37 separated and 26 were divorced; 237 were employed, 78 were unem­
ployed but seeking work, 24 were unemployed, and 21 reported to be a house-husband or wife; 
and, in terms of highest educational qualification received, seven respondents had a postgraduate 
qualification, 84 had a degree, 47 had attended college for at least 1 year, 73 had an ‘A’ level or 
equivalent, 99 had ‘O’ level or equivalent and 50 had left school with no qualifications.
2.1.2. Measures
A number of religiosity, spirituality, religious coping, personality, psychological well-being and 
coping measures were administered among the present sample.
1. The ‘Age-Universal’ I-E Scale—12 (Gorsuch & Venable, 1983; Maltby, 1999)
From this scale, indices of Extrinsic-Social and Intrinsic religious orientation was derived.
2. A 12-item version of the Quest scale (Batson & Scheonrade, 1991a, 1991b)
From this measure indices of quest-complexity and quest-tentativeness orientations toward 
religion was derived.
3. The brief RCOPE (Pargament et al., 1998a)
From this a measure of positive religious coping was derived.
4. The Appraisal of Life Events Scale (Ferguson et al., 1999).
5. The General Health Questionnaire—28 (Goldberg & Williams, 1991). Each of these scales 
comprise seven-item measures of depressive symptoms, anxiety symptoms, social dysfunction 
and somatic symptoms.
2.2. Results
Table 4 shows a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient matrix between all the variables. 
The correlations reveal a number of significant correlations between the religious orientation, 
religious coping, stress appraisal and psychological well-being measures. More specifically, sig­
nificant correlations can be found that replicate the findings in Study 1, and, in addition, are con­
sistent with each of the proposed models. For the first model, positive religious coping is significantly 
associated with the use of challenge appraisals, and both these variables share a significant negative 
correlation with the four indices of psychological well-being. For the second model, intrinsic, 
extrinsic-social, quest-complexity orientations toward religion, threat appraisals, and the mea­
sures of psychological well-being are significantly related in the expected directions, and are
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consistent with the findings in study one. Similarly, for the third model, quest-complexity and 
quest-tentativeness orientations toward religion, loss appraisals, and the measures of psycholo­
gical well-being are significantly related in the expected directions, and those consistent with the 
findings in study one. These correlations suggest that among the present sample the three models 
are suitable to be analysed for good-fit.
The models were analysed using PRELIS and LISREL 8. The following LISREL analysis was' 
assessed on the co-variance matrices. PRELIS analysis was used to assess the univariate and multi­
variate normality of the measured variables. Kurtosis statistics to assess univariate and multivariate 
normality were all non-significant. The model parameters were estimated using LISREL 8.
For each of the models, separate analyses were run for each of the psychological well-being 
measures (depression, anxiety, social dysfunction and somatic symptoms). Table 5 shows the 
goodness of fit statistics reported for each of the models using cut-off criteria of 0.95 for the ML 
based statistics (TLI, IFI, CFI; Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Using the goodness of fit indices, the Religious Coping-Challenge-Psychological Well-being 
model, for depression and anxiety, presents a good description of the data. However, the indicators 
of good-fit do not suggest the other models present a good description of the data.
2.3. Discussion
The present findings suggest importance be attached to the theory that the use of challenge 
appraisals is an important factor in examining the relationship between positive religious coping 
and the four indices of psychological well-being. This model suggests that individuals who use
Table 5
Goodness-of-Fit statistics for each o f  the models3
X 2 GFI AGFI NFI TLI (NNFI) CFI IFI (BL89)
Model 1 
Depression 4.68 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96
Anxiety 0.56 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98
Social Dysfunction 13.66 0.98 0.85 0.87 0.71 0.88 0.87
Somatic Symptoms 6.76 0.99 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.92
M odel 2
Depression 102 59 0.91 0.55 0.54 0.48 0.57 0.54
Anxiety 66.93 0.94 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.60 0.68
Social Dysfunction 79.66 0.93 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.55 0.62
Somatic Symptoms 79.52 0.93 0.63 0.60 0.62 0.57 0.63
M odel 3
Depression 63.03 0.94 0.70 0.67 0.66 0.60 0.66
Anxiety 65.38 0.94 0.69 0.64 0.64 0.59 0.67
Social Dysfunction 53.94 0.95 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.63 0.72
Somatic Symptoms 47.69 0.95 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.65 0.74
3 M odel 1: Religious Coping-Challenge-Psychological Well-being model; M odel 2: Orientation-Threat Appraisals- 
Psychological Well-being; Model 3: Religious Orientation-Loss Appraisals-Psychological Well-being.
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1 positive religious coping are able to view stressful events as opportunities for positive growth and
2 development, and that this has a positive effect on psychological well-being. Therefore, the pre-
3 sent findings begin to characterise a full account of the psychological processes involved in the
4 relationship between positive religious coping and psychological well-being.
s However, no support is found for the other models developed. Therefore the correlation
6 between religious orientation and threat and loss appraisals need to be further considered and
7 conceptualised. It is then suggested that further research still seeks to employ all measures of
8 religious orientation and religious coping, when further examining these ideas, to ensure that the
9 significant variables found in this study are not just specific to the present sample.
10 Within the present study clear distinctions emerge between religious coping and religious
11 orientation, and their relationship to stress appraisal and coping. In terms of religious coping, it
12 would seem that the emphasis in further research should be on those positive aspects of belief,
13 appraisal and psychological well-being. This is sometimes a neglected emphasis within the psy-
14 chology of religion, whereby positive outlook and outcomes are central to the research questions.
15 Future research should explore whether other religious attitudes and behaviours, particularly
16 those that emphasise positive outcomes, such as optimism, positive affect, satisfaction or high
17 self-esteem can be considered within these positive aspects to religion (e.g. Jung, 1933).
is With the measures of religious orientation there are some different conclusions. Though both
19 intrinsic, extrinsic, quest-complexity orientations towards religion are related to primary apprai-
20 sals (threat and loss), no support is found for models that incorporate these relationships to
21 understand the relationship between religiosity and psychological well-being. However, the pre-
22 sent findings suggest that, although there is a dominance of intrinsic and extrinsic orientation
23 towards religion in the religious-well-being literature, there is some added value in viewing the
24 quest orientations towards religion as important in the relationship between religious orientation
25 and primary appraisals.
26 Together, the present findings provide insight into the different ways religious orientation and
27 religious coping are related to the different ways of approaching stress. Further, the present
28 studies provide support for a theory that suggests that positive religious coping engenders a
29 challenge approach to stress that aids psychological well-being.
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